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History

Pennsylvania Politics, 1854-1860
Director: Harry W. Fritz
Based heavily on the use of personal correspondence, newspapers, and political
platforms, the following study covers the triumph of the Republican party in
Pennsylvania between 1854 and 1860. As the failures of competing political
organizations were fundamental to the success of the Republican party, the
breakup of the Whig party, the rise and fall of the Know Nothing movement, and
the disruption of the Democratic party also figure prominently.
Between 1856 and 1860 the Pennsylvania Republican party increased the expanse
of its political precepts yet strengthened its centrifugal cohesion. Devotion to Free
Labor principles, and a commitment to stopping the slave power were central
principles of the party. The Democratic and American parties meanwhile, failed
to maintain such a cohesive commitment to a core ideal. Throughout the era, the
problems of the intensifying sectional schism-specifically the future of slaveryplayed a predominate role in political rhetoric and ideology. Though a
combination of principles both economic and social also drew voters to the
Republican party, the fundament commitment to antislavery precepts remained a
central feature of the party in Pennsylvania. The victory of Lincoln in 1860 placed
Pennsylvania firmly within the camp of northern sectionalism.
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INTRODUCTION

Readers will quickly notice that the following study is heavily influenced
by the looming prospect of the American Civil War. Knowledge that the election
of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 ultimately produced the bloodiest conflict in
American history could not be ignored. Furthermore, any examination of
antebellum Pennsylvania politics must confront the reality that the Keystone State
provided the final margin of victory for Lincoln. However, mid nineteenthcentury Pennsylvanians had no way of foreseeing such an outcome. Although
/

sectional issues, especially the debate over the future of slavery, were prevalent in
politics during the years before the war, they were not the be all and end all.
Voters confronted a host of political issues that had little to do with slavery
throughout the 1850’s. Immigration, temperance, taxes, railroads, and religion
were all hotly debated political items right up to the firing on Fort Sumter. Many
recent historians have argued that state and local issues were more likely to bring
a voter to the polls or keep him at home during these years.
Though this study in no way seeks to repudiate the works that have so
illuminated the depth and nuance of antebellum politics, its most lasting
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contribution may be to entrench the notion that antislavery rhetoric did indeed
matter to the final triumph of Lincoln. That conclusion could not be denied as I
examined rolls of newspaper microfilm and shifted through crumbling old letters.
It was actually surprising to encounter the volume of antislavery and anti-southern
propaganda that jumped out of Keystone Republican editorials, letters, platforms,
and speeches. During the 1860 Presidential election the Republican newspaper of
the state capital of Harrisburg printed more editorials on slavery than all but one
topic; a trait shared by most Republican papers throughout the state.1 Only the
most conservative Republicans tried to keep slavery in the shadows, and even
they occasionally took positions that no southerner would publicly support.
Pennsylvania’s other major parties also dealt extensively with slavery politics if
often defensively. The slavery question was an inescapable feature of antebellum
Pennsylvania politics.
Newspaper editorials, political correspondence and speeches, and party
platforms have provided the bulk of primary sources for this study. Critical
observers will note the lack of legislative roll-call analysis and voter regression
estimates in this study. Though I fully adhere to the importance of these tools, the
primary goal of the project was to discuss the development of party ideology and
rhetoric as presented to the public. No statewide survey of Pennsylvania’s
antebellum politics has yet addressed these critical themes satisfactorily. A fulllength regression analysis is needed for Pennsylvania-and perhaps a future
1 Survey o f Harrisburg Telegraph, June through October 1860. The most common editorials were
general attacks on the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. Sixteen articles dealt with issues
related to slavery, twenty-four attacked the candidate. The next most common topic was the tariff
with ten articles. Of papers surveyed only Philadelphia’s North American broke the trend.
Praising the moderation o f Abraham Lincoln was the top priority o f the North American.
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edition of this study will include one--but the following provides valuable and
necessary background for future work.

CHAPTER 1
The Keystone of the Union
Pennsylvania Politics: Motivation and Heritage

The presses in the sleepy little village of Gettysburg, soon to be
immortalized in American history, teemed with revolutionary political rhetoric
during the summer and autumn of 1860. Recalling the perils and patriotism of an
earlier era, the town’s Republican mouthpiece, the Adams Sentinel, called on all
men who “desire to restore the Government to the purity of the Founder’s
Republic,” to pledge their votes that year to Abraham Lincoln and the rest of the
national, state, and local Republican ticket. Those in “favor of adequate protection
[for] the languishing Industrial Interests of the country—who are opposed to
extending the blightening {sic} curse of Slavery to the Free Territories of the
Union,” and who wished to save the West for “White Freemen,” were duty-bound
to expel the shameful Democratic administration from office. Such inflammatory
anti-southern and antislavery rhetoric would have won scant support in
Gettysburg, or the state as a whole, just a few years earlier. Many Pennsylvanians
proudly proclaimed that their state stood in the middle of the two sections both
literally and politically. Antislavery radicalism traditionally was not quite as
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strong in Pennsylvania as it was in New England or New York. Abolitionists were
denied access to a Philadelphia meetinghouse in early 1861, for fear they would
provoke a riot. The Free Soil party had not been popular in the state in 1848 or
1852. James Buchanan, the sitting President and a resident of Lancaster, was
highly sympathetic to the fears that southerners expressed over the growth of the
antislavery movement. Pennsylvania had rejected Republican radicalism in 1856
by awarding a landslide victory to her favorite son; many felt the same was
possible four years later. In 1860 however, the Adams Sentinel and the
Republicans of Gettysburg had no place for reactionary policies or quiet
submissiveness to southern braggadocio. The “supremacy of the Constitution”
could crush any of the “conspiracies and threats of Secessionists and
Disunionists.” If such talk could win converts in Gettysburg, which lay just miles
from slave-holding Maryland, then perhaps the old Keystone State was no longer
in the middle of the nation. The open demand for a revolutionary change in
slavery policy across the state in 1860 indicates that Pennsylvania had become
more like its northern neighbors than many of its residents would willingly admit.
While antebellum political parties approached each election as if the very
survival of the republic depended upon the correct result, the excitement of 1860
was quite different. An unknown number of Gettysburg’s citizens took an oath in
the Republican Wide Awake organization, pledging, “to resist by all
Constitutional means [slavery’s] further extension.” The paramilitary character of
the Wide Awakes, who marched through Gettysburg nightly by torchlight and
drilled with various weapons in support of their candidates, was quite ominous for

6
the future of the American Union. What were Pennsylvania’s southern neighbors
to think of such matters?
Between 1856 and 1860 the Republican party won over the majority of the
tiny town’s voters, even though they had never shown such a proclivity for
antislavery politics. On November 7,1860, Abraham Lincoln received 259 of
Gettysburg’s 484 votes, a large increase over the 1856 Republican candidate’s total.
Adams County gave Lincoln an eighty-vote margin over the Democratic ticket. By
1860 the vote in Adams resembled the counties of Massachusetts more than Carroll
Country Maryland, which bordered it to the south. Carroll Country gave Lincoln
only 59 votes, Democrats received 2,000 votes, while Constitutional Union
nominee John Bell won the county with 2,295. Only twelve years earlier the vote in
Carroll County and Adams County had been quite similar. Whig Zachary Taylor
had won both counties in relatively close races. The situation in 1860 was
drastically different.3 The goal of this study is to account for this change.
The partisan rhetoric of Gettysburg’s Republican newspaper editors and
Wide Awake leaders cannot fully explain the turnaround in Adams County, or the
state as a whole. The seemingly high-minded principles of Republicanism,
especially opposition to the extension of slavery, have rightfully been emphasized
in most studies of Civil War era politics. These principles were central to the
establishment of the party’s identity throughout Pennsylvania, and will indeed be
2 The principles o f Republicanism, which headed all announcements o f public People’s party—as
the Republican party was known—gatherings, can be found in all summer and autumn editions o f
the Adams Sentinel. The Wide Awake constitution appears in the October 9, 1860 issue. The
military nature o f the Wide Awakes receives revealing coverage in the Pittsburgh Gazette, June
13, 1860.
3 Borough and township returns for Adams County are in the November 14th issue. All county
Presidential returns are taken from Walter Dean Burnham, Presidential Ballots, 1836-1896
(Baltimore, 1955).
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stressed in this study. But they cannot entirely explain why people voted for or
against the Republican party. Attempting to discover the reasoning of even a
negligible percentage of the state’s electorate would be an exhaustively futile
undertaking; nonetheless, it is clear that countless voters made their decisions to
vote for or against the antebellum Republican party for less idealistic reasons. The
various issues associated with slavery were not decisive for every voter. One
declared that he had helped elect the man whom he derisively referred to in 1864
as “Leancom” simply because, “he had wanted change.”4 In antebellum
Pennsylvania making the decision to vote for a party, whatever its principles or its
platform, could come down to the crudest of all motivations.
In January 1857, Keystone Republicans were surprisingly confident that
they could elect their man to the available U. S. Senate seat, despite their fivevote minority in the joint state assembly. Democrats, meanwhile, were panicking.
Divided over the dictation of their senatorial nomination by President James
Buchanan, they secretly feared that Republicans could defeat them with a not so
secrete weapon. That weapon was Simon Cameron, a man with many friends and
deep pockets. Democratic fears were justified. For with the help of three
Democrats who bolted the party, Cameron was elected Senator amid much
clamor. In many ways Cameron, who would come to dominate Pennsylvania’s
Republican party, embodied the state on the eve of the Civil War.5

4 Isaac Metzler quoted in Arnold M. Shankman, The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 1861- 1865
(Cranbury, New Jersey, 1980), 186.
5 The coverage of the 1857 Senatorial election is based on many secondary sources, including
Edwin Bradley, Simon Cameron: Lincoln's Secretary o f War (Philadelphia, 1966) and Alexander
K. McClure, Old Time Notes o f Pennsylvania, I (Philadelphia, 1905). Bradley’s work is the best
and most thorough work on Cameron. Bradley gives Cameron’s career a much more positive spin,
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By 1857 Simon Cameron had already earned a reputation as an
unscrupulous political schemer. Yet Cameron had also earned widespread respect
and devotion from his followers and friends. Possessing the needed skills of any
machine politician, Cameron used all his virtues and vices to gain control of the
Republican party in Pennsylvania. Those who fell victim to Cameron’s power
almost to a man despised him, but those who earned his confidence could hardly
say they had a truer friend. Bom into poverty and orphaned at a young age, the
tale of Cameron’s rise to power could probably top any Horatio Alger success
story. By the 1850’s he was a wealthy ironmaster and held investments in various
Pennsylvania industries and companies. The political empire that was in place by
his second trip to the Senate—he had also served as a Democrat in the late 1840’s-would last into the twentieth century. In many ways the personal success of
Simon Cameron and the political success of the Republican party in Pennsylvania
were linked. Pennsylvania had no leader comparable to William Henry Seward, or
Salmon Portland Chase. When Lincoln selected a representative from
Pennsylvania for his cabinet he chose Cameron, not Thaddeus Stevens, a vocal
critic of slavery who also felt he deserved a cabinet position. Just as he had done
so often in Pennsylvania, Cameron earned Lincoln’s trust, despite his stormy
short-lived stint as Secretary of War. When Lincoln’s electoral fortunes looked
dim during the summer of 1864, he turned to Cameron to work his magic once
again in Pennsylvania. And as he had done so often, Cameron came through.
Even Alexander K. McClure, one of his political competitors readily saw the
especially compared to the treatment he has received from many historians including Allan Nevins
and James McPherson.
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skills of Cameron. “He was far-seeing,” McClure admitted in his memoirs, “knew
the precise value of men, would commend influences by the most circuitous
methods, and was tireless in managing his organization.”6
Cameron’s 1857 election to the Senate resulted both from his adeptness as
a political manager of his own flock and his notorious ability to influence those
men whom he considered potential supporters. For whatever reason, Cameron
was able to get three Democrats to risk their reputations and even their physical
safety to vote him into the Senate. After meeting with Cameron at his Harrisburg
hotel room, William Lebo, Samuel Manear, and G. A. Wagonseller declared their
votes for Cameron. It was immediately alleged that the three had been bribed, and
that may very well be the case, but there had been clear dissension in Democratic
ranks leading up to the election. John W. Forney, whom Buchanan had practically
demanded be elected, was an even more divisive character than Cameron.
Secretly, many Democrats felt his selection was a mistake; others openly admitted
that they would not vote for him.
As the election approached Republicans knew that they might be able to
count on Cameron’s legendary connections to turn the tide. Even former foe
Thaddeus Stevens felt that Cameron was the right man in 1857. “I have every
reason to believe,” he wrote E. D. Gazzam “that he can get enough of his old
friends to elect him.” The late-night meeting the day before the election between
Cameron and the three men merely provided the guarantee that these votes were

6 McClure, O ld Time Notes, I, 436.
7 G. R. Barrett to William Bigler, January 14, 1857, Bigler Papers, HSP.
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coming. It only took one ballot to achieve Cameron’s victory--and that might
have been his only chance—but the stunning result would not soon be forgotten.

Q

The three ‘traitors’ were quickly read out of the Democratic party. No
hotel in Harrisburg would grant them a room for the remainder of the legislative
session. Their political careers were over; only Lebo continued to serve in the
Cameron army after 1857. The vitriolic criticism annunciated by Democratic
journals and politicians on Cameron was scathing, hardly letting up for weeks.
William Bigler, who occupied Pennsylvania’s other Senate seat, called for a
Congressional investigation of the election. However, to the outrage of most
Democrats, Cameron was able to take his seat that autumn. The Senate Judiciary
Committee could not find sufficient evidence to launch an investigation.
Pennsylvania Republicans had won their first major victory.
Although it seems obvious that the motivations of those who attended the
various Republican rallies mentioned in the Adams Sentinel, and the three
Democrats who gave their votes to Cameron were not the same, both methods
produced the same result, a victory that outraged Democrats. “Whether we view
the result as an act of justice to you,” explained one of the many congratulations
offered to Cameron that January, “[or] the repudiation of Fomey-the rejection of
Presidential dictation-the endorsement of sound Americanism, or the expression
of hostility to the extension of slavery, it cannot but be highly gratifying to every
lover of our institutions.”9 Simply put, the accomplishment of Cameron’s victory

8 Stevens quoted in Bradley, Cameron, 116; Also see Pittsburgh Gazette, January 14, 1857; P.
Hamman, November 18, 1856, J. Madeia, November 28, among many others, to Cameron,
Cameron papers, DCHS.
9 Stephen Miller to Cameron, January 13, Cameron papers, DCHS.
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encompassed a diverse array of political doctrines and interests. The same could
be said of the other major Republican victories that followed. Yet despite its
diversity, the Pennsylvania Republican party was able to achieve a cohesion
cemented by a core devotion to a section-wide principle. Even if not all
Pennsylvanians voted for the party because of this core belief, it cannot be
forgotten that the opposition to the spread of slavery and its political agenda was
what held the Republican coalition together in Pennsylvania.
Using a multitude of methods, and making a wide range of promises,
denials, and attacks, the Pennsylvania Republican party was able in a relatively
short five-year period, to win over the votes of a majority of the state’s electorate.
Its eventual victory outraged Democrats who saw their defeat as the end of
Pennsylvania’s position as a sensible bulwark between two extremes. In many
ways the downtrodden Democrats were right. By 1860 it was hard to make the
argument that Pennsylvania was still the Keystone of the Union. Instead, it had
firmly placed itself along side of its northern neighbors. The history of
Pennsylvania before the 1850’s had shown few signs that this development was
inevitable. Pennsylvania’s path to the crisis of 1860 was in many ways uniqueand in some ways unforeseen—but it shared with its peers the ultimate outcome of
that change.
I
Pennsylvania was second only to New York State as the political and
economic powerhouse of the Union during the 1850’s.10 Although the power and

10 The most recent general history of Pennsylvania is: Philip S. Klein and Ari Hoogenboom, A
History o f Pennsylvania (New York, 1973).
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influence of the Middle Atlantic states was shrinking, as Midwestern states like
Illinois began to assert their economic and political power, Pennsylvania still
remained the second most significant state in the Union on the eve of the Civil
War.11 As sectional tensions intensified, the politics of the Keystone State became
even more crucial. Pennsylvania possessed twenty-seven electoral votes in 1860,
a number large enough to attract close attention from national political leaders and
organizers throughout the antebellum era. Securing the state’s Presidential vote
was critically important to the election of most antebellum Presidents. By 1860,
the outcome of the Presidential contest in Pennsylvania was critical to the survival
of the Union itself.
Situated in the middle of the original thirteen colonies, Pennsylvania had
earned its sobriquet the ‘Keystone State’ as a result of its ties with both of the
country’s main sections. Lacking the evangelical tradition of New England and
sharing much of the same ethnic and cultural heritage as parts of the South,
Pennsylvania arguably resembled Virginia more than Massachusetts at the
nation’s birth. Although the southern-born population of Pennsylvania had
declined considerably by the 1850’s, the state had once been the destination of
many southern emigrants. In 1860 Pennsylvania still contained a number of
former Maryland and Virginia residents in southwestern counties of Fayette,
Washington, and Greene. Philadelphia also housed a number of southern-born
residents. One prominent Philadelphian, General Robert Patterson, who was the
first in a long line of northern generals to fail in the Shenandoah Valley during the

11 Pennsylvania is technically a commonwealth, but I will forego using this term.

Civil War, owned a large number of slaves in the South. The city’s University of
Pennsylvania Medical College yearly graduated more southern doctors than all of
the South’s few medical schools combined. An undetermined number of
Pennsylvanians, most with southern family ties, fought for the Confederacy
during the Civil War. However, these examples emerge as little more than
anomalies when Pennsylvania is compared with its northern and southern
neighbors.
Pennsylvania was clearly a northern state by 1860. In 1780 the Keystone
State passed the nation’s first abolition law. Although at least 6,000 slaves had
once been held in Pennsylvania, there were none by the 1830’s. The state’s
population of free blacks though remained relatively high, topping 50,000 before
the Civil War. Some Pennsylvania blacks were escaped southern slaves, but most
had been legally manumitted or were the descendants of freedmen.
In 1850 the state’s total population stood at 2,311,786. By 1860 it
numbered 2,906,370, far surpassing any southern state. Over 400,000 of her
residents had been bom abroad, mostly in Germany, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom. Germans, virtually unknown in the South, resided mainly in the rural
southeast. The largest concentration of Irish was in Philadelphia, although their
numbers were high in several eastern counties, especially Luzerne and Schuylkill.
Many of the state’s northern tier inhabitants had moved there from New England
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or New York. The New England and Yankee population easily trumped that of
southerners by the Civil War.

1^

Pennsylvania’s urban communities easily outclassed southern
counterparts. Philadelphia was a world-class city with some 400,000 living in its
environs by 1850, trailing only New York as the most populous city in the nation.
Growth during the 1850’s was rapid, expanding the city’s population to 565,529
on the eve of the war. Philadelphia was easily the most powerful community in
the state, containing most of its financial and business interests. Reading, in
neighboring Berks County, contained over 20,000 inhabitants, while Lancaster
nearly approached that total. Although Pennsylvania’s population was heavily
concentrated in the southeastern party of the state, smaller cities also dotted the
western section. Pittsburgh, the west’s main city, had experienced stagnant
growth during the 1850’s, but its industrial sector was on the verge of explosion.
In 1860 50,000 made Pittsburgh home, while nearly 30,000 lived in neighboring
Allegheny City.
The rapid development of its industrial sector and the expansive reach of
its transportation facilities further distinguished Pennsylvania from the South.
Although the majority of the state’s residents dwelled in rural areas and made
their living through agriculture, the rise of manufacturing was quite evident by
1860. Although beaten to the punch by New York, Pennsylvania developed a
canal system nearly its equal by the 1830’s. Railroad building began in earnest
t

12 Pennsylvania’s foreign-born population made up a smaller percentage of the population than in
Massachusetts or New York. Population o f the United States in 1860, Joseph C. G. Kennedy,
superintendent o f census (Washington, 1864).
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during the 1840’s. By 1860 2,598 miles of rails crossed the state. However,
Pennsylvania was fiercely divided over their management, especially the selfish
monopolization of benefits by Philadelphia interests. As the sectional controversy
was raging, railroad politics attracted even more attention in several western
locales.
While over 200,000 Keystone residents worked in some way with
agriculture, the industrial sector was expanding rapidly. More than 130,000 men
toiled as nondescript laborers, while slightly fewer than 4,000 men were
employed in the iron industry, mostly in Allegheny County. Berks, Chester,
Centre, Huntingdon, Lancaster, and Mifflin Counties also boasted iron
establishments. Glass works employed smaller numbers of people in Philadelphia
and Pittsburgh. The lumber industry was strong in the still heavily wooded north.
18,000 toiled in the coalfields of eastern Pennsylvania, especially in Schuylkill
County. Philadelphia was mostly a manufacturing and mercantile city, where the
manufacture of cotton goods was a leading source of income. Pennsylvania was
also home to 4,500 lawyers and just under 20,000 clerks. The diversity of the
state’s economy and workforce influenced the pattern of the state’s politics during
the antebellum years, mandating an inclusive and progressive system of
government, and guaranteeing that a wide array of politicians and political ideas
would find a constituency.
II
The democratic principles of the Keystone State were of crucial
importance to its character and political history. Pennsylvania’s 1790 constitution
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very nearly established universal white manhood suffrage decades ahead of other
states. As the state grew, its physical and ethno-cultural makeup contributed to the
solidification of its allegiance to democracy and compounded its importance to
the new nation. With its large open expanse to the west and wealth of resources,
Pennsylvania developed a culture, which enhanced the democratic heritage that
the state was imbued with after the Revolution. Suspicion of central authority,
distrust of concentrated financial powers, and a sense of personal independence,
were traits shared by many rural Pennsylvanians. These principles would deeply
affect the political history of the state right down to the eve of the Civil War.
Pennsylvania was a stronghold of Jeffersonian Democracy. Outside of
Philadelphia and Lancaster the Federalist party lost most of its following after the
1800 election. However, as was the case in most states, voter turnout remained
light despite the lack of constitutional restrictions. Turnout in Presidential
elections remained at around thirty-three percent until 1828. However, the
universal democratic movement and the development of popular parties with
recognizable political philosophies vastly increased participation in politics.
These principles are clearly revealed in Pennsylvania’s 1838 constitution,
which governed the state until 1874. The constitution set Pennsylvania’s state and
congressional elections for the second Tuesday in October. Every year a new set
of legislators would be chosen, while a third of the state senate would be up for
election. One hundred legislators and thirty-one senators would assemble every
January to start a new legislative secession that generally ran until April. Every
three years a governor would be selected. In the event of his death while in office,
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a new election would be held the following October. Shortly, seats on the state
supreme court also became elective. Various other state offices were open for
election, though the governor did have considerable appointive powers. Universal
white manhood suffrage was the fundamental precept of the document.13
Andrew Jackson’s democratic crusade proved quite popular in the
Keystone State. The first national party convention, designed to avoid the
backroom wheeling and dealing associated with professional politics during the
1810’s and 20’s, was held in Harrisburg in 1824. There, in truly democratic
fashion, Jackson received the people’s nomination. In November of that year
Jackson won an easy victory in that state, although he lost the election after the U.
S. House selected John Quincy Adams. Four years later, Jackson again defeated
Adams in Pennsylvania, this time by a two-to-one margin amidst a much larger
turnout.
Despite the rise of the Democratic party, devotion to personalities and
cliques remained politically important well into the 1840’s. The Calhoun-wing of
the Democratic party had a strong following under Samuel Ingham, an early
member of Jackson’s cabinet, but it lost favor after Martin Van Buren's
influence began to trump that of Calhoun. James Buchanan, Henry Baldwin, and
George M Dallas helped rebuild the party around Van Buren who easily defeated
William H. Harrison in 1836. Although often divided by both personal and policy

13 The Constitution o f the Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania, as Amended by the Convention o f
1837-38 (Chambersburg, 1839).
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differences, the Democratic Party remained quite strong in the state until sectional
rifts shook the party on the eve of the Civil War.14
The opposition to the Democratic party in Pennsylvania was slow to
develop and in many ways unique to the state. Jackson’s attack against
Philadelphia’s Bank of the United States began the process of forming a cohesive
opposition. Old Hickory’s objection to federal improvements projects and support
of free trade, which many Keystone businessmen argued would snuff out local
industries, also fueled the opposition. It was Masonry though, that caused
Jackson’s party the most problems during the 1830’s. The Anti-Masonic party
was initially stronger than the Whig party, capturing the governor’s mansion
while Democrats squabbled among themselves in 1835. However, the rule of
Anti-Masonry proved short-lived as the party disgraced itself during an electoral
dispute in 1838. Most Anti-Masons, including Thaddeus Stevens, eventually
became Whigs. The principles of Anti-Masonry, especially the distrust of
secretive organizations, persisted among former adherents and influenced the
Keystone Whig party.
The panic of 1837 undercut the disunited appeal of Anti-Masonry and
helped launch the growth of the Whig party. However, Pennsylvania’s Whig party
never produced leaders that matched state’s Democrats. Nor did they measure up
to Whig leadership in New York, Massachusetts or even Ohio. Perhaps the most
notable Whigs were Senator James Cooper and onetime Democrat William F.
Johnston, the only Whig to serve as governor. Cooper and Johnston represented
14 Pennsylvania politics from Monroe to Jackson are covered aptly by: Philip S. Klein,
Pennsylvania Politics, 1817-1832: A Game Without Rules (Philadelphia, 1940).
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different factions of the party, with Cooper being the more conservative of the
two. Whig Presidential candidates won Pennsylvania twice—1840 and 1848-and
in 1844 the party came up painfully short. In Pennsylvania, like most northern
states, the majority of Republicans cut their political teeth as Whigs. Thaddeus
Stevens, Andrew G. Curtin, Alexander K. McClure, and Russell Errett were the
most prominent.
1848 was the high tide of Pennsylvania’s Whig party. That year the party
triumphantly elected Zachary Taylor, sent William F. Johnston to the state house,
and elected the majority of its congressmen. However, the seeds of the party’s
downfall had been planted in Pennsylvania. Taylor’s attempt to form his own
independent party through patronage offended Whigs affiliated with James
Cooper’s conservative wing of the party. Furthermore, Taylor’s opposition to the
compromise measures of Henry Clay, which Governor Johnston also opposed,
further divided the party. Johnston’s opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act and the
subsequent Christiana Riot of 1851 may have cost him reelection. A number of
conservative Whigs defected from Johnston, and in October 1851 he lost to
William Bigler by 8,500 votes.15 Disagreement over slavery though was not the
main reason why the Whig party dissolved in Pennsylvania. The most serious
threat, unbeknownst to many Whigs at the time, was the development of nativism.
Protestant outrage at the increasing Catholic presence in the state helped
cause a bloody riot in Philadelphia during 1844. The Native American party,
15 Johnston’s vote in the northern and western sections o f the state, where he gained control of the
small Free Soil contingent improved on his 1848 total. Although Johnston won 10,000 new votes,
Bigler drew 18,000 more than his Democratic predecessor. Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall o f
the American Whig Party : Jacksonian Politics and the Onset o f the Civil War (New York, 1999),
664-67.
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which attempted to impose a twenty-one year waiting period for an immigrant to
become a voting citizen, won a small, though influential, number of converts in
Philadelphia. Various other locales suffered occasional outbreaks of anti-Catholic
or anti-immigrant violence and politics during the 1830’s and 1840’s. Many
Whigs, who were suspicious and jealous of the Democrat’s near monopoly on the
immigrant vote tended to support the nativist cause. Yet, most were unwilling to
leave their beloved party as long as it made local concessions to nativists. The
Native American party remained insignificant, as long as Whigs maintained their
fealty to nativism. When the Whig party tried to disassociate itself from nativism
during the 1852 Presidential campaign in a vain attempt to attract some of the
quickly growing immigrant population, many nativists spumed them. Their
decision not to support General Scott, the Whigs’ Presidential nominee, helped
cause his defeat.16 Two years later the Whig party would pay the ultimate price
for again alienating nativists. However, during the early 1850’s not all Whigs
were willing to admit that nativism would remain a crucial issue. Some leaders
wanted to reform the party on a sectional basis and attack the increasingly dough
faced policy of the Democratic party. The revival of sectional tensions through
the introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, gave many Whigs hope that in 1854
the party could be reborn as an antislavery party. Although such a party would
eventually triumph in Pennsylvania, it would take six years for it to meet with
complete success.

16 Scott’s weakness on nativism will be further discussed in the next chapter. The most notable
effect o f this weakness was the 6,000 vote drop off o f the Whig vote in Philadelphia County—where
nativism was strongest—between 1848 and 1852.

CHAPTER 2
“Our Party Has Been Made to Bare the Sin of Catholicism”
Pennsylvania and the Destruction of the Second Party System, 1854-1855

On May 3, 1854 the Pittsburgh Gazette declared, “THE WHIG PARTY
OF THE NORTH is, this day, stronger than at any former period.” The passage’s
author William Larimer, a staunchly antislavery Whig, was convinced that the
Kansas-Nebraska Act would revitalize his struggling party. Although Whigs had
tasted defeat in Pennsylvania for five straight years, all the while suffering the
same fate throughout most of the North, many northern Whigs felt quite confident
during the early months of 1854.
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Rallies throughout Pennsylvania excoriated

the Democratic submission to the autocratic demands of the slave-holding South,
apparently portending a coming reversal of electoral trends. As spring emerged
throughout the Keystone State in 1854, it appeared that the Whig party might also
have a new life after a long cold winter.
Larimer originally expressed his confidence in a letter to his party rival
James Pollock, shortly after the close of Whigs’ March state nominating
convention. Pollock had defeated Larimer in the race for the gubernatorial
17Pittsburgh Gazette,, May 3, 1854. Quoted Holt, The Rise and Fall o f the American WhigParty
836.
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nomination. Larimer sent his letter on March 24th. At that moment Democrats in
Washington appeared to be embarking on a suicidal path, reopening the wounds
of sectionalism by way of Stephen Douglas’s mad Kansas-Nebraska bill. Larimer,
who had once been a supporter of the Free Soil party, shared the confidence of
many antislavery Whig leaders during the early months of 1854. KansasNebraska was apparently just what the down-and-out party needed. Purged of
doughfaces like Daniel Webster, the northern Whig party could now apparently
claim to be the true defenders of northern antislavery principles. The apostasy of
Democrats would not stand as long a vigilant Whig party stood firm. The
Pittsburgh Gazette, one of the Whig party’s staunchest antislavery papers, used
William Larimer’s words to assure readers that an anti-Nebraska position would
bring victory in October. “Occupying as she now does, the true Republican
ground, the policy of the opposition is making her a unit, and is doing more to
render her invincible than all those efforts of her most astute political tacticians
could accomplish.” Whigs like Larimer and Gazette editors D. N. White and
Russell Errett worked into the early summer to strengthen the antislavery
credentials of the party. Worried Democrats appeared vulnerable. Twelve
Keystone Democrats, including Senator Richard Brodhead, voted for KansasNebraska, but not all of the state’s Democrats agreed with the act. Summertime
correspondents of Governor William Bigler--who had been re-nominated by
Democrats in March-expressed concern that his apparent decision to quietly side
with Douglas and the Pierce administration would cause defection and defeat.
However, even as William Larimer’s letter was published, new political winds
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were blowing that would make his spring confidence appear nothing but
ridiculous in the aftermath of fall elections. Indeed, by June even Larimer had for
all intents left the party he had declared invincible just weeks earlier. As many
Whig leaders were attempting to capitalize on the Kansas-Nebraska backlash,
they failed to fully address the issue that would carry most fall elections across the
North. That failure would destroy the Whig party and plunge Pennsylvania
politics into disarray for years.18
II
Nativism arguably had a stronger tradition in Pennsylvania than in any
other northern state. Embittered by the growing numbers of Irish Catholic
immigrants, groups pledged to limit their influence upon society and politics first
appeared in the 1830’s. Nativism was particularly pungent in Philadelphia and
surrounding areas where the majority of Catholics lived. Most anti-Catholic
voters there and throughout the North supported the Whig party during the era of
the second party system. Nativist partisans often provided critical votes that
helped Whigs obtain victories during the 1840’s. Political nativism began to play
a crucial role in state Whig politics during the Taylor Administration. Taylor
secured leading patronage positions for Philadelphia nativists, which angered
some of the state’s older, more conservative Whigs like Senator James Cooper.
The growing strength of the nativist movement exacerbated tensions existing

18 Most o f the information for the 1854 election is based on two excellent secondary sources,
Holt’s wonderful The Rise and Fall o f the American Whig Party and William E Gienapp,
“Nebraska, Nativism, and Rum: The Failure o f Fusion in Pennsylvania, 1854,” Pennsylvania
Magazine o f History and Biography, hereafter PMHB, 109 (October, 1985), 425-71. Holt is
extremely informative on Pennsylvania’s nativist tradition.
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within the state Whig party. The rivalry between more conservative Whigs like
Cooper and those who tended to be both supporters of nativism and opponents of
appeasing the South on slavery matters disturbed the unity of the party during the
Taylor years.
1852 was a crucial year for Whig/nativist relations in Pennsylvania. The
campaign of Winfield Scott openly courted Irish immigrants to the dismay of
nativists, and the party was badly defeated. Meanwhile, the increasing political
prominence of Catholics coupled with the visit of the Papal envoy during 1853
increased the draw of nativism. The appointment of James Campbell, a Catholic,
as state attorney general by Governor Bigler and then as Postmaster General by
President Franklin Pierce was particularly outrageous to Keystone nativists. The
perceived cultural threat o f Catholics also motivated nativists. Pittsburgh Catholic
leaders outraged many Protestants in that city when they attacked the public
school system for encouraging Bible reading. Moral reformers across the state
often criticized the propensity of Catholics to indulge in excessive liquor
consumption, especially during the Sabbath. Whigs usually cited such cultural
‘outrages’ when they criticized Catholic power. Indeed, during the early months
of 1854 Pennsylvania Whigs linked their outrage over Kansas-Nebraska with their
traditional commitment to Protestant values.19 However, the perception that
obtaining the entire anti-Nebraska vote would be the key to victory caused Whigs

19 Pittsburgh Gazette, March 20. The Party platform specifically cited Whig’s Protestant heritage.
Interestingly, one nativist paper had no problem with Jews; apparently they were not a problem
because they were not under the control o f a transnational despot like the Pope, Harrisburg
Herald, June 27, 1855.
For good examples o f Whig attacks on Catholics see Pottsville Miner's Journal, December 31,
1853, March 18, and April 8.
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to largely ignore nativism during the prime campaign season. Whigs were not
blind to the power of nativism; they just took it for granted in 1854.
It is not easy to castigate Whig leaders for their apparently myopic
decision to de-emphasize nativism during the 1854 campaign. While many Whigs
were confident that Douglas’s bill would be the issue which they could use to
revitalize their party, the small Free Soil party was not ready to let Whigs steal
their issue without due compensation. Responding quickly and with greater
vindictiveness towards Democratic offenders, Free Soil leaders undercut the Whig
position that they were the stoutest critics of Kansas-Nebraska. While the
Pennsylvania state Whig convention in March had denounced the introduction of
the hated bill, the meeting came before its passage and thus did not demand its
repeal. Free Soilers quickly capitalized. Pennsylvania Whigs incurred the wrath
of dissatisfied Free Soilers who pointed to Keystone Whig’s traditionally tepid
opposition to slavery. The Washington National Era, the leading Free Soil paper
declared, “Pennsylvania Whiggery is simply old fogeyism.”20 Thus Whigs would
have to prove they were worthy of the Free Soil vote. Confident Free Soilers
provided the critical balance for victory in October, Whigs struck bargains that in
hindsight killed their party. Because they were scared Free Soilers would
nominate the supposedly popular David Wilmot for governor, thus robbing them
of an otherwise easy victory, many Whig leaders focused all their energies on
appeasing him and his relatively small cadre of followers. Most Democratic Free
Soilers were uncomfortable with Whig ties to nativism. Consequently, many
antislavery Whigs played down nativism and other traditional Whig causes.
20Holt, Whig Party, 882.

26
Pittsburgh Whigs like Larimer and Russell Errett were especially eager to dump
all non-slavery issues. “We are not so wedded to the Whig organization or the
name as to refuse to enter any better organization for the purpose of resisting the
encroachments of slavery,” declared Errett’s Gazette 21 Candidate Pollock
responded with an open letter in July strongly objecting to the repeal of the
Missouri compromise and declaring that Congress had no right to establish
slavery in the territories, which Kansas-Nebraska had apparently mandated.
Allegheny County Whigs took the additional steps of nominating a Free Soiler for
one of the county’s legislative seats and passing strong antislavery resolutions.
One declared, “in view of the dangers of the crisis—a crisis overriding all former
party distinctions-we hereby pledge ourselves to the camp of Freedom-we
inscribe Free Men to Free Labor and Free Lands upon our banner, and enlist for
the whole war.”22 The re-emphasis of antislaveiy was not limited to Pittsburgh.
Eastern journals also stepped up their attacks on Kansas-Nebraska. The state
committee address issued during a July meeting in Harrisburg was much stronger
in its denunciation of southern outrages than the March state platform.
There were some signs that the strategy of concentrating on Nebraska was
working for Whigs. Although Wilmot never seriously considered running, Free
Soilers had nominated a candidate for governor in May. After Pollock released his
strong anti-slavery letter however, Free Soilers withdrew him. Wilmot also
decided that he would permanently leave the Democratic party and gave his
support to Pollock. The election cycle beginning in March was producing defeats

21Pittsburgh Gazette, April 19. Quoted in Holt, Whig Party, 882.
22Ibid. 883
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for Democrats throughout the North. Pennsylvania Democrats often blamed
Kansas-Nebraska as they suffered defeats in summer municipal elections.23 Yet
those elections revealed that nativism would be far more detrimental to
Democratic fortunes in 1854. As Michael F. Holt explains, Pennsylvania’s Whigs
had placed all their eggs in one basket, thus when the electorate decided that a
different issue was paramount, the result was disastrous. Taking for granted their
support and underestimating their strength, Whigs lost the nativist vote to a new
movement which did not trust the party of Winfield Scott and his Irish brogue to
protect them from the encroach of the ‘Catholic menace.’24
m
Protest movements across the state expressed disdain for both parties;
several independent nominees appeared during the summer pledging to limit the
influence of both immigrants and liquor in the Keystone State. A “queer
temperance party” nominated candidates for office in Erie County and also
appeared in York and Schuylkill Counties. Maine Law candidates appeared
sparingly across the state, while pressure for prohibition led the legislature to
prepare a referendum to be voted on in October that would consider a ban on
liquor sales.25 Nativism though, proved to be the most crucial issue throughout

23 Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics o f the
1850’s (New York, 1992). Anbinder contends that Kansas-Nebraska crucial to the electoral
misfortunes o f Democrats, but Holt’s conflicting opinion that slavery mattered but little in results
o f October especially, seems to bear more scrutiny. William Gienapp tends to take a similar
position.
During an impromptu speech before the election of 1852, Scott had responded to the presence o f
some Irishmen in his audience that he ‘loved to hear that old Irish brogue.’ Such pandering cost
him dearly.
25 Erie Observer, May 13, 1854; The referendum, if passed, would recommend that the legislature
pass a law banning the sale o f spirits. See Asa E. Martin, “The Temperance Movement in
Pennsylvania Prior to the Civil War,” PMHB, 49 (July, 1925), 219-223.
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the state during 1854. The evidence came in as early as May when several
municipal elections were held. Whig Robert T. Conrad, who was also a member
of a secret nativist order soon to be dubbed the “Know Nothings,” routed local
Democratic party boss Richard Vaux in Philadelphia’s mayoral election. Know
Nothings triumphed with shocking regularity throughout the southeast. Democrats
keenly blamed the organization they often euphemistically dubbed ‘SanT for their
defeats. “At the bottom of this is a deep-seated religious question-prejudice if
you please, which nothing can withstand. Our party is made to bare the sin of
Catholicism [sic],” declared one astute Democrat.26 Governor Bigler began to .

receive many worried notes. “In my opinion this [defeat in Philadelphia] is a
direct result of Campbell-ism,” noted one Democrat in reference to the notorious
Catholic Postmaster General. “If you are not alarmed, you must have very strong
nerves,” he concluded.27
October’s results proved to be quite humiliating for Democrats. However
the elections did not provide Whigs with the revitalizing victory William Larimer
and others had gleefully predicted either. James Pollock won with the highest
percentage of the vote obtained by any Whig ever in Pennsylvania. However, he
was the only Whig to win a statewide race. Democrats overwhelming reelected
Jeremiah S. Black to the state supreme court, while a Know Nothing, Henry Mott,
won the seat on the state canal commission. The prohibition referendum failed by
a few thousand votes.

26 E. A. Pennington to William Bigler, June 8, 1854, Bigler papers, HSP. Also quoted in Anbinder,
54.
27 William E. Gienapp, Origins o f the Republican Party, 1852-1856 (New York, 1987), 101.
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The incredibly schizophrenic returns resulted from the Know Nothing
pledge to vote for the candidate-usually a lodge member-who most fit their
criteria regardless of party. Pollock had apparently joined a Know Nothing lodge
during the summer, while Mott received both Democratic and nativist support
because his Whig opponent had been bom in Scotland. The supreme court race
conveniently revealed the true strength of the Know Nothing movement and
spelled the doom of the Whig party. Know Nothings pledged to vote for a thirdparty nativist who subsequently received thirty-three percent of the vote, while
Black won with forty-five percent, and the Whig candidate earned a pathetic
twenty-one. Black drew nearly the same number of votes as Bigler who lost the
gubernatorial election.28 Seemingly out of nowhere a new organization had
turned keystone politics upside down.
While Democrats were solidly beaten, the Whig party was virtually
obliterated in Pennsylvania. Fifteen of Pennsylvania’s new congressmen ran as
Whigs, but twelve were Know Nothings. Know Nothings clearly backed four
anti-Nebraska Democrats who triumphed-two of them independent of regular
Democratic support-and elected the nativist Jacob Broom in Philadelphia. Broom
was the Presidential nominee of the independent Native American party in 1852.
Seventeen of Pennsylvania’s twenty-five Congressional seats belonged to Know
Nothings of one sort or another. Across the state, disgruntled Whigs and

28The full returns were: Governor; Pollock 204,008, Bigler 167,001,a Native American nominee
received 1,503. Canal Commissioner; Mott 274,074, the Scottish Whig received 83,331. Supreme
Court Justice; Black 167,010, the Whig, Smyser 78,571, and Baird, a Know Nothing, 120,576.
The referendum failed 158,342 to 163,150 southeastern Know Nothings who did not support
prohibition were apparently the difference.
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Democrats as well as first time voters left their parties to back Know Nothing
candidates.
Decisions made in local Know Nothings lodges to back a candidate for
office were not clearly documented, but they seem to have considered several
interrelated issues. Alexander K. McClure alleged that Know Nothings had
approached his friend, Whig state Chairman Andrew G. Curtin, pledging to
support Pollock in return for patronage. Although Pollock apparently appointed
some of the alleged bargainers, his reputation as a strident Protestant moralizer
was likely much more important than any promise of jobs. Democrat Bigler
meanwhile was strongly associated with Catholics and was known as somewhat
of a heavy drinker. Although William Gienapp estimates that more Pennsylvania
Democrats left their party for the Know Nothings than in any other northern state,
Whigs had clearly been hurt the most by Sam’s rise.
Anti-Nebraska pledges provided Whigs with virtually nothing across
Pennsylvania. Although those who voted for Know Nothing candidates were
usually critics of Kansas-Nebraska, Whig attempts to capitalize on that
dissatisfaction had obviously failed miserably. Nativism broke the strained ties
that held the Whig party together. Factionalism was always a problem for the
party, but the strength of the Know Nothing movement allowed disgruntled
groups to obtain the fruits of election victories denied by party regulars. The
notoriously antislavery Whig Thaddeus Stevens helped back a Know Nothing
who unseated his anti-Nebraska replacement in Lancaster’s Congressional
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district. Stevens was upset that he had been spumed in 1852 and had no qualms
turning against the regular Whig party.

OQ

Philadelphia’s lone Whig Congressmen Joseph R. Chandler, who had
voted against the Kansas-Nebraska Act, lost his fight to be re-nominated because
Know Nothings controlled the district Whig convention. Chandler was a Catholic.
Outraged regular Whigs then fatally split the party by running Chandler and other
anti-nativists in local elections. The regular nominee, Job Tyson, picked up the
support of Know Nothings and thus easily triumphed as Chandler finished a
distant third. The Philadelphia North American concluded that the nativist issue
was “more potent and pervasive in its influence, perhaps, than any or all others
combined.” Philadelphia had once been a stronghold of Whiggery, but after 1854
Whigs were rare even in the City of Brotherly Love.30
Even in the western part of the state, traditionally the strongest antislavery
quarter, Know Nothings dealt a deathblow to Whigs. The Democratic Pittsburgh
Post clearly discerned that the fall elections would be a referendum on Know
Nothingism not Kansas-Nebraska. The Allegheny Free Soiler who appeared on
the Whig’s county legislative ticket came in last place. However, all five Know
Nothing nominees won assembly seats. Many of Pittsburgh’s antislavery leaders
were outraged with the results. Subsequently, they spumed both the new Know

29 Fawn M. Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge o f the South (New York, 1959). Regrettably
Brodie fails to cover Stevens’s conduct during this election.
30Philadelphia North American, October 11. Quoted in Gienapp, Origins, 147; Frank Gerrity, “The
Disruption o f Philadelphia Whigocracy: Joseph R. Chandler, Anti-Catholicism, and the
Congressional Election o f 1854,” PMHB 111 (1987), 161-94.

32
Nothing coalition and the rump of the Whig party. Pittsburgh Whigs fused with
•

Democrats to defeat Know Nothings during spring municipal elections.

11

Pennsylvania’s Know Nothing leadership was composed of ‘second tier’
politicians, most of whom were former Whigs. Michael Holt notes that
Pittsburgh’s “Know Nothing leaders were young men who generally came from
the middle or lower classes.”32 State legislators’ incomes were noticeably less
than those of their Whig and Democratic counterparts. And, while Whigs always
attracted the support of wealthy merchants and factory owners, especially in
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, Know Nothings claimed virtually no wealthy
businessmen. Know Nothings sent an inordinate amount of Protestant clergymen
to the legislature~to the disgust of some Democratic journals- and apparently
attracted considerably fewer farmers than Democrats or even Whigs. While some
historians have argued that inadequate leadership contributed to the eventual
downfall of the Know Nothings, a stronger argument contends that sectional
pressures and continued friction among former Democrats and Whigs within the
new coalition were more critical to the downfall of the movement.33
Know Nothings controlled Pennsylvania’s government after the 1854
elections. It was not clear however that they could unite as a political force that
was capable of achieving anything. Nor was it clear that they could establish
themselves as the leading independent anti-Democratic party. Establishing a

31 For an excellent coverage o f Pittsburgh politics during the era upon which much o f my coverage
o f that city is based see, Michael F. Holt. Forging a Majority: The Formation o f the Republican
Party in Pittsburgh, 1848-1860 (1969, reprint ed., Pittsburgh, 1990).
32 Holt, Forging a Majority, 155.
33 Anbinder, 131-33.
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government, filling offices, electing a Senator, and passing positive legislation
that followed the principles that had elected them, proved much harder for Know
Nothings in 1855 than winning office in 1854.
IV
The Know Nothing coalition in Pennsylvania, and indeed throughout the
country, immediately faced a myriad of problems. Democrats had learned after
1852 how quickly the fortunes of success could breed discontent and fracture
even the most established political parties. Know Nothings, who now preferred to
be called the American party, faced a daunting task as they attempted to coalesce
the disparate masses that had elected them in 1854 into a coherent political party.
Pennsylvania’s Know Nothing contingent included former Whigs, Democrats,
Free Soilers, Native Americans, as well as prohibitionists arid antiparty men.
Their divergent views of what should be the priorities of the new party created
great confusion and disagreement within the state Know Nothing coalition during
1855. However, the intrastate squabbles among Know Nothings pale in
comparison to the nation-wide struggle to define the character of the American
party. While Democrats regrouped to face a new opponent whom they quite
possibly hated more than they ever hated Whigs, Keystone Know Nothings had to
cope with the problems associated with the attempt to create a new national party.
That difficult process, coupled with developments in other northern states, would
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challenge their claim to the title of Pennsylvania’s leading anti-Democratic
party.34
Although the elections of 1854 seem to have turned on nativist outrage
throughout the nation, the question of how to approach the increasingly divisive
slavery question quickly divided the Know Nothing coalition and muted the
nativist issue. Conservatives like former President Millard Fillmore quickly
determined to use the breakup of the Whig party and the rise of the Know
Nothings to build a national anti-sectional party. Those Know Nothings who
opposed the Fillmore faction of the Whig party during the 1850’s, like
Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson and Maine congressman Israel Washburn,
hoped to forge a northern antislavery party. At the same time, many, though not
all, Know Nothing-Democrats drifted back to their former allegiance. While some
Know Nothing leaders were able to manipulate the party to their liking in a
particular state, the attempt to create a national American party in 1855 was an
unmitigated disaster.
With eyes focused on the 1856 Presidential race, ambitious politicians
caused great strife within what had essentially been a populist movement. Many
of those who had been attracted by the antiparty pronouncements of the Know
Nothings were turned off by the machinations of those who took hold of the
movement. A majority of first time voters who were attracted to the Know
Nothings in 1854 quickly resumed their disinterest in voting after their movement

341 will use the term “American party” when referring specifically to the party that attempted to
consolidate the Know Nothing uprising, but will continue to refer to members as “Know
Nothings.”
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was taken over by the dreaded wire-pulling politicians. While the tensions
between national leadership and local interests undermined the strength of the
Know Nothing movement throughout much of the North, the situation in
Pennsylvania was particularly detrimental to the long-term health of the new
American party. While the potential for the Know Nothing coalition to gather
strength in the state still existed, the external pressure to define the coalition with
regards to slavery-which was not essential to the growth of the party in
Pennsylvania-aborted the American party before it could take root in the
Keystone State. Although the American party and nativism remained popular in
1855 and afterwards, its viability as a national party was severely eroded by the
search for an acceptable national platform. Due to the need to keep the state
within the political mainstream, even the most devoted Keystone nativists were
forced to abandon the American party when it was destroyed upon the rocks of
sectionalism. Thus, the sectional pressures that fatally wounded the Know
Nothing movement nationwide made its continued existence in Pennsylvania,
where its strictures had been quite popular, virtually pointless.35 However,
divisions in the new coalition appeared in Pennsylvania even before the sectional
rift became apparent.
Y
The disunity of the American party in Pennsylvania revealed itself as soon
as the legislature met in January 1855. The most important order of business was
the election of a new Senator to replace the conservative Whig, James Cooper.

35 Again, to argue that antislavery was not essential to the 1854 Know Nothing victory is not to
say that Pennsylvania Know Nothings were proslavery or even conservatives in sectional matters.
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Know Nothings claimed 91 of the joint assembly’s 133 seats, but they had no
clear choice for Senator.36 A mere eight men resolutely attended the straight Whig
caucus, but they nonetheless determined to run a candidate. Democrats, who also
had little chance for success, united on Charles Buckalew. While Cooper tried in
vain to obtain the votes of former Whig legislators who made up the vast majority
of the Know Nothings, former Democratic Senator Simon Cameron emerged as
the frontrunner for the seat. Cameron, who had been a critic of the Catholic
influence upon the state’s Democratic party, had tepidly supported William Bigler
in 1854. Behind the scenes he had also been a key proponent of the pro-Nebraska
platform at that year’s state Democratic convention. Like many other ambitious
politicians, including Thaddeus Stevens, Cameron joined a Know Nothing lodge
after the election, expressing his availability to the American party. Others who
attracted interest for the American nomination included former Whig governor
William F. Johnston, David Wilmot, and Andrew Gregg Curtin, a leading
member of the Pollock administration.37
The American caucus, which met on February 9, 1855, could not escape
the lingering effects of old partisan battles. Many former Whigs could not
swallow Cameron, while ex-Democrats, to a man, stuck to him. One noted,
“democratic (Know Nothings). . . will not consent to Whigify so strongly their

36 C. Maxwell Myers “The Rise o f the Republican Party in Pennsylvania, 1854-1860”
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University o f Pittsburgh, 1940), 50, lists 17 Democrats, 15
Whigs, and 1 Native American in the state senate; 48 Whigs, 24 “regular” Democrats, 14 Nativist
or Anti-Nebraska Democrats, and 3 Free-Soilers.
37 Tyler Anbinder asserts that Cameron’s weakness as an antislavery candidate was critical to his
eventual defeat. I disagree. His coverage o f the Senate race can be found in Nativism and
Slavery, 150-55; For the involvement o f Cameron in supporting the Kansas-Nebraska act see
Gienapp, Origins, 172; The fullest coverage o f Cameron in 1855 is found in Erwin S. Bradley,
Simon Cameron, 95-105.
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party after having so secretly elected a Whig Governor!” Four secret ballots
could not produce a winner, with Cameron leading and Curtin trailing. On the
fifth try Cameron obtained 46 votes, apparently giving him a one-vote majority.
However, the total vote numbered 92, with the phantom vote providing the
margin. Outraged Cameron opponents stormed out of the meeting and renounced
his nomination. All of the bolters were former Whigs or Free Soilers and it may
have been one of them who planted the extra vote to defame Cameron whom they
could easily pin the corruption tag on.38
Those who remained in the American caucus supported Cameron when
the joint assembly met a few days later, but he consistently fell about eight votes
short of a majority. However, those Know Nothings who bolted from the caucus
could not agree on a new candidate, nor could they fuse with holdout Whigs and
Democrats. Balloting went on for two weeks without a nominee before the
iL

assembly adjourned, then resumed on the 27 before giving up the search as
hopeless. Both pro and anti Cameron Know Nothings vilified each other for
breaking up the coalition. A new Senator would not be selected until after a new
legislature was elected in the fall. Cameron and Curtin, who had lately been one
of Cameron’s most vocal critics, became lifelong enemies. More importantly,

38 W. F. Caplan to Simon Cameron, Anbinder, 150-51. Some o f Cameron’s opponents were
outraged at the adoption o f a secret ballot, which they charged would not allow them to determine
who might be affected by Cameron’s dollars. Their outrage as his nomination, whatever the
legitimacy of their claims—and I tend to doubt the totality o f Cameron’s corruption —can be
summed up by the following line in the Harrisburg Telegraph, February 21, “Ask us not to support
a nomination brought about, as we, believe, by the concentrated and cohesive power o f public
plunder, and the superadded elements of shameless and wholesale private bribery ” Quoted in
Bradley, 97. Clearly not all Know Nothings believed the charges against Cameron, as he obtained
votes in the joint assembly from men who did not vote for him before his most vocal critics bolted
the American caucus.
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with fall elections again looming Pennsylvania’s American party had suffered a
humiliating setback.39
VI
Further divisions within the American party emerged as 1855 dragged on.
Although the temperance referendum had narrowly failed in October 1854, Know
Nothings turned most of their legislative attention to the liquor question. The sale
of liquor on Sundays was outlawed and liquor license fees were tripled, now
costing applicants $1,000. The most notorious bill banned the sale of liquor in
quantities less than a quart. Democrats particularly vilified the “Jug law” because
it discriminated against small-time operators. Know Nothings also received
opposition from within their ranks especially in the southeastern part of the state
where numerous Germans, who opposed temperance, resided. One Philadelphia
newspaper declared that Know Nothing support for temperance had been “the
supremest insanity.”40
After its final adjournment the Pittsburgh Gazette declared that the
legislature had been a “blot on the good name of the people of Pa.” However, the
problems of the American party were hardly limited to the divisive temperance
question, or even to feuding party leaders; the situation for the party outside of the
state was much worse. An attempt to form a conservative anti-sectional Know
Nothings party crumbled at Philadelphia during June. Many northerners who
attended the convention were outraged at the adoption of Section Twelve of the
American party platform, which declared the current slavery laws-including the
39 The origins or the Cameron/Curtin feud are aptly discussed in Bradley, while the coverage by
McClure in Old Time Notes is also thorough, if colored by McClure’s lifelong support for Curtin.
40 Philadelphia Times quoted in Anbinder, 182.
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hated Kansas-Nebraska Act—final. While statewide reaction revealed that
Pennsylvanians were not yet prepared to renounce the American party, their
almost unilateral condemnation of Section Twelve was quick and harsh. “To ask
the members of the [Know Nothing] order in the Northern States,” declared the
Harrisburg Herald, “to maintain the existing laws on the subject of slavery as a
final apd conclusive settlement of that subject, in spirit and in substance is an
insult to a wronged and injured people.” Even Democrats realized that
developments in Philadelphia would disrupt the American party. “There are
thousands in the new party,” declared the Pittsburgh Post, “throughout the state
with whom the anti-slavery sentiment is stronger than all other political purposes,
and they will leave the ranks of the [Know Nothings] for more congenial
fellowship of the anti-slavery party, which is to be rendered more attractive under
the ill-fitting name of Republican.”41 The Republican party, which had formed in
Michigan and Wisconsin the previous year, made its first appearance in
Pennsylvania during 1855, trying to capitalize on the disgust with the Philadelphia
platform. Keystone Know Nothings however, were not quite ready to surrender
their power to another organization.
VII
While Republicans in states like Massachusetts and Ohio used the strength
of their state’s old Free Soil parties to pry some Know Nothings away from the
♦

American party after the Philadelphia convention, Pennsylvania lacked such a
core group of antislavery politicians who could entice such a split. David Wilmot

41 Harrisburg Herald, June 22; Pittsburgh Post, August 6, quoted in Holt, Forging a Majority, 160
(misdated August 4).
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received very few votes during the senatorial race while Thaddeus Stevens
covertly worked against the frontrunner, Simon Cameron, because as he told an
ally, “I did not think him true to freedom.”42 If a strong Republican party was to
be established in the state, Free Soilers would have to work with Know Nothings-as well as with holdout Whigs--to build a new coalition. Antislavery elements
would also have to have the strength to force some Know Nothings away from the
American party and into a Republican party that would compete with both
Democrats and the Americans. In New York, Ohio, and Massachusetts
Republicans ran strong tickets against American party nominees, winning in the
Buckeye State where Salmon P. Chase was elected governor. Pennsylvania
though, possessed no strong antislavery leader who could compare with Chase, or
New York’s William H. Seward, or Massachusetts’s Henry Wilson and Charles
Francis Adams. In Pennsylvania, thanks to radical domination and Know
Nothings interference, the Republican party did not get off the ground in 1855.
The Pittsburgh Gazette, which had so gleefully predicted an antislavery
Whig victory in 1854, led the call for a Republican party. Editors Russell Errett
and D. N. White proposed that Pennsylvania follow the example of Ohio and
form its own antislavery party. Eventually, with the help of David Wilmot and
Ohio Republican leaders, a convention to form a Keystone Republican party was
set for Pittsburgh on September 5,1855. The convention’s platform denounced
the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and declared that “FREEDOM IS
NATIONAL AND SLAVERY SECTIONAL.” The antislavery zeal of the

42 Stevens to E. D. Gazzam, December 4, 1856, McPherson papers, LC. Also quoted in Anbinder,
155.
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platform carried over to the nomination of Passmore Williamson-an abolitionist
presently incarcerated for a violation of the Fugitive Slave A ct-for canal
commissioner, the only statewide race that fall. Alexander McClure, an attendee
who still clung to the Whig party, decried Williamson’s nomination as a mistake.
“A torch applied to a powder magazine could not have been more explosive,” he
later stated 43

vm
Pennsylvania’s 1855 elections would only select a canal commissioner, a
new legislature, and a third of the state senate. However, due to the uniqueness of
the political situation, five candidates would compete for the almost totally
symbolic canal commission seat.44 A few Whigs still determined to keep their
party alive, although their sparsely attended September 11th convention consisted
of disenchanted men without followers who lied “awake at night to decide
whether they most hated Know Nothingism or Democracy.” Their nominee for
canal commissioner, the last Whig to participate in a statewide race, ultimately
received fewer than 2,300 votes. Democrats meanwhile, determined to win back
their power so they could take the still vacant Senate seat. Despite their losses in
1854, Keystone Democrats were reinvigorated by their outrageous defeat at the
hands of an upstart group of bigots. Their apparently harmonious convention
nominated Arnold Plumer for canal commissioner. “The sober second thought of
the people will soon dispel the mists of prejudice by which they have been
surrounded and vindicate that party and its principles, which to-day stands forth

43 McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 237-38.
44 The state Main Line canal was in the process o f being sold to one of the states leading railroads.
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the confirmed defender of the constitution and the civil and religious rights of all
men in this land,” declared Erie’s Democratic newspaper. “Thousands of honest
Whigs, who have no sympathy with Know Nothingism or Abolitionism,” opined
Gettysburg’s Democratic organ, “will desert those leaders who have hastily
betrayed them, and will vote with the Democratic party.”45
Although troubled by the Philadelphia breakup and the rise of the
Republican party across the North, Know Nothings declared their movement to be
anything but dead. Sensing the potential of the new party to damage their control
of the anti-Democratic vote, Know Nothings attempted to smother the
Pennsylvania Republican party in its infancy. Covertly controlling the party’s
central committee, which was created in the immediate aftermath of the
September Republican convention, Know Nothings eroded the party from the
inside. The subverted Republican committee mandated a new convention in order
to fuse with the American party; uncommitted Whigs were also invited. Meeting
in late September, the fusion convention had the support of Simon Cameron,
Thaddeus Stevens, Governor James Pollock, and most anti-Democratic leaders.
The original American party nominee was replaced with Thomas Nicholson, a
member of the Pollock administration who falsely claimed that he was not a
Know Nothing in order to gamer support from those who opposed that order. The
Republican and Whig nominees were also formally withdrawn. However,
Republicans who were disgusted with the infiltration of their state committee and
rightly doubted Nicholson’s claim of independence, refused to give up

45 Erie Observer, October 21, 1854; Gettysburg Republican Compiler, October 8, 1855.
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Williamson. This small group of radicals, who mostly resided in western
Pennsylvania, cast the first Republican ballots in state history.46
As the election approached American party editors turned their wrath
towards holdout Republicans—whom they justifiably alleged were attempting to
destroy the nativist movement-with just as much vigor as they defamed
Catholics. Pittsburgh’s Know Nothing journal asked, “Does not everyone in
voting the Republican ticket, vote foreignism as well as antislavery while the
supporters of the American nominations in this country are placed on record as
voting just as strongly antislavery, yet expressing themselves at the same time
favorably to salutary changes in the naturalization laws?” After the election the
Harrisburg Herald dejectedly explained: “We have never had a doubt that the
Republican party was organized solely to defeat Americans and not to advance
anti-slavery.”47
The results of the October election were mixed at best for fusion
supporters. The Democratic canal commission candidate, Arnold Plummer, won
election with 161,281 votes, slightly less than half of the total vote. Nicholson
received slightly fewer than 150,000 votes, with forty-six percent of the vote.
Republicans, meanwhile, could not capitalize on dissention within the American
party that the infamous Section Twelve caused. Williamson received only 7,226
votes. Although he had formally been withdrawn in September-a predicament
that no doubt reducing his potential vote-his 2.6 percent of the vote was nowhere

46 Gienapp, Origins, 211-12; Myers, “Republican Party,” 62-71.
47 Pittsburgh Dispatch, quoted in Holt, Forging a Majority, 165; Harrisburg Herald, October 12,
1855.
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near the total for Republicans who competed against American party nominees in
other northern states during 1855 48
Democrats were thrilled at the result. ‘“ Sam’ has retreated to his caverns
. .. ‘Sambo’ too, with all the inspiration of mad fanaticism, has proved powerless
to save his midnight brethren,” declared the Erie Observer. Although Democrats
grouped ‘Sam’ and ‘Sambo’ together, many Know Nothings and Republicans saw
them as competing, perhaps mortal, entities. “Sambo apparently don’t like Sam,”
declared a leading Know Nothing organ. In 1855 they had clearly not cooperated
in the Keystone State.49
Although Know Nothings could boast that they had quashed the
Republicans in Pennsylvania, they had suffered across the board defeats. While
Nicholson’s forty-six percent improved on the thirty-three percent of the vote that
the Know Nothings state supreme court candidate received in a three-way race in
1854, it fell well short of the fifty-five percent that James Pollock—who combined
the Know Nothings and Whig vote-received. In addition to the canal commission
victory, Democrats recaptured the legislature. In January they easily elected
William Bigler to the Senate seat that Know Nothings had been incapable of
securing the previous February.50

48 The total vote for canal commissioner, available in most October papers was: Plummer
(Democrat) 161,281; Nicholson (Fusion) 149,745; Williamson (Republican) 7,226; Cleaver
(Native American) 4,056; Henderson (Whig) 2,293; Martin (American) 678. Although the Whig,
Republican, and American candidates were withdrawn at the September 27th fusion convention,
ballots had been distributed beforehand and there was no way to stop those stubborn, or
courageous, enough who wanted to vote for them.
49 Erie Observer, October 13; Harrisburg Herald, October 12.
50 The total vote for Nicholson was thirty thousand more than the 1854 supreme court nominee,
but some 54,000 less than Pollock’s total. The total for Plumer, on the other hand was only 6,000
less than that o f William Bigler.
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Republican leaders were generally despondent over the situation in
Pennsylvania. “The short and the long of it,” wrote Pittsburgh’s Russell Errett to
Salmon Chase, “is that, as things now are, I have no hope of Pennsylvania. I
cannot see how all parties can co-operate here without a sacrifice of principle or a
loss of votes sufficient to ensure defeat.”51 As the Presidential election of 1856
approached there was little hope that Republicans could mount a serious
campaign in the Keystone State no matter whom they nominated. Likewise, with
their party on the ropes in many states only one year after their amazing victories-and completely in a shambles as a national unit—Know Nothings also feared the
worst. Although elated by their victory the Democratic party was not ready to
declare the 1856 campaign over. Democrats knew that Pennsylvania, which
looked like a potential lock at the end of 1855, would nonetheless be critical if
they were to save the Union by electing their man and defeating sectionalism and
bigotry. They would take no chances.

51 Russell Errett quoted in Holt, Forging a Majority, 213.

CHAPTER 3
“It Will Be the Rainbow of Peace”
The Election of James Buchanan, 1856

Pennsylvania played a critical role in the elections of 1856. Many
observers could agree with the Philadelphian who opined: “As goes Pennsylvania,
so goes the nation.” As southerners steadfastly insisted, the fate of the Union was
at stake during the tumultuous contest; to the great relief of thousands,
Pennsylvania helped provide the crucial victory that Democrats insisted would
quiet sectional rumblings. Pennsylvanians presented a record vote to their own
James Buchanan, proving to his partisans that the state still was the key to the
unity of the nation. Yet Buchanan’s majority was not as natural or overwhelming
as it may have seemed. Several circumstances that helped secure Buchanan’s
victory would not be applicable four years later.52
In early 1856 the Republican party secured its first great victory. The
election of Nathaniel P. Banks as Speaker of the House further split the American
party, which had already had a bad year, and helped launch the Republican party
towards dominance in the North. In February Republicans held their first national
52 Samual Peassor[?] to James Buchanan, May 29, Buchanan papers, HSP.

meeting in Pittsburgh, where the party organized to prepare a run for President.
However, the party faced long odds in Pennsylvania. “The opposition to
Democracy was not coherent, but was floating around promiscuously as old line
Whigs, antislavery Democrats, Know Nothings and Republicans,” remembered
Alexander K. McClure. At the time of the Pittsburgh meeting there existed
virtually no party structure in the state, and almost no resident of the populous
southeastern part of the state, including Philadelphia, claimed to be a Republican.
However, the political situation was hardly set in stone as 1856 opened. Although
the Republican party appeared stillborn after its first Pennsylvania campaign, an
abrupt intensification of sectional tensions during the winter and spring won the
party countless new devotees.53
I
The eruption of violence in Kansas—allegedly the direct consequence of
dough-faced Democratic policy—added considerable fodder to the editorial
arsenals of Republican spokesmen across the North. Violent rogues, mostly from
Missouri, with the whole-hearted support of powerful southern slaveholders,
invaded the territory in order to intimidate any who would oppose their intents.
The South’s power structure had apparently determined that the fertile fields of
Kansas would be infected with the plague of slavery, violently if need, be.
Although northern Douglas Democrats had pleaded that fearing the possible
spread of the peculiar institution onto the Great Plains was unreasonable due to
the region’s dry climate, the so-called invasion of Kansas convinced many
northerners that no natural obstacle would stop the spread of slavery. Bleeding
53 Alexander K. McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 245.
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Kansas was a golden campaign issue for the burgeoning Republican party. Instead
of the rather hypothetical arguments over the possibilities of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act that dominated the political debate in 1854 and ‘55, Republicans could point
to actual physical assaults upon freedom. With the opening of the physical
struggle for Kansas, Pennsylvania’s Republican party secured a critical base of
supporters.
For the third consecutive year, the Pittsburgh Gazette was at the forefront
of Pennsylvania’s political antislavery movement. The principles of the new
party, which were laid down at the Pittsburgh meeting, filled the pages of the
Gazette in early 1856. One of the three platforms of the Pittsburgh meeting
declared: “we feel it our imperative and solemn duty not only to protest against
this dangerous and arrogant assumption of power and perversion of the spirit and
intentions of our Constitutional framers, but resist to the utmost of our abilities
those high-handed acts of injustice, tyranny, and oppression of our rulers, who . . .
are endeavoring to crush out the spirit of liberty in the Free State settlers in
Kansas and elsewhere.” Enacting a political program that would protect the
Kansas and Nebraska territories from the encroachment of slavery was the central
concern of the Republican party. “We will support by every lawful means our
brethren in Kansas in their constitutional and manly resistance to the usurped
authority of their lawless invader,” the Gazette declared in March.54
The violence in Kansas, and the apparent culpability of the Democratic
Pierce administration in the attempt to spread slavery, disgusted many

54 Pittsburgh Gazette, March 21, March 23. All newspapers and correspondence cited in this
chapter are from 1856 unless otherwise noted.
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Pennsylvanians who had resisted the formation of a Republican party only the
year before. During the early spring of 1856 the ranks of the new party swelled to
include such notable politicians as Simon Cameron, Thaddeus Stevens, Andrew
G. Curtin, and Galusha Grow among others. But the greatest breakthrough for the
Republican party occurred during May when two virtually unprecedented
incidents stunned the nation.55
On May 21, a party of proslavery Missourians raided the settlement of
Lawrence Kansas, destroying property and harassing local opponents of slavery.
Before reports of the raid reached the East, the news of the near fatal beating of
Senator Charles Sumner by a South Carolina Representative named Brooks,
outraged many northerners who had never supported Sumner’s radical antislavery
positions. “It ill becomes any man,” the nonpartisan Philadelphia Public Ledger
declared, “who respects the laws of the country, to lead his countenance to such
outrages as that perpetrated by Mr. Brooks.” These dual offenses, which splashed
across the pages of northern newspapers at virtually the same time, helped
convince many Pennsylvanians that civil liberties were under assault from a
brutish, undemocratic power that dwelled in their midst. “The brutal outrage on
Senator Sumner,” opined a nativist paper, “and the pro-slavery ruffians of Kansas,
have made in the North a hundred ffee-soilers, where yesterday there existed

55 Although Cameron apparently joined the Republicans sometime before the national contention,
his shrewd silence left many correspondents guessing over whom he would support for President
well into the summer. L. Rightmyer to Simon Cameron, January 24, June 13, Charles Kelly to
Cameron, June 16, Levi Reynolds to Cameron, June 30, Cameron papers, DCHS.
56 Philadelphia Public Ledger, July 17; Pottsville, Miner's Journal, May 31, June 7 (quotation),
also quoted in Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 214; The Erie Observer, May 31, placed most of
the blame for Sumner’s beating on his offensive speech.
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Civil War scholars have long recognized the importance of Bleeding
Kansas and the attack on Senator Sumner to the quick rise of the Republican party
in 1856. The events of May helped cement a theory in many northern minds that
became one of the Republican party’s core arguments. The slave power doctrine
achieved unprecedented validity during 1856. According to its testaments,
southerners, who were determined to enforce their view of labor throughout the
nation, dominated the national government with the help of northern Democratic
dupes, and were systematically attempting to ensure that the whole of the United
States would be turned into a slaveholding empire. None of the allegedly
proslavery bills recently passed by Congress could compare to the May outrages
as an illustration of the extralegal ways in which southerners were attempting to
ensure slavery’s future.
The slave power argument was ever-present in Pennsylvania Republican
propaganda. Party founder David Wilmot clearly evoked this theory shortly after
attending the Pittsburgh organizing meeting. “The slave-holders constituting less
than one in fifty of the free population of the country, control all the functions of
the General Government,” he declared. Even the North American, Philadelphia’s
conservative Republican paper, could insist that the South wanted to make
“slavery as wide as the national domain and as lasting as any mere human
institution on earth.” Harrisburg’s new Republican paper wished to attract men to
the party if only to battle the slave power. “A time has arrived in this country
when all true patriots, all sound, conservative politicians, and all moral and
religious men should stand shoulder to shoulder in opposition to the aggressions
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of the slave-holders aided by Northern demagogues.” The increasing impudence
of the South indicated that the North was losing the struggle for the soul of the
nation. If a Senator could be nearly beaten to death to the applause of southerners,
what line would not be crossed in order to serve the appetite of the slave power?

57

Northern Republicans could not accept the triumph of the slave power for
many reasons. Most insisted that the slave power was in direct opposition to the
principles of American democracy and republicanism. Wilmot explained that,
“slavery assails those fundamental truths declared to be self evident in the
Declaration of Independence.” The extralegal violence that the South had
apparently resorted to in order to perpetrate slavery outraged many persons across
the North. The South was additionally accused of openly assaulting the freedom
of speech, brutally oppressing any local attempt to question its institutions. Many
Republican leaders though felt that the slave power’s greatest threat was its attack
on the northern labor system. An important aspect of Republican rhetoric
involved convincing workingmen that stopping the slave power would benefit
their welfare.58
Pennsylvania Republicans constantly evoked Free Labor principles.
Republican leadership constantly attacked southerners who ridiculed northern
workingmen and called them wage slaves. Former Democrat William Kelley
declared that southerners “think it a great deal better that capital should own labor

57 Wilmot quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, March 28; Harrisburg Daily Telegraph October 7;
Philadelphia North American, October 14, quoted William E. Gienapp, Origins, 364.
58 Pittsburgh Gazette, August 20; David Wilmot quoted in Charles B. Going, David Wilmot: Free
Soiler (New York, 1924), 481. Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Men: The Ideology o f the
Republican Party Before the Civil War (Oxford, 1970), is the best source on the Free Labor views
o f the Republican party.
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than hire it! Pray, will you not go and sell yourselves my fellow citizens.”
Democrats had traditionally attracted the majority of the urban vote, where most
laborers resided, but Republicans felt that they were now vulnerable. “The
Buchanier Party of the North,” claimed the Pittsburgh Gazette, “is fast subsiding
not only into the use of the southern slang about the workingman of the free
states, but into the convention so frankly avowed in the South, that workingmen
ought to be slaves.” Republicans generally also insisted that Free Labor could
benefit the South as well. “In the great contest for Free Labor,” insisted the
Gazette, “they have as much at stake as we [the North] have.”59
Although slavery was at the forefront of the sectional debate, the fate of
the slave troubled only a minority of Republicans. Few Pennsylvania newspapers
openly dwelled on the fate of those most clearly affected by the slavery debate.
While overt racism was only occasionally expressed in most Republican sheets,
attitudes towards African Americans were rarely unprejudiced. The Pittsburgh
Gazette was on of Pennsylvania’s more radical papers, but it was not willing to
make the plight of the slave a priority. “We do not suppose that any honest
Republican desires to oppress the colored race or to inflict upon them further
injustice, but we trust they would prefer to lighten their heavy burden. But the
present contest is one which effects the colored race indirectly and remotely.”
Republicans were concerned with winning elections. Egalitarianism was not
popular in 1850’s Pennsylvania.60

59 Kelley quoted in William Dusinberre Civil War Issues in Philadelphia, 1861-65 (Philadelphia
1974), 34; Pittsburgh Gazette, September 13, 18, February 23.
60 Pittsburgh Gazette, September 17.
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Keystone Republicans also had to address continuing religious bigotry.
Much of the Republican campaign in early1856 concentrated on capturing former
Know Nothings who were increasingly disgusted with the dough-faced slant of
the American party. “There is an earnest desire, prevailing men of all parties to
have union on some terms,” declared the Pittsburgh Gazette in March. Most
Republicans insisted that nativism had ceased to be the cause of the moment. The
Gazette declared that Millard Fillmore-the leading aspirant for the American
Presidential nomination, who had spent much of 1855 in Europe—was out of
touch with the current political climate. “Had he been in the United States instead
of on the balmy shores of the Mediterranean during the past six months, he would
have seen and felt that the time for ignoring the question of slavery is past.” The
American party had already lost supporters after the 1855 Philadelphia convention
and House speaker election; the nomination of Fillmore made the party more
vulnerable to defections.61
In March 1856 Pennsylvania’s Republicans took a giant stride towards
capitalizing on the disruption of the American party. Members of both parties
agreed to hold a joint nominating convention to form a “Union” ticket. Those
attending the Union meeting at Harrisburg agreed that only one opposition ticket
would be in the field, thus giving both groups a much better chance to defeat
Democrats whom they both disliked. Combining antislavery rhetoric, which
keyed on Kansas outrages, and nativism, the convention nominated three men for
the statewide offices at stake for October. A conservative Whig was nominated

61 Pittsburgh Gazette, March 28, June 16. The problems o f the American party will be covered in
the next section.
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for canal commissioner, a former Democrat for surveyor general, and a member
of the American party for auditor general. Although some Republicans were
disappointed with the favors given to nativists, the Union convention seemed to
bode well for the possibility of unified Presidential ticket for November.

62

The national Republican convention, as agreed upon after February’s
Pittsburgh meeting, convened June 17th in Philadelphia. Although Pennsylvania
Republicans were optimistic that the party could win the state’s Presidential
electors, there was little consensus that a sure winner could be found among the
aspirants for the party nomination. Many Pennsylvanians favored Supreme Court
Justice John McLean, an Ohioan who maintained only a minimal adherence to
Republican principles. McLean was the favorite of Thaddeus Stevens and several
of Pennsylvania’s eighty-one delegates. However, most Republicans did not
consider him a serious candidate. At the same time, few Keystone Republicans
backed William H. Seward or Salmon P. Chase, two of the leading candidates.
After adopting a strong antislavery platform, the Philadelphia convention
nominated John C. Fremont, a famous western explorer with little political
experience, as the party’s first presidential candidate. New Jersey Congressman
William Dayton received the Vice-Presidential nomination, although many
conventioneers felt that William Johnston, the nominee of the breakaway North
American convention, should have been chosen. Despite the somewhat surprising
nominations, Pennsylvania’s leading Republican newspapers responded positively

62 John F. Coleman, The Disruption o f The Pennsylvania Democracy, 1848-1860 (Harrisburg,
1975), 89-90; Pittsburgh Gazette, March 26.
63 E. Joy Morris to John M. Clayton, May 11, Clayton Papers, LC; Thomas Allen to Thaddeus
Stevens, June 4, Stevens papers, LC.
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to the convention. Confidence resonated from leading journals. The Harrisburg
Telegraph insisted that Fremont’s election would “be a barrier against the
encroachments of the slave-holding power, [success] will give a large and fertile
territory to the ffeedmen of the North.”64
The Fremont nomination however, was met with some apprehension in
Pennsylvania. It seemed clear that winning support in conservative Philadelphia
would be difficult. “There is no doubt that McLean would have been a popular
nominee in this city and that Fremont is just now devoid at that strength so far as
[Philadelphia] is concerned.” 65 Although Pennsylvania Republicans still had a
considerable task before them if they wanted to secure the full opposition vote,
the difficulty of their quest was eased by the continued disintegration of the
American party.

n
At the moment when the Republican party was forming in Pittsburgh, the
American party was again coming apart--if not dying—across the state in
Philadelphia. At a time when sectional tensions continued to rise, the American
party was still hoping to ignore sectional problems as it limped into its national
convention. Amazingly, the party had yet to come to an agreement on how to
address the Kansas-Nebraska Act. When the party did try to take some kind of
stand on pressing sectional questions, it tended to assume southern views. Across
the North, including Pennsylvania, the American party was increasingly subject to
Republican ridicule. After the division over section twelve of the 1855 platform,
64 Harrisburg Telegraph, October 7; Pittsburgh Gazette, June 21; For the Republican platform see,
Philadelphia Public Ledger, June 18.
65 Pittsburgh Gazette, June 21.
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and the victory of Nathaniel Banks in the Speaker’s race, Republicans felt that
many northern Americans would simply surrender to the younger party. After
February 1856, it seemed that this scenario was quite possible.
Few observers felt that American party could survive its February national
nominating convention intact. Some convention attendees felt that the party was
too divided to even risk a nominee so early in the year. But most party members
felt that dissolving the convention would only meet with disaster. “If we should
dissolve [illegible] without nominating, the American party must become
subservient to the Black Republican party,” fretted one supporter. The fears over
the cohesion of the party proved quite valid as it again split.66
Only two men had a chance at the nomination as the convention opened
on Washington’s birthday: former President Milliard Fillmore, and New York
businessman George Law. To the disgust of many of the founders of the Know
Nothings movement, and those who whished to include some antislavery
principles in the party-most of whom favored Law-Fillmore received the
nomination for President. Many within the old Know Nothing movement
regretted the new conservative neo-Whig makeup of the American party, which
the Fillmore nomination seemed to indicate. But those most upset by Fillmore’s
victory were northerners who despised Fillmore’s role in the passage of the
Compromise of 1850.67 “We infer,” concluded the Pittsburgh Gazette upon
hearing of the nomination, “that Northern Doughfacism and Slavery have

66 G. P. James to John M. Clayton, [no date, but dispatched from Philadelphia, 1856] Clayton
papers, LC.
7 Andrew Jackson Donelson, a nephew o f Old Hickory, was chosen for the Vice Presidential slot.
A sparsely attended Louisville, Kentucky convention o f holdout Whigs also nominated Fillmore.
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triumphed over the Anti-Slavery sentiment in the American party.” Even
Democratic papers saw the nomination as a “southern triumph.”
The breakup commenced even before the nominating process began. A
large number of northern delegates left the convention rather than see Fillmore
receive the nomination. Calling themselves North Americans, the seceding
delegates condemned the American platform for not opposing the Missouri
Compromise repeal and called for their own nominating convention in June.
Many interested observers believed that fusion between the bolters and
Republicans would occur easily, but North Americans wanted assurance that they
could retain their nativist identity and receive due compensation from
Republicans if they were to support their candidate in November. The failure to
secure a smooth union between the two groups caused the opposition much grief
in Pennsylvania.69
The North American convention met shortly before the Republican
convention opened its doors. Agreements between Republican and North
American leaders led to the nominations of Nathaniel P. Banks and William F.
Johnston. As was apparently stipulated, Banks withdrew after Republicans
nominated Fremont, but most North Americans thought that Republicans would
drop William Dayton and accept Johnston as their Vice-Presidential candidate.
The refusal to support the former Pennsylvania governor upset many who hoped
to secure a relatively painless fusion between the two groups. But many
Republican party leaders outside of Pennsylvania felt that they could not afford to

68 Pittsburgh Gazette, February 25; Gettysburg Republican Compiler, March 3.
69Pittsburgh Gazette, February 23, 26, 28; Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 238-40.
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be so closely linked with the nativist movement and they rejected accepting
Johnston. Republicans counted on receiving a large number of German
immigrants in key western states, but many Keystone voters were disappointed by
the failure of Republicans to show more deference to the nativist movement.70
Meanwhile the fortunes of the American party continued to decline. Amid
allegations of gross mismanagement over the course of their two-year reign in
government, the party suffered defeat in Philadelphia’s city election where
Richard Vaux recaptured the mayor’s office. Americans also preformed poorly in
New England’s spring state elections.

71

Nativism though retained a powerful

interest in Pennsylvania that could prove costly if the national Republican party
tried to distance itself too much. The anti-Catholic dogma of the Know Nothings
was noticeable in many Pennsylvania Republican sheets. Editorials often
combined anti-southern rhetoric with anti-Catholicism. “The elements of the
Slave Power in this State,” complained the Harrisburg Telegraph, “comprise the
entire Catholic vote.” Pennsylvania Republicans quickly learned to dislike
Democrats for attracting the great majority of the Catholic and immigrant vote,
consistently condemning the “thoughtless” fealty of Catholics. Moderate nativists
could feel confident that some of their concerns would be addressed even if their
original party dissolved.72 But many former-Pennsylvania Know Nothings were
unconvinced by the actions of Republican leadership during 1856. The failure of

70Pittsburgh Gazette, June 19, 23, July 2; On the Vice Presidency controversy, T. Weed to Simon
Cameron, November 12, Cameron papers, LC; Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 244; Gienapp,
Origins, passim.
71 The result in Philadelphia was: Vaux-D, 29,534 Moore-A, 25,445. No Republican candidate
competed. For New England’s Elections see Gienapp, Origins, 273-278.
72 Harrisburg Telegraph, October 25. The Philadelphia North American also had strong tinges of
nativism.
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the Republican party to attract a larger percentage of support from former Know
Nothings cost them the election in 1856.
Both Democrats and Republicans hoped to receive votes from the
disintegrating American party.

T\

Yet both parties also felt compelled to ridicule

those Americans who choose to side with their enemies. The Democratic
Pennsylvanian was quite tom in what attitude to adopt. Although the paper felt
that the alliance between nativists and Republicans would not last, it was still
disgusted to see the two groups working together declaring: “the bargain . ..
between certain false Fillmore men, who profess to be for Fillmore, and are
anxious only to get themselves into place at the expense of national principles,
and the straight out Fremont leaders, is evidently a mere rope of sand, and will be
blown into the air in a very short time.”74 Democrats were often placed in an
awkward position as they saw the American party break up. They hoped to secure
disillusioned members, but felt compelled to ridicule Republicans for seeking
nativist support and often criticized those Americans who chose to side with
Fremont as sellouts. The same Pennsylvanian, which seemed so upset at
Americans who sold out Fillmore, could also insist that, “the object of the
Fillmore leaders in Pennsylvania is to assist the Abolitionists to elect their State
ticket in October.”75

73 Harrisburg Telegraph, October 11; For Democrats: Pittsburgh Post, November 1; George A.
Crawford to William Bigler, August 9, Bigler papers, HSP; Benjamin Parke to James Buchanan,
August 7, Buchanan papers, HSP.
74 Pennsylvanian quoted Pittsburgh Post, September 17.
15Pennsylvanian quoted, Gettysburg Republican Compiler, July 28. Jeremiah Sullivan Black was
an especially harsh critic o f Know Nothings even though other Democrats pleaded for their
support. J. S. Black to James Buchanan, July 12, Buchanan papers, HSP; The Union-loving
Fillmore often earned personal praise from Democrats see: Gettysburg Republican Compiler,
October 6.
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Despite moments of schizophrenia when dealing with the American party,
Democrats were wholly attuned to the seriousness of their position. As they saw
one mortal enemy slip into premature decline another was threatening the very
existence of the Union they loved so much. Pennsylvania Democrats entered 1856
much stronger than the national organization. Consequently, many eyes turned to
the old Keystone State for rescue. In March 1856 the Pennsylvania Democratic
state convention recommended that the national party nominate James Buchanan
for President. His experience, his integrity, his conservatism, and his availability
all combined to make him the front-runner to rescue the Union from the dual
demons of American party nativism and Black-Republican abolitionism.
m
Although Franklin Pierce still had support for a second term in the South
and among some New Englanders, his troubled Presidency had earned him few
devoted supporters in Pennsylvania. The old bachelor of Wheatland seemed to be
the answer. “A refusal to nominate you,” insisted a Somerset Democrat, “would
as certainly bring defeat to us in Pennsylvania.”76 Buchanan had a long record of
national service and was generally well respected in most political circles. Unlike
Stephen A. Douglas, another leading contender for the nomination, no direct link
could be made between Buchanan and the Kansas trouble. Others felt that the
sixty-five year old simply deserved a term as President for all his years of
service. 77

76 Isaac Hangas to James Buchanan, May 5, Buchanan papers, HSP. “Wheatland” was the name
o f Buchanan’s Lancaster home.
77 Philip S. Klein, James Buchanan: A Biography (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1962).
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Although Democrats opened the year with apparently little to fear from
the underdeveloped Republican party, the rise of sectional tensions worried many
in Pennsylvania including Buchanan: “We shall, I firmly believe triumph in the
conflict and save the Union,” he assured Virginia’s Henry Wise, “b u t . . . we shall
78

have a more bitter fight in front than we have ever yet encountered.” The
Kansas turmoil was a serious problem for many Democrats, but party rhetoric
focused on questioning the validity of Republican complaints. “We know not,
when receiving Kansas news,” stated the usually nonpartisan Philadelphia Public
Ledger, “whether we are getting real facts or only the exaggerated distortions of
every crazy partisan.” After the ‘sack’ of Lawrence the Erie Observer scoffed,
“the abolitionists wish these rumors true, because they make capital for their
party. ” 79
Pennsylvania’s Democrats had to respond to Republican’s Free Labor
arguments as well as the Kansas troubles. “Workingmen,” declared the
Pittsburgh Post, “be not blinded to your own home interests by a senseless and
lying clamor about a remote territory that will be a free State, and peaceably too,
if the abolitionists let it alone.” Northern Democrats were continually
embarrassed by comments coming from their southern brethren. Few were willing
to defend southerners’ more outrageous acts. However, Democrats would not sit
quietly and let Republicans agitate the slavery question. Many felt that

78 James Buchanan quoted, Myers, Republican Party, 113.
79 Philadelphia Public Ledger, May 26; Erie Observer, May 31; Also see, B. W. Lacey to William
Bigler, August 19; W. Hutter to James Buchanan, June 9, and William Bigler to Buchanan, June
28, Buchanan papers, HSP.
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Republicans opened themselves up to racist attacks when they criticized the
institution.80
Even if slavery was not popular in the Keystone State, Republican
antislavery commitments could still be a political liability with the state’s racist
electorate. Racism was at the core of many Democratic attacks on the
Republicans. The Pennsylvanian, based in Philadelphia, was arguably the most
virulently racist Democratic organ in the state. “If free niggers are so elevated by
the mere nomination of Fremont,” it stated in October, “their overbearing
insolence would be insufferable if there was any probability of his being elected.
White people would hardly be allowed to trespass upon the street by these
odoriferous Republicans.” The Pittsburgh Post, which was more restrained in its
racism than most Democratic organs nonetheless relied on it. “There is no
disguising now the fact that the one practical element of the Black Republican
party is to abolish slavery and elevate the negro race to an equal social and
political condition with the white race,” it declared shortly before the election.

81

While Democrats nobly defended Catholics and European immigrants
constantly, they could find few good things to say about African Americans be
they slave or free.

“Know Nothings and abolitionists—what a hideous

amalgamation of treasons!” declared Jeremiah S. Black. Racism was a devoutly
held belief for many Pennsylvanians, and Philadelphia was arguably the most

80 Pittsburgh Post, October 16 (quotation), September 15.
81 Pennsylvanian, October 11, quoted in William Dusinberre, Civil War Issues in Philadelphia,
1856-1865, 28; Pittsburgh Post, October 16; James Buchanan to William Bigler, August 19,
Bigler papers, HSP; For attacks on slavery from a Democratic pastor see Gettysburg Republican
Compiler, January 14.
82 For one of the numerous examples of Democratic hatred o f nativism see: Gettysburg Republican
Compiler, February 4.

63
racist place in the North. The Dispatch, one of the city’s nonpartisan papers,
succinctly summed up its opinions: “it would be beneficial for the country if the
whole black population could be removed from the soil to some other clime.”
Such attitudes help explain the power of the Democratic party in Pennsylvania,
but racism was hardly the only weapon the party held.
The Democratic national convention completed its business relatively
smoothly. Meeting in Cincinnati during the early days of June the convention
preformed the party a considerable service by presenting a unified front. Even
with the turmoil of the Pierce administration Democrats faced nowhere near the
contentiousness that would plague them four years later. To the great delight of
many in Pennsylvania, James Buchanan received the nomination. “I give Fremont
all possible credit,” admitted leading Pittsburgh Democrat William Wilkins, “but I
have no idea of placing him over such a man as Mr. Buchanan.”
Republicans were understandably less impressed with the nomination.
“Buchanan is an Old Fogey of the worst kind,” declared the Pittsburgh Gazette,
“but the battle will be fought on the great question of the day, on the issues
between Freedom and Slavery.”85 Slavery remained at the center of Republican
attacks upon Democrats. Even if Pennsylvania did not maintain the anti slavery
passions of states like Massachusetts and Ohio, Republicans still used the
campaign against the spread of slavery as the base of their arguments. What were

83 J. S. Black to James Buchanan, August 11, Buchanan papers, HSP; Dispatch, May 25, quoted,
Dusinberre, Civil War Issues, 44-45. James Buchanan was not a demagogue; his racism could
hardly be compared to that o f Stephen Douglas.
84 Pittsburgh Post, June 10, August 29 (quotation); W. McLean, to William Bigler, June 28, Bigler
papers, HSP.
Pittsburgh Gazette, June 9.
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perceived as the proslavery planks of the Cincinnati platform where constantly
attacked. One placard at a Pittsburgh Republican rally reportedly read: “Wanted
1000 Niggers for Wheatland. A plank from the Cincinnati platform.”
Pennsylvania Democrats however, constantly defended their party’s policies in
Kansas, insisting that their party was not determined to expand slavery. “That Mr.
Buchanan is in favor of extending slavery every one {sic} knows to be a
falsehood,” insisted the Pittsburgh Post. “No man could assert a greater falsehood
than to say that the Democracy of the Free States are in favor of Slavery in any
shape or form,” declared Franklin County’s Democratic paper.86
The campaign of 1856 would take on revolutionary qualities in
Pennsylvania. All parties did their best to alert voters to the seriousness of the
political situation, frequently harkening back to the days when the nation
struggled for its independence to make their point. Both Americans and
Democrats cloaked themselves in the flag and insisted they could save the Union
from radicalism. But it was Republicans who seemed to evoke the most stirring
portraits of the Revolution. “Politically, we are now as much in a state of
revolution as our fathers were in 1776,” declared the Pittsburgh Gazette.
“Freemen of Beaver County,” cried the Beaver Argus, “[the] words of Jefferson
now appeal to you. Fremont is their representative—the representative of
freedom. Buchanan is the representative of their opposite—the representative of

86 Rally reported on by Pittsburgh Gazette, September 18; Pittsburgh Post, July 28; Chambersburg
Valley Spirit, quoted Gettysburg Republican Compiler, September 15.
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slavery.” Sectional tensions had created a very sharp atmosphere in the Keystone
State. But Pennsylvanians still wanted a peaceful solution in 1856.87
IV
In addition to the threatening section tensions, the Presidential campaign
was also quite vigorous due to the highly fluid nature of party membership.
Unlike the years before 1852 and after 1860, the chances that a voter would
switch parties were high in 1856. For Republicans, and Americans dissatisfied
with the nomination of Fillmore, the major struggle of the campaign was forming
a unified Presidential ticket. At the outset of the year Republicans seemed to be
operating from a disadvantage. A state committee that was more concerned with
nativism than antislavery handicapped the party severely. But by the summer even
William Jessup, who had helped undermine the party the year before, was ready
to admit that the slavery question should be at the forefront of any unified
opposition party. The reports after the first attempt to unify the anti-Democratic
forces in the state were largely positive. The Gazette declared that the March 26
Harrisburg Union convention proved that although the opposition in Pennsylvania
was divided, “a large majority of the freemen of this State are agreed upon the
momentous issues forced upon the country by the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise.” Editor D. N. White, who had hesitated in his support for fusion
with former Know Nothings, was pleased that Republican* principles apparently

87 Beaver Argus, October 17; Pittsburgh Gazette, July 4. The Gettysburg Star and Banner claimed
Fremont sought, “to restore the National policy which Washington and his compeers inaugurated.”
Quoted Gettysburg Republican Compiler, September 22.
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would find their way into the platform of the state’s opposition party, even if it
would not be officially referred to as the Republican party.88
Although the American party’s support had dissipated considerably across
the North, the party still retained a considerable and critical number of resilient
supporters throughout Pennsylvania. Many observers felt that their votes would
account for the difference at the polls. But even if the votes of former Know
Nothings could provide the margin of victory in October, there was no guarantee
that they would back Fremont in the far more important November election.
Simon Cameron declared we must “convince the people that Fremont can be
elected and that Fillmore, as is the truth, has not the shadow of a chance.” Some
former backers of Fillmore were convinced; Republicans newspapers constantly
printed the names of papers or notable persons who made the switch. The
proslavery aggressions of the South were the most consistent reason for the
change that papers cited. The Gettysburg Star and Banner explained as it
announced its switch to Fremont that the, “fixed purpose of the Southern
politicians to convert the National Government into an engine for the furtherance
of the purposes of Slavery propagandists, can no longer be doubted.” 89
However, not all Fillmore men could be convinced. For as Alexander
McClure later stated, “a large proportion of the Know Nothings of the North were
strongly conservative on the slavery question.” Correspondents consistently
pressed Simon Cameron, who had many connections with old Know Nothings, to

88 Pittsburgh Gazette, March 29; Stephen Mills to Simon Cameron, August 8, Cameron papers
DCHS.
89 Simon Cameron to Edwin Morgan, and Gettysburg Star and Banner, June 27 both quoted in
Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 239, 227; Pittsburgh Gazette, July 17.
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do what he could to play down the influence of Republicanism and create a
unified Presidential ticket. “It would fully commit all the conservative
Americans,” pleaded one such correspondent, “many of whom will not support a
ticket selected by the Republicans alone.” No unified Presidential ballot existed
despite the presence of a united state ticket. Consequently, pessimism began to set
in on the Republican side. Pennsylvania Democrats on the other hand were
confident that such holdouts would be enough to hand them victory.90
A core group of Fillmore supporters refused to form a unified Presidential
ticket. These men usually despised the antislavery radicalism of the Republican
party. Some of the leaders of the Fillmore group even secretly worked with
Democratic chairman John W. Forney to assure Republican defeat. Even more
outrageously, elements within the American party attempted to ‘slander’ John C.
Fremont by claiming that he was a Catholic. Pennsylvania Republicans devoted
scores of editorials and were forced to spend valuable campaign funds to account
for this poisonous accusation. “I do not see that anything can be said with regard
to Col. Fremont’s religion that has not already been said,” an exasperated Horace
Greeley explained to Simon Cameron. Some Republicans countered these
accusations by pointing out that a Catholic convent educated Fillmore’s daughter
and that he had had a positive meeting with the Pope while visiting Rome.91

90 Alexander K. McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 245-46; Stephen Mills to Simon Cameron, August
28, Cameron papers, DCHS; Nimrod Strickland August 11, to Bigler, John Veit to Bigler, August
2, John C. Evans, September 7, to Bigler, Bigler papers, HSP.
91Horace Greeley to Simon Cameron, September 15, Cameron Papers, LC; Pittsburgh Gazette,
July 21, September 6. A Catholic priest married Fremont and his wife Jessis, but he remained a
Protestant.
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Most Republicans were outraged by the obstructionism of the Fillmore
men. “The feud is now pretty bitter between the Fillmore and Fremont men,”
noted Democratic Congressman J. Glancey Jones. But some Republicans would
later admit that much of the blame for the schism rested with their state’s own
party forces. “I do not know to what extent the straight ticket will injure us,”
admitted Stevens. “Our fatal mistake was delaying to form our ticket until it is too
late to smash the Sanderson Party,” he stated in reference to the straight-Fillmore
leader.92
In addition to the difficulty attracting former Know Nothings, Keystone
Republicans also had to deal with Democratic accusations that they were Unionthreatening radicals.

Most Republicans insisted that the Union faced no real

threat from southern loudmouths. “As to treats of disunion and serration,” stated
the Philadelphia North American, “they are simply nonsense. The South cannot
exist without the North.” The North American insisted that if the South were to
secede, the North would have to be called upon to rescue it from slave
insurrections.

94

Both the Republican and Democratic camps exulted over their success in
winning converts during the 1856 campaign. Democrats took particular pride in
announcing the conversion of former Whigs to the Jacksonian standard. The most
notable Pennsylvania Whigs who agree to support Buchanan were William B.
Reed, John Randall, Joseph R. Chandler, and the Ingersoll family of
92 J. G. Jones to James Buchanan, July 20. Buchanan papers, HSP; Thaddeus Stevens to E. D.
Gazzam, August 24, McPherson papers, LC.
93 Pittsburgh Post, July 19; James Buchanan to William Bigler, August 19, Bigler papers, HSP;
John W. Fomey to Henry Wise, July 8, Forney papers, LC.
94 Philadelphia North American, August 11, quoted in Dusinberre, Civil War Issues, 38.
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Philadelphia.95 Democrats also claimed to have secured the votes of former
Know Nothings, some of who may have left the Democratic party temporarily in
1854. Vying for the support of former Whigs was almost as important as the
attempts to gain the vote of former American party supporters. The Whig vote
may have been a decisive factor in the Democratic victory, especially in the
southeastern part of the state. Most former Whigs though, either aligned with the
Republicans, or left the electorate.96
While former Whigs made up the majority of the Pennsylvania Republican
party, a sizable minority were ex-Democrats. Along with the former Free Soilers
David Wilmot and Congressman Galusha Grow, Simon Cameron, John M. Read
of Philadelphia, James K. Moorhead of Allegheny County, and former Treasury
Secretary Samuel Ingham, came out in favor of Fremont.97 The biggest recruiting
victories for Republicans however, came in the form of mass support from the
state’s northern and western districts. Political observers, Democratic and
Republican, predicted well before balloting began that Republicanism would win
a majority in places like Pittsburgh, Erie, and Towanda. We must have some
“help or we will sink,” pleaded one Potter County Democrat. “The people of
Western Pennsylvania are against you,” insisted the Pittsburgh Gazette, “You
cannot rally them to the Filibuster, Nigger-Driving, Slavery-Extending, Ten-

95 Gettysburg Republican Compiler, July 21, August 18.
96 Harrisburg Telegraph, October 24; Isaac Hangas to James Buchanan, May 25, Buchanan papers,
HSP. The Pittsburgh Gazette, June 16, thought it was “absurd” that Whigs would vote for their old
enemy Buchanan.
97 Myers, Republican Party, 111; Philadelphia Public Ledger, October 13.
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cents-a-day Standard.” 98 Overwhelming support in the north and west pleased
many Republicans. But these successes were not enough to win the state.
Pennsylvania Democrats had one giant advantage over Republicans. Their
organizing capabilities, especially the ability to raise money to support speakers
and distribute propaganda, were far superior to those of the newly-organized
Republican party. The skill of John W. Forney in managing the Democratic
campaign was critical in the minds of many contemporary and historical
observers. Although Republicans operated from a great disadvantage because they
had to start virtually from scratch in organizing party machinery, their level of
disorganization was hard to account for. Quarreling persisted between former
Whigs and Democrats, especially between Simon Cameron, who was also the
leading private financer for the party, and the ex-Whig state chairman. The
shortcomings of the state’s Republican committee had forced Cameron to become
more personally and financially involved. This was the beginning of Cameron’s
influence upon Pennsylvania’s Republican party, which he would eventually run.
But the effects of his leadership in 1856 were questionable.99
Out-of-state Republicans, who eventually had to assist their Keystone
State brethren, were highly disappointed with the party’s organization. One
leading party functionary expressed his disgust shortly before the election: “if we
98 D.W. James to William Bigler, August 18, (quotation), P. McCormic to Bigler, August 20,
Bigler papers, HSP; Pittsburgh Gazette, September 11 (quotation), July 14; John W. Forney to
Buchanan, July 20, George W. Bacon to Buchanan, August 4, Christopher Ward to Buchanan
September 10, Buchanan papers, HSP; J. Pones to Simon Cameron, September 15, Cameron
papers, DCHS. Buchanan had long been accused o f stating that workers could survive on ten cents
a day.
99 T. Weed to Simon Cameron, August 16, Simon Cameron, to T. Weed, November 9, Cameron
papers, LC; Compare to: Nimrod Strickland, August 11, and A. Stahler, August 13, to William
Bigler, Bigler papers, HSP; John W. Forney, September 10, and 26 to James Buchanan, Buchanan
papers, HSP; Gienapp, Origins, 400.
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hope to carry Pa we must literally lift & carry it.” The highly pessimistic
Thaddeus Stevens could simply add that, “the State is worse managed this
campaign than I ever knew it.” Despite the tremendous strides that the party had
made in less than a years time, few Pennsylvania Republicans seriously believed
that victory would greet them at the polls.100
V
The October result was surprisingly close. Some Republican journals even
declared that the Union ticket had prevailed, but they eventually had to admit a
heart-wrenchingly close defeat. The three Democratic candidates defeated their
Union ticket opponents by an average 212,700 to 209,400 tally. Democrats
retained a six-vote majority in the state legislature and a three-vote majority in the
joint assembly. Fifteen Democrats won seats in Congress while ten opposition
candidates won election. As expected, Republicans had made little progress in
Philadelphia. The one opposition man to win election to Congress, E. Joy Morris,
had little tolerance for Republicanism, while the only real Republican to run in
Philadelphia, William Kelly, received only 2,457 votes out of the 17,500 cast in
his district.101
The statewide Union ticket vote improved on the Fusion vote in the off
year election of 1855 by 60,000 and was even 8,000 higher then the combined
Whig and Know Nothing vote that James Pollock received in 1854. Democrats

100 William B. Reed to James Buchanan, October 11, Buchanan papers, HSP; Henry B. Stanton
and Thaddeus Stevens, quoted Gienapp, Origins, 397, 398; Myers, Republican Party, 127.
101 The full results were: Canal Commission, Scott-D, 212,925 Cochran-U, 210,172; Auditor Gen.,
Fry-D, 212,925 Phelps-U, 209,261; Surveyor Gen., Rowe-D, 212,623 Laporte-U, 208,888.
Philadelphia Public Ledger, October 18; William Gienapp estimates turnout at 72.7 percent,
Origins, 401. Newspapers were not clear on the legislative majorities, but the voting for Senator in
1857 indicates these numbers.
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though, drew 50,000 more votes than they received in 1855 and 45,000 more than
two years previous. Several Republicans declared that Democrats had only
obtained victory through fraud, alleging that a large number of illegal ballots were
cast in Philadelphia; accusations that Democrats steadfastly refuted.102
After the October defeat, Keystone Republicans attempted a mad
scramble, trying to get all Fillmore voters to switch to Fremont. Even though
Fillmore no longer even had a chance to throw the vote into the U.S. House, his
staunchest supporters in Pennsylvania would not agree to the withdrawal of his
ticket. But an agreement was reached with some elements of the Fillmore group
and a joint electoral ticket was formed in late October. Twenty-six electors would
be shared by the two parties, with the name of either Fillmore or Fremont
rounding out the ticket. If this ticket won the state, the candidate with the most
ballots headed with his name would win twenty-six electoral votes. However,
most leaders of the state’s American party, including John Sanderson, would not
support the fusion movement. And so, a straight Fillmore ticket remained
available. The 26,303 men who cast ballots for the straight Fillmore ballot very
nearly provided the margin of victory for Democrat James Buchanan.
Buchanan triumphed over the fusion opposition ticket 230,101 to 203,288.
While fewer than 150,000 voters supported Fremont over Fillmore on the fusion
ticket, he would have won Pennsylvania’s electoral votes under the terms of the
October agreement if 30,000 more votes had gone to the dual ticket. Republicans
quite reasonably cited the stubbornness of the straight Fillmore men for their

102 Harrisburg Telegraph, October 16; Pittsburgh Gazette, October 18; Philadelphia Public Ledger,
October 20; McClure, O ld Time Notes, I, 292.
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defeat. “What was the effect of the straight out ticket? To help BUCHANAN!,”
concluded the Harrisburg Telegraph. The disagreement over the party’s VicePresidential choice was also cited in election postmortems. Others cited the
popularity of native son James Buchanan.103
The closeness of the result in October and November belied the weakness
of the Republican party in Pennsylvania. Although it had performed very strongly
in the extreme western and northern sections of the state, the party was woefully
underrepresented in several populous eastern and central counties. Buchanan
received 30,000 more votes than Fremont in Philadelphia County alone. Millard
Fillmore had considerably more supporters than Fremont in several southeastern
counties. In York County Fremont was outpolled by the combined Fillmore vote
by nearly 4,000. Fremont received less than thirty-three percent of the vote in
thirty-three of Pennsylvania’s sixty-four counties including highly populated
Philadelphia, Berks, Dauphin, and Schuylkill.
Despite their relatively poor showing, Pennsylvania Republicans held out
great hope. “The campaign which concluded on the 4th of November in the
temporary defeat of the great Republican party,” insisted the Pittsburgh Gazette,
“disclosed nevertheless, such strength in various portions of the Republic, as is an
excellent omen for the future.” Democrats also had great hopes for the future.
Many pointed to both the October and November victories and the relative calm
that had descended upon Kansas; mostly the result, they claimed, of another
Pennsylvania Democrat John W. Geary. However, their predictions of a future
103 Harrisburg Telegraph, November 6 (quotation), October 20. T. Weed to Simon Cameron,
November 12, Cameron papers, LC. The total vote in Pennsylvania was: Buchanan, 230,700
50.1% Fremont, 147,510 32.0% Fillmore-fusion, 55,838 12.1% Fillmore-straight, 26,338 5.7%.
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blessed by serenity seem tragically ironic. “The Inauguration of James
Buchanan,” declared Gettysburg’s Democratic paper, “will form a new era in the
history of the country. It will be the rainbow of peace to the nation and tend to
strengthen and consolidate the bonds of the Union, and add to the glory and
perpetuity of the Republic.” James Buchanan’s administration would not meet
these expectations. Nowhere would his party pay a higher price for that failure
than in the Keystone State.104

104 Pittsburgh Gazette, January 6, 1857; Beaver Argus, November 12.

CHAPTER 4

“You Know How Sensitive Our People Are About Slavery”
The Chaos of the Pennsylvania Democratic Party, 1857-1859

If the Republican party hoped to capture the presidency in 1860 winning
in Pennsylvania was a virtual necessity. To achieve majority status in the
Keystone State Republicans would have to absorb the greater part of the nativist
and conservative Fillmore vote. Nativist principles and the American party were
still formidable at the end of 1856. “We believe,” declared the Harrisburg Herald
that “more than two-thirds in this State, who voted with the Republicans at the
late election, on the grounds of expediency, are soundly American at heart.” It
was clear to all but their most strident believers however, that the American party
itself was mortally weakened after Fillmore’s defeat. One key question remained.
Could enough of these nativjsts and conservatives accept the principally
antislavery Republican party to swing the Keystone State away from
Democracy?105

105 Harrisburg Herald, November 25, 1856. All primary sources in this section are from 1857
until otherwise noted.
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In many ways, the solution to this quandary lay not with the Republicans
themselves, but with their rivals. The four years of turmoil that ravaged
Democrats after the election of Buchanan helped the Republican cause
immensely. The American problem also resolved itself. After 1857 the
Republican party was finally free from American competition for anti-Democratic
votes. While many Fillmore voters never accepted Republican hegemony, the
death of the American party only benefited the Republican alliance. The agonies
of the Democratic party proved even more profitable. Eventually, the coalition
that presented James Buchanan with an unprecedented vote in 1856 proved
untenable. Slavery continued to splinter Democracy. Patronage squabbles and
policy differences intensified long-welling internal fissures, and a lack of
cohesive party policy on banking, railroads, and tariffs left Keystone Democrats
unprepared for economic crisis. Voters deserted en masse; some to the sidelines,
others to the Republicans. Ultimately, the years between 1856 and 1860 are best
described as a period of Democratic and American failure.
I
The Republican party achieved its first major victory in Pennsylvania
early in 1857. Even though his elevation was somewhat tainted by charges of
bribery, the election of Simon Cameron to the U. S. Senate was a tremendous
boost to the heretofore struggling party. At the same time, the failure of
Democrats to hold their legislative majority during the electoral struggle harkened
ill tidings for the future of the state party. The factional squabbling, which the
Senatorial election exposed, would continue to plague the Pennsylvania
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Democratic party throughout James Buchanan’s presidency, consistently
providing Republicans with an opportunity for victory. The internal
decomposition-even if it was minor compared to other northern states—of the
Keystone Democratic party was essential to Republican triumphs after 1856.
The humiliating setback to the control of his own party was a dark omen
for James Buchanan. As the chief political officer in the nation Buchanan was
tasked with addressing the nearly all-consuming desire for patronage. While
cabinet officers filled the majority of patronage slots, Buchanan personally
controlled the selections for Pennsylvania’s key positions. As he embarked upon
his arduous task Buchanan not only had to be careful not to neglect or outrage any
of the various cliques within the Keystone Democracy-as he was obligated to
keep the party as cohesive as possible—but he also had to make sure his selections
did not offend his powerful southern supporters. Finding a worthy reward for
John W. Forney proved to be Buchanan’s most troubling task. Although he had
been a valuable campaign manager in 1856, Forney had acquired many personal
enemies in Pennsylvania and across the South. Thus Buchanan decided he could
not have Forney in his cabinet nor could he edit the official national
administration newspaper. Finally, Buchanan decided he would champion Forney
for Pennsylvania’s soon to be open Senatorial seat.106
Richard Brodhead, who had little support for a second term, was due to
exit the Senate in March.107 Pennsylvania’s Democratic leadership reportedly

106 John F. Coleman, The Disruption o f the Pennsylvania Democracy, 103-105; Philip Klein,
James Buchanan, 264-66; Robert Tyler to James Buchanan, January 23, 1857, Philip G.
Auchampaugh, Robert Tyler: Southern Rights Champion, 1847-1866 (Duluth, 1934), 74-75.
107 G. W. Childs to William Bigler, January 3, Bigler papers, HSP.

78
desired to replace him with former congressman Henry D. Foster of
Westmoreland County. However, after failing to obtain a place in the cabinet,
Forney decided that he would accept elevation to the Senate. Begrudgingly, the
Democratic legislative caucus approved his nomination in early January. In the
interim, Simon Cameron had secured the unified backing of Republicans and
remaining American legislators. Rumors were now flying that he could secure at
least three Democratic votes, which would overturn their slim majority.108
As revealed in the first chapter, Cameron did indeed receive the necessary
three votes, thus securing his election. Democrats howled with acerbic incredulity
at Cameron’s “treachery,” but much of the blame clearly rested.upon their own
party.109 Eleven Democrats failed to heed the dictation of Buchanan and voted
against Forney. Some western legislators were apparently upset that the
Philadelphia resident Forney would replace Brodhead, who lived in New Jersey
bordering Northampton County. Both of the Democratic candidates who received
dissenting votes hailed from the western end of the state.110 Yet it seems that the
unpopularity of Forney, along with the deft management of opposition forces by
Cameron, were the leading causes of the stunning upset.111
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Cameron, November 22, 1856, Joseph Wilkens, to Cameron, December 12, Cameron papers, LC;
For apprehension on Fomey’s candidacy see: G. R. Barrett to William Bigler, January 5, Bigler
papers, HSP; John W. Forney to James Buchanan, January 10, 11, 13, Buchanan papers, HSP.
09 Pittsburgh Post, January 14, 15, 16, 17; Gettysburg Republican Compiler, January 26; H. M.
North to William Bigler, January 15, Bigler papers HSP.
110 The full result was: Cameron 67 votes, Forney 58, Henry Foster 7, William Wilkins 1.
111 W. L. Hallowell to Simon Cameron, January 15, E. Kitchen, to Cameron, January 21, among
many others, Cameron papers, DCHS; P. Martin to Cameron, January 13, George Lean, to
Cameron, January 20, Cameron papers, LC. As a sop to his patronage needs, Forney eventually
obtained the editorship o f the Philadelphia Press. J. W. Forney to Jeremiah S. Black, July 5, Black
papers, LC.
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The Senatorial election was hardly the only grief that the new president
would suffer during 1857. The “rainbow of peace” never materialized in the wake
of the stormy Pierce administration. The corrosive forces of Buchanan’s
administration took time to mature though. The Dred Scott decision outraged
many Pennsylvanians, but it does not seem to have been as effective as the
Kansas troubles of 1856 in mobilizing Republicans. Kansas itself seemed to offer
no new issues in 1857. “The Kansas question, thank Heaven, will soon be put to
rest,” assured the Pittsburgh Post in September.112 James Buchanan’s first year in
office provided much controversy, but it would not produce the political
convulsions that would plague his second year.
II
Pennsylvania’s gubernatorial contest was arguably the most critical
i

election of 1857. Yet, the race failed to arouse the interest or turnout of the
preceding year’s presidential election, ultimately providing little more than the
groundwork for future campaigns. While the Democratic party was able to lay
aside its traumatic January Senate defeat and cruise to victory, Republicans
instead focused on strengthening their political base. Winning-admittedly a tall
order in light of the party’s shortcomings in 1856--was not their foremost goal.
Keystone Republicans instead used the governor’s campaign to establish the
ideological dominance of antislavery within the state’s anti-administration
coalition.
Although the final margin of their defeat was disturbing, most
Pennsylvania Republicans concluded in the wake of the election that they had
u2Pittsburgh Post, September 12. For Dred Scott: Pittsburgh Gazette, March 7, and 26.
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accomplished their broadest mission: independent nativism was finally crushed.
Although a considerable number of American party holdouts refused to accept
Republican hegemony within the anti-Democratic coalition for 1857, the
gubernatorial election proved that their party was finished in Pennsylvania. Even
if Republicans would have to yield some minor concessions in future elections in
order to attract the most pliable American holdouts, they would be negotiating
from a position of considerable strength after 1857. The Americans who objected
to Republicanism too much to ever join its ranks, generally drifted out of the
electorate after 1857.113
Although the failure to unite on John W. Forney for the Senatorial election
suggested that Keystone Democrats were vulnerable to dissension, the party’s
state convention passed harmoniously. William F. Packer, a well-respected
veteran of state politics, received the gubernatorial nomination.114 The opposition
‘Union’ convention was considerably more contentious as Republicans
endeavored to dominate a coalition that still seemed too conservative to some
antislavery men. Although the nominations for the two lesser state offices went to
Americans, David Wilmot’s selection for the governorship offended many
conservatives and nativists within the ‘Union’ coalition. Wilmot, a former Free
Soil Democrat from Bradford County, had never openly joined the Know Nothing
movement, instead moving directly into the Republican party. Combined with a

113 Coleman, 106-09; Alexander McClure, Old Time Notes I, 300; Charles Going, David Wilmot,
496-514. Voters would also choose a canal commissioner and a state supreme court justice in
October, as well as a new legislature and a third o f the state senate.
Many Democrats also looked forward to the death o f the American party. See: D. Weyands to
Jeremiah S. Black, September 28, Black papers, LC.
114 Erie Observer, March 7;
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party platform that was heavy on antislavery and light on nativist issues, was
Wilmot’s acceptance letter, which virtually ignored all issues not germane to the
slavery question. In the letter he tersely quipped that: “I have not time to speak of
the other topics.” Wilmot was a brazen choice for a party that was not yet
united.115
It was all too much for those in the anti-Democratic alliance who had not
fully accepted Republicanism, most of whom had voted for Fillmore in 1856.
Disaffected American-coalitionists sent Wilmot a public questionnaire and
attempted to have him affirm his nativist credentials. Although he complied, and
convinced some hesitant Americans, Wilmot remained too radical and too
unconvincingly nativist for many Pennsylvanians. American leadership now
decided that they should select a gubernatorial nominee of their own.116 Isaac
Hazlehurst, a Philadelphia American who had opposed the unified
Fremont/Fillmore presidential ticket, was nominated to oppose Wilmot and
Packer. This refusal by a core group of Americans to submit to Republican
obstinacy virtually guaranteed that Wilmot would meet defeat. However, despite
the high probability of defeat, Wilmot firmly believed that no further concessions
should be made to the equally stubborn Americans. Most Pennsylvania
Republicans seemed to agree.117
To no one’s surprise Wilmot’s campaign relied heavily on antislavery
rhetoric. “Let the freemen of the North,” he declared in his acceptance letter,
115 Pittsburgh Gazette, March 4, April 22.
116 Wilmot’s letter is printed in full: Pittsburgh Gazette, April 22; For the questionnaire and
Wilraot’s response see: Going, 732-33.
117Pittsburgh Gazette, June 6; Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 261-62; David Wilmot to
Lemual Todd, August 8, James McPherson papers, LC; Pottsville Miners ’Journal, July 4.
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“announce in language firm and unmistakable their purpose to resist the spread of
slavery.” The now portly Wilmot toured the state with uncharacteristic vigor, but
he seemed to add little to the political dialogue that had not already been debated
in the bygone presidential race. Wilmot challenged Packer to join him in a series
of public debates—a strategy that Abraham Lincoln would turn to in 1858-but
sensing that it would serve him no advantage, Packer declined.

118

Democrats concentrated on attacking Wilmot’s antislavery passions, all
the while benefiting from the relative calm in Kansas. “Why even now,” scoffed
Senator William Bigler, “Mr. Wilmot and his party will not say that they will be
content with the decision of the people, and admit Kansas as a State unless that
decision be against slavery.” Wilmot seemed to want to discuss nothing other than
slavery. “We doubt,” declared the Observer after Wilmot’s stop in Erie, “there is
one man in one thousand in the county that can call to mind a single thought,
outside of the negro question, that he impressed upon the popular mind.” “He can
be supported only as an Abolition agitator,” agreed Gettysburg’s Democratic
organ.119 In spite of the admitted organizational goal of the election year, many
Republicans became frustrated with Wilmot’s candidacy. Funding problems again
plagued the party, forcing Simon Cameron to foot much of the campaign bill for a
second time.120

118 Wilmot quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, May 5; William Packer to William Bigler, August 8, Bigler
papers, HSP.
19 Erie Observer, September 19; Bigler quoted Pittsburgh Post, September 12; Gettysburg
Republican Compiler, April 6.
120 A. B. Anderson to Simon Cameron, September 29, David Wilmot to Cameron, October 8,
Cameron papers, LC.
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The gubernatorial race seemed outright boring to many casual observers.
Even partisan leaders expressed frustration at the lack of contestable issues aside
from the eternal slavery question. “The old issues which formerly entered into
campaigns and made them interesting,” opined the Pittsburgh Post, “such as the
tariff, banks, distribution of the proceeds of public lands, etc., are not now heard
of... every other question swallowed by the one idea of slavery.” As autumn
summoned the election many Pennsylvanians were more concerned with a
worsening economic situation than a sterile governor’s election. “The financial
troubles,” admitted the Philadelphia North American, “are of too engrossing a
nature to leave room for much of public interest.” The North American, which
had supported Fremont in 1856, did not even bother to mention the election until
the last days of the campaign, a trait that was shared by many papers.121
Democrats never seriously doubted that victory would be theirs.122 In an
election that drew only about the same number of voters as the 1851 gubernatorial
election seven years earlier, Packer easily defeated Wilmot. Packer obtained
188,846 votes, Wilmot 146,139, and the American Hazlehurst 28,168. The
average margin of victory in the four statewide races--which Democrats swept-was 16,000 votes. In perhaps a backlash from the election of Cameron to the
Senate, Democrats rolled up an uncontestable majority in the legislative house
and senate.

127

121 Pittsburgh Post, August 31; Philadelphia North American, October 9 quoted in Stampp,
American in 1857, 247; William Dusinberre, Civil War Issues in Philadelphia, 66; JohnM
Kirkpatrick to Simon Cameron, August 24, Cameron papers, LC; Adams Sentinel, October 9;
Pottsville Miners ’ Journal, July 4.
122 C. R. Buckalew, to Jeremiah S. Black, August 28, William Bigler, to Black, August 26, R.
Greenhaus to Black, September 5, George M. Lauman, to Black, September 6, Black papers, LC.
123 Adams Sentinel, October 19.
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The voting pattern was largely the same as the previous year’s presidential
race, with Republicans winning big in the northern and western sections of the
state while performing poorly in the east. The greatest source of embarrassment
was in Philadelphia, where Hazlehurst outpolled Wilmot. Although Wilmot
attracted more votes than Fremont in several eastern counties, he distantly trailed
in nearly all of them. Democratic turnout though was also down significantly
from 1856. Although confidence in victory may explain some of the drop off, it
also seems that former Whigs, who had helped to swell Buchanan’s vote, were
hesitant to become full-fledged Democrats.
Most Pennsylvania Republicans though seemed satisfied that they had
gained the result that they desired. “Such a defeat may have been needed to
consolidate the party in the state,” admitted future congressman Edward
McPherson. Alexander McClure deemed the campaign “all that the Republican’s
leaders had hoped for. It practically eliminated the American organization as a
political factor in the state.” Even David Wilmot saw a bright future. “We have
the material for a triumphant party in the state,” he insisted. “Whenever it can be
cordially combined in one organization, and this cannot much longer be
prevented.” 124
In October 1857 though, the Republican party still remained a distinct
minority in Pennsylvania. Some Democrats even claimed that the party would
disappear in light of three years of seeming failure.

Before the year elapsed

however, a renewal of the Kansas controversy, and the deepening fiscal crisis
124 Edward McPherson to Simon Cameron, October 15, Cameron papers, LC; McClure, Old Time
Notes I, 304; Wilmot quoted Stampp, 250.
■25 Pittsburgh Post,. October 17; Erie Observer, October 24.
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opened new opportunities for Republican growth. Just as they finally obtained
dominance within Pennsylvania’s opposition coalition, fresh proslavery outrages
in Kansas and continuing economic peril at home, propelled Republicans into
power. Coupled with the expansion of state party doctrine to address both
economic and local problems, the success of 1858 laid the foundation for the
future domination of the Pennsylvania Republican party.
m
1857 was a difficult electoral year for Republicans throughout the North:
Pennsylvania hosting only their most lopsided defeat. Salmon P. Chase barely
held on to the governor’s office in neighboring Ohio, while the party suffered a
shocking loss in New York. 1858 though would be a different story. Another
round of Kansas turmoil fuelled by dough-faced Democratic cupidity helped
reinvigorate Republicans, and so outraged many northern Democrats that a
considerable number either switched their allegiances or refused to vote in the fall
elections. Pennsylvania’s October elections were a startling reversal from the past
three years of Democratic triumph.
The Lecompton controversy revolved around James Buchanan’s decision
to accept the result of Kansas’s proslavery constitutional convention, which had
assembled despite the boycott of free-soil settlers. Much to the dismay of
Republicans, the proslavery Lecompton constitution stood before Congress in
early 1858. “Should Congress... not refuse to admit the bogus State,” cried the
Pottsville Miners ’Journal, “a tempest will arise unparalleled in the history of the

United States.”126 Initially however, Pennsylvania Democrats seemed little more
than irritated that Republicans were again trying to benefit from the well-traveled
Kansas battleground. “The petty negro issues upon which the Kansas troubles are
based,” moaned the now Democratic Harrisburg Herald, “have for more than ten
years been forced upon the attention of the country by fanatics and demagogues,
for selfish and unpatriotic purposes.” Many other Pennsylvania Democrats
simply accepted the position of the national leadership and supported the
admittance of Kansas as a slave state. Senator William Bigler swallowed some of
his personal disapproval of Buchanan and became one the strongest northern
supporters of Lecompton. New Attorney General Jeremiah S. Black and the
majority of Pennsylvania Democratic leaders also agreed to support the
administration.

■I 2 ' 7

But dissatisfaction with the administration’s Kansas policy began to
surface in some Democratic newspapers and correspondence. “You know how
sensitive our people are about slavery,” warned one correspondent of Senator
Bigler. “I sincerely hope some plan will be carried through that will allay the
prevailing alarm.” The questionable circumstances of Lecompton’s adoption
made many Keystone Democrats balk at supporting another slave state. Yet most
upsetting was the attempt of the administration to dictate congressional policy; an
outrage that Illinois’s Stephen Douglas also refused to accept. “At this time, a

126 Pottsvillo, M iners’Journal, November 22, 1857; Pittsburgh Gazette, January 8, 1858.
127 Harrisburg Herald, February 9, 1858; Erie Observer, July 17; Lecompton supporters seemed
considerably more numerous in my survey of Democratic correspondence see: B. Crawford to
William Bigler, December 19, T. Livenford to Bigler, December 21, N. Strickland to Bigler,
March 3, 1858. W. F. Boone to J. S. Black, February 8, John L Dawson to Black, April 4, Black
papers, LC; James Buchanan to Robert Tyler, February 15, Auchampaugh, Robert Tyler, 232;
Hereafter all years in this section are 1858, until otherwise noted.
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large majority of Democrats here [agree] with Douglas and Walker,” warned a
cadre of Indiana County Democrats.128
A Douglas faction appeared in Pennsylvania soon after he spilt with the
administration as a consequence of the English Bill. To hardly anyone’s surprise,
John W. Forney led the new Democratic opposition.

1 ?Q

Forney had been a

headache while a party insider in early 1857, but his agitation from the fringes of
the Democratic party would be a persistent thorn in the side for the rest of
Buchanan’s term. Governor Packer also moved towards opposition to Lecompton,
but he, unlike Forney tried to hold the Keystone Democracy together.130
As Buchanan and Bigler pressed their fellow Democrats to fall in line, the
resentment against the national administration-first evidenced in the Cameron
election—began to intensify. The overt support of extreme southern positions
outraged anti-Lecompton Democrats. The Harrisburg Herald asked if Buchanan’s
‘official’ state organ, the Pennsylvanian, would denounce all “who oppose some
of the measures recommended by him? Or will it boldly take the ground it really
maintains, and insist that northern Senators must blindly follow the lead of the
President, while southern Senators may think for themselves?” 131
Sensing they had a golden campaign issue, Pennsylvania Republicans let
forth their sharpest anti-administration attacks yet. “The Policy of Mr. Buchanan’s

128 T. J. Keenan, to William Bigler January 6, J. Alexander Fulton to Bigler, January 29; Joseph
Thousou ? Et. All to William Bigler, December 12, 1857, Bigler papers, HSP. Walker was the
Pennsylvania-born territorial governor of Kansas who came to oppose Buchanan; Jacob Crassell
to Jeremiah S. Black, February 1, W. A. Smith to Black, February 26, Black papers, LC.
129 J. W. Forney to Simon Cameron, May 25, Cameron papers, LC; J. W. Forney to Henry Wise,
May 25, Forney papers, LC.
130 On Packer see: F. W. Hughes to William Bigler, March 7, Thomas C. MacDowell to Bigler,
March 23, Bigler papers, HSP.
131 Harrisburg Herald, February 22.
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Administration upon this subject,” declared congressional nominee Edward
McPherson “was probably the most flagrant violation of the fundamental
principles of American Liberty known to our history.” Conservatives--who had so
far been hesitant to embrace Republicanism--also railed against Lecompton. “Not
one in a thousand of the people cares much whether [Kansas] be a slave state or a
free state!” exclaimed Philadelphia businessman Sidney G. Fisher. “But millions
do care whether slavery is to be forced upon it against the wishes of the people.”
Finally Philadelphians seemed ready to accept the fundamental faiths of
Republican antislavery positions. The North American could testify that “the
Kansas business... [had driven] thousands on thousands of intelligent and upright
men into the ranks of the Republicans.”132
In March 1858 the Democratic state nominating convention endorsed
Buchanan’s course, adopting a pro-Lecompton report by a vote of 109-21 that
also fiercely defended popular sovereignty. Although a minority of the convention
put forward a stem anti-Lecompton resolution, it appears that no more than a
quarter of Keystone Democrats openly opposed the administration’s handling of
Kansas. Although such dissent could critically impair the electoral fortunes of
Democrats, party leadership was still confident that the disturbance would be
minor. In an apparent sign of harmony, both Governor Packer and Administration
leaders received praise in the platform. To further quell the dissent, the state

132 McPherson quoted Adams Sentinel, August 30; Fisher quoted Philadelphia North American,
February 24, 1858, also in William Dusinberre, Civil War issues in Philadelphia, 76; North
American, August 2, September 4.
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supreme court nomination was granted to an opponent of Lecompton. However,
the damage to Democratic cohesion had already been done.133
IV
The Lecompton controversy was not the only political landmine to injure
Keystone Democrats in 1858. Democratic weakness on industrial protection,
which had once benefited Whigs, reemerged as a partisan issue. Congressional
tariff policy had faded from importance in Pennsylvania after the California Gold
Rush and the breakup of the Whig party, but in 1858 Philadelphia economist
Henry C. Carey and Senator Simon Cameron helped bring it back into
prominence. Using the tumult of the Panic of 1857, which was especially
detrimental to the state’s mining, manufacturing, and iron interests, many
Republican leaders and newspapers added calls for a protective tariff to the
party’s banners.134
“Co-equal in importance and interest with the Kansas question, is the
subject of protection,” insisted the Pottsville Miners ’Journal. “The Free Labor of
the Country,” explained Edward McPherson, “needs, deserves, and must have
Protection.” Philadelphia’s leading Republican newspaper was particularly
vehement in its demands for protection. The North American felt “the foremost
practical question in the next Congress [will] be the enactment of such a tariff as
will save the interests of Pennsylvania from destruction.” Editor Morton
McMichael’s paper continued to espouse the Whig economic policies that seemed
to have disappeared from political debate after the breakdown of the second party
133Harrisburg Herald, March 3; Jeremiah S. Black to William A Porter, February 2, Black papers,
LC.
134 Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, 202-03.
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system. Demands for protection spread throughout much of industrializing
Pennsylvania, winning strong support from most Republican leaders. Simon
Cameron tirelessly called for higher tariffs in the Senate and implored voters to
send pro-tariff men to Congress. “In place of gentlemen who sneer when we talk
of protecting, they must send men here who know something of the usefulness of
the laboring men.”135 Although many Pennsylvania Democrats claimed to support
higher tariffs--with their congressional votes usually supporting those claims--the
Republican adoption of the protectionist cause troubled not a few Keystone
Democrats.136
Protection would remain a Pennsylvania Republican standard for years to
come. Although the importance of the tariff to the Republican victories of 1858
and 1860 has been considerably inflated by several historians, the demand for
protection no doubt deepened the disadvantages suffered by Democrats as a result
of the economic downturn, and helped win over a few old protectionist Whigs
who balked at antislavery politics in key eastern counties. Simon Cameron
especially received many letters from men who claimed that they did not care
about slavery or hated blacks, who nonetheless supported his campaign for higher
tariffs.

Protection however, was often combined with nativist and antislavery

appeals. Nor did the Lecompton controversy or other Buchanan scandals
disappear from the editorial pages. Stopping the spread of slavery and dismantling
135Pottsville Miners ’ Journal, May 5; McPherson quoted Adams Sentinel, August 30; Philadelphia
North American, August 2; Cameron quoted Crippen, Simon Cameron, 184;Pittsburgh Gazette,
June 16; James Davis to Simon Cameron, July 31, Cameron papers, DCHS; John W. O’Neile to
Cameron, May 13, Cameron papers, LC.
136 Louis Reeser ? to William Bigler, May 10, G. W. Scranton to Bigler 5-18, Bigler papers, HSP;
J. W. Forney to Henry Wise, May 25, Forney papers, LC.
137 W. D. Lewis to Cameron, May 22, Cameron papers, LC; James Davis to Cameron, July 31, G.
R. Shaw to Cameron, February 2, 1860, Cameron papers, DCSH.
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the hated slave power remained a fundamental principle of the Pennsylvania
Republican party.138
Pennsylvania politics were hardly limited to national issues during 1858.
For the first time Keystone Republicans profited from local politics, forming a
more effective and coherent program than Democrats in several instances. Even
more important, Pennsylvania Democrats failed to cultivate state and local issues
that could divert attention from their troubling national situation. The inability of
Democrats to agree on a response to the Panic of 1857 in either the state
legislature or on the campaign trail was crippling when combined with the
Lecompton disorder. Bruce Collins, who has completed the fullest study of the
Pennsylvania’s 1858 elections, has concluded that the inability of Democrats to
maintain a cohesive state economic policy—especially on banking reform—was
even more detrimental than Lecompton or the Republican adoption of the tariff;
with no positive policies to project, Democrats could hardy expect to escape the
negative ramifications of economic distress and internal party turmoil.139
The sale of the state Main Line canal garnered almost as much political
attention as Lecompton and the tariff during 1858, but Democrats could not
harness it as a great campaign issue. Pennsylvania’s canal system, which never
came close to the economic profitability of the Erie canal, had long been a source
of patronage and corruption. By the mid 1850’s though, its continuing operation

138 Philadelphia North American, September 27.
139 Bruce Collins, “The Democrat’s Loss of Pennsylvania in 1858,” PMHB, v. 59 (October, 1985),
499-536; At their nominating convention Democrats added a plank on banking reform, meekly
declaring: “we particularly recommend such a revision o f the system o f Banking, as may prevent
in the future the troubles and difficulties that the people o f the State have lately encountered.”
Harrisburg Herald, March 6; G. W. Scranton to William Bigler, May 18, Bigler papers, HSP.
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was largely unnecessary. The state desired to sell the canal system, but few
acceptable buyers approached. Finally, the Main Line was unloaded to the
Pennsylvania Railroad, which obtained questionable tax breaks to sweeten the
deal. By 1858 the rest of the canal system was sold to a competing railroad. Some
Democrats tried to attack the sale to the Pennsylvania, but they could not maintain
party cohesion to either block the transfer in the legislature or make it a campaign
issue in either 1857 or 1858.140 Most Republicans gave hearty support to the sale,
seemingly suffering little backlash.141
Dissatisfaction with the development of Pennsylvania’s railroads also
attracted political attention in the 1850’s. In few places was disgust with railroads
more apparent than in Pittsburgh.142 Fears were prevalent that Pittsburgh would
be reduced to unimportance by a diversion of the state’s key line. But it was the
obstinacy of railroads that seemed to hold the public hostile to their demands that
galled Pittsbughers the most. When one such ill-managed and unfinished road
forced Allegheny County government to raise property taxes in 1857 the revolt
began. County Democrats in turn came out against the new taxes. Although they
had established themselves as the majority party in Allegheny County,

140 Collins, “Democrats’ Loss,” 508; McClure, Old Time Notes, 1 223; Jeremiah S. Black was
particularly outraged by the sale of the canal system, launching a lawsuit that eventually outraged
many o f his Democratic colleagues. J. S. Black to Samual J. Randall, June 30, and November 15,
Black papers, LC.
141 Pittsburgh Republicans were more hesitant in approving the sale. In 1857 the Gazette
commented: “we are convinced that the Pennsylvania Road ought not to have been permitted to
buy it.” June 27, 1857, also June 17, 1858.
142 My coverage o f the railroad issue in Pittsburgh is based entirely on Michael Holt’s excellent
Forging a Majority, especially pages 228-36 and 245-53.
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Republicans suffered when they failed to counter the new Democratic tactic.
David Wilmot’s vote was little more than half of Fremont’s tally in 1856.143
By 1858 however, Pittsburgh Republicans were ready to meet the
challenge. Democrats again tried to exploit anti-tax feelings, recruiting the leading
anti-tax Republican to run for one of Allegheny County’s congressional seats.
Republicans though led a much more assertive campaign than they had in 1857,
pounding the hypocrisy of Democrats for assailing railroads that they had helped
create. Democratic hands were proved to be hardly spotless in Pittsburgh’s
railroad debacle. At the same time, the strong calls for repudiating the taxes upset
some Democrats, especially the editor of the Pittsburgh Post William Barr. It all
guaranteed that strong Republican majorities would return to Pittsburgh and
Allegheny County in 1858.144 To their unquestioned advantage, Pennsylvania
Republicans now tackled state and local issues with much greater cohesiveness
than they had in the past two election years. Democrats could claim no such unity;
defeat now stared them in the face.
Y
As it often did, Philadelphia’s May mayoral election forecast October’s
results. For the first time since 1854, the anti-Democratic candidate was able to
triumph. Alexander Henry, a former Whig who embraced nativism and mildly
antislavery Republican principles, defeated Richard Vaux, the well-respected

143 Pittsburgh Gazette March 9, June 5, 11, 12, 20, September 9, 17, 21, 1857; While Fremont won
over 13,000 votes, Wilmot obtained only 7,687, which was also less than the totals for James
Pollock in 1854, and William F. Johnston in 1851 and 1848.
144Pittsburgh Gazette September 9, 1857, September 3, 9, 7, 20, 1858; For criticism from
Democrats for the anti-tax movement see the Post July 21, August 19, 20, 24, September 4, 13;
Holt, 253-255.
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Democratic incumbent. The victory was further significant because it proved that
Americans and Republicans could unite in the locality where it was most needed.
Henry’s vote easily surpassed the paltry totals previously obtained by
Philadelphia Republicans. He received almost 10,000 more votes than the
combined tally of Wilmot and Hazlehurst the previous October. Although their
conclusions are questionable, Republicans and Democrats alike cited the
Lecompton controversy as a key reason for the upset. Regardless, the victory
delighted Republicans who were preparing to cement the union of Pennsylvania’s
opposition forces at June’s state nominating convention.145
After deciding in early spring to delay the nomination of their state ticket,
Republicans who surveyed the chaos in Democratic ranks and the successful
combination with Americans in Philadelphia, could easily conclude that they had
made the correct decision. A former Know Nothing garnered the soon to be
defunct canal commission nomination, while Philadelphian John M. Read, a
former Free Soil Democrat, headed the ticket as the state supreme court nominee.
The platform embraced both the standard antislavery and nativist planks, and
added calls for the protection of American industiy. At the behest of Philadelphia
North American editor Morton McMichael, the opposition would run under the
moniker of the ‘People’s party,’ which was supposedly more inviting to former
Americans than ‘Republican.’146

145 The mayoral vote was: Henry-R 33,771; Vaux-D 29,068; Pottsville Miners ’Journal, May 8; B.
H. Brewster to James Buchanan, May 7, Buchanan papers, HSP; Robert Tyler to Henry Wise,
May 5, Auchampaugh, 238. Tyler, the state Democratic chairman, believed that national issues
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46 Coleman, 115-16; Pittsburgh Gazette, July 17; Pittsburgh Post, July 16.
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The most critical races of 1858 were for Pennsylvania’s twenty-five
congressional seats. Separate district or county conventions chose the nominees
for both parties; often the selections reflected local concerns or electoral
composition more than national legislative issues. Key opposition congressmen E.
Joy Morris of Philadelphia, Galusha Grow from David Wilmot’s district, and
John Covode of Westmoreland County, were re-nominated; Democrats re
nominated eleven incumbents, running new candidates in three other districts that
they held. Select new Republican/People’s nominees however, proved to be
highly significant. These candidates demonstrated how the party had grown since
previous elections, and helped draw critical votes in a number of key districts.
Some opposition nominees were familiar names, having previously served
in various political positions as Whigs, Americans or Democrats. Candidates were
often selected to highlight Republican support for protective tariffs and economic
development. George W. Scranton, a former Whig, and a Democrat for the past
four years, was one of the leading industrialists of northeast Pennsylvania.
Midway through 1858, Scranton left the Democratic party-citing his concurrence
with the emerging pro-tariff policy of the opposition—and accepted the
congressional nomination for the twelfth district, which was centered in Luzerne
County. John Schwartz, a sixty-five year old iron manufacture and former
Democrat, was called upon in heavily Democratic Berks County. Manufacturers
and businessmen ran in at five other districts on the People’s party ticket.
Democrats boasted considerably fewer pillars of the economic community. Yet
vigorously antislavery politicians were not absent from Republican tickets.
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Thaddeus Stevens and Edward McPherson, who both vehemently attacked the
Lecompton ‘fraud,’ were chosen to run in the southeastern ninth and seventeenth
districts.147
Few could argue with the wisdom of their nominations or the expansion of
the Republican platform. The extent of the People’s/Republican victory in
October was stunning. The Pennsylvanian declared the race a “complete
prostration of the Democracy in the old Keystone.” The statewide races were
decided by a margin of more than 20,000 votes, with Read winning his seat on the
supreme court 198,117 to 171,130. More importantly, twenty-one People’s party
congressional candidates were victorious. Only two pro-administration Democrats
were returned to office: four term Philadelphian Thomas Florence and William
Dimmick from the northeastern thirteenth district. Two Democratic opponents of
Lecompton, William Montgomery, and John Hickman-who soon joined the
Republicans-also returned to Washington. Perhaps the most shocking
People’s/Republican victory occurred in Berks County, which encompassed the
eighth district. There, Johan Schwartz unseated Buchanan floor leader J. Glancy
Jones. According to the Republican who finished Jones’s un-expired term, both
support for protection and racist antislavery reaction to Lecompton had
transformed the usually pro-Democratic Berks voters into opposition men. “They
hate negroes, and have no affection for slavery,” concluded William Keim.148

147 Collins, “Democrat’s Loss,” 522-27; Congressional Biographical Dictionary,
bioguide, congress.gov.
148Pennsylvanian quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, October 13; Keim quoted in Collins, “Democrat’s
Loss,” 522.
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Most Keystone Republicans stressed both the Lecompton disturbance and
the economic downturn in post-election commentaries. “The hard times caused by
the free trade policy of the democracy,” affirmed the Pittsburgh Gazette, “have
had a great part in arousing the people to the assertion of their power and rights.”
The North American concluded that Pennsylvania had “been ‘redeemed’ from the
despotism of sectional and tyrannical managers.” The “shameful conduct” of the
Democratic party had been repudiated elated party newcomer Sidney George
Fisher. The election “shows that there is a healthful and sound moral sentiment
left among the people.”149
Democratic explanations for the defeat varied. “The Kansas humbug,”
insisted the Erie Observer, “has had no effect upon the Democracy of Erie
County. It has not divided us as in counties east of the mountains.” A Fayette
County Democrat could counter: “the election has resulted disastrously as was
clearly foreshadowed by the course of the Anti-Lecompton Democrats.” The
Pittsburgh Post meanwhile bemoaned the attempt to turn the Allegheny
Democracy into an anti-tax movement. In light of it all, few Pennsylvania
Democrats could deny that their party was badly divided. Many Democratic
voters had responded by simply withdrawing their support from the party
ticket.150
An investigation of Pennsylvania’s congressional races reveals that the
election of 1858 was not so much a People’s/Republican triumph as a Democratic
149Pittsburgh Gazette, October 16; Philadelphia North American, October 12, 13 [quotation];
Adams Sentinel, September 20; A Philadelphia Perspective: The Diary o f Sidney George Fisher
Covering the Years 1834-1871, ed. Nicholas B. Wainwright, (Philadelphia, 1967), 308.
150 Erie Observer, October 23; J. B. Sian to William Bigler, October 18, Bigler papers, HSP;
Pittsburgh Post, October 13.
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defeat. “We have met the enemy and we are theirs,” grumbled President
Buchanan.151 Republicans did expand on their totals from the previous two
elections, obviously winning over a sizable number of former Fillmore voters. Yet
they seem to have gained few Democrats, and exceeded the ‘Union’ vote in
1856’s congressional races in only a few districts. Most districts actually saw a
drop-off in the opposition vote between 1856 and ’58. Significant gains were
made in the fourth and fifth districts, which bordered Philadelphia. While former
Democrats George Scranton and John Schwartz also vastly improved on the
previous opposition totals, scoring tremendous upsets.
Democrats though lost voters in every single district. Incumbents in the
third, fourth, fifth, and seventeenth districts lost more than a quarter of their 1856
supporters, all meeting defeat. Five other Democratic seats passed into the hands
of the People’s party coalition. In Schuylkill County William Dewart drew 4,000
fewer votes than he had two years earlier. Dewart was undercut by an antiLecompton challenger who provided the margin of defeat in a three-way race. But
his eleventh district was the only one where such a challenge played in so directly
to an administration defeat. An anti-Lecompton Democrat failed to alter the race
in Thomas Florence’s first district, while John Hickman brushed off both a proLecompton Democrat and a People’s party challenger. In Butler and Allegheny
Counties’ twenty-second district the former Republican anti-tax candidate drew a
dismal thirty-nine percent.
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Although the crisis of 1856-with the possibility of

secession looming-helped draw an artificially high Democratic vote in both
151 Buchanan quoted in Crippen, Simon Cameron, 190.
152 The best source for congressional elections is: The Congressional Quarterly Guide to US
Elections, 4th edition, John L. Moore et. all editors, (Washington DC, 2001)
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October and November, the drop-off in 1858 bore an eerie resemblance to the
recent demise of the Whig party. Hardly a comforting thought to say the least.
It was once standard to anoint the reappearance of the tariff as the end-all
cause of the 1858 turnaround.153 But this conclusion can hardly be sustained
anymore. Multiple causes contributed to the all-important decline in Democratic
votes in Pennsylvania. Clearly Lecompton was one reason while the Republican
adoption of the tariff was another. Additionally, state and local issues failed to
unite the party and could not serve as a distraction from the noticeably
floundering Buchanan administration. Republicans had obviously been the
beneficiaries of the disorder. They now held a majority of Pennsylvania’s elected
offices, having finally absorbed a critical amount of former Fillmore voters. It was
not guaranteed that they could hold that coalition though. The American party had
served as a tragic example between 1854 and ’56. Pennsylvania Democrats still
had an opportunity to return to their position. A large number of voters sat out the
1858 election, many of them Democratic.154 If Democrats could somehow heal
their divisions or reawaken the sprit of ’56 their cause was far from hopeless. The
possibility of recreating the crisis-induced swelling of the Democratic vote—as
had happened in 1856-still existed. That possibility though was a tall order.
The fissures in Pennsylvanian’s Democratic party only widened in 1859;
although only minor state offices-along with state house and senate seats—were
being contested in the year’s elections, many politicos were already preparing for
153 See especially John Coleman, Disruption o f Democracy, and also C. M. Myers, “The Rise o f
the Republican Party in Pennsylvania,” as well as works by Allan Nevins and Roy Nichols.
154 Turnout is estimated at only 60.8% for 1858’s elections. William E. Gienapp, “Politics Seems
to Enter into Everything,” Essays on American Antebellum Politics, 1840-1860 Stephen E.
Maizlish and John Kushama ed. (College Station, Texas, 1983), 19.
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the next year’s presidential election. A failure to heal party schisms could harm
any chance at victory in that all-important election. While Keystone Democrats
spent much of 1859 trying to address the convulsions created within their party by
the Lecompton disaster, Republicans could enjoy their first year as the majority
party, ail the while keeping up a constant attack on the floundering Buchanan
administration. In October they would cruise to their first predicted victory.
However, in that same month abolitionist crusader John Brown descended out of
Pennsylvania and into infamy, engendering the toughest test yet to antislavery
political power in the state. His raid raised the specter of civil war, outraging most
of Pennsylvania’s population, and again raising doubts about the future of the
Republican party.
VI
In March 1859 Pennsylvania’s Democratic party set about smashing its
anti-Lecompton dissent. Spurred on by both James Buchanan and William Bigler,
strongly pro-administration resolutions were passed; Buchanan’s course on
Lecompton was sustained. The biggest loser in the convention was governor
William Packer, who was practically read out of the party. “He refused to meet
with WILMOT upon the everlasting negro question,” complained the Erie
Observer, “but the moment he was elected he commenced agitating that very
question himself. The sooner we get rid of all disorganizes the better for the
purity of the party.”155 Dissent would no longer be tolerated. John W. Forney
continued to curse his former patron from his Philadelphia Press editor’s office,
155 Erie Observer, March 26; Harrisburg Patriot and Union, March 24, 25, 1859; Pittsburgh Post,
March 19, 23 : the Post was much more supportive o f governor Packer. All newspapers and
correspondence for the rest o f this chapter, unless otherwise noted, are from 1859.
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but it was clear that the Buchanan/Bigler faction of the party now dominated
Keystone Democracy.156 Republicans convened again as the People’s party,
presenting perhaps their strongest platform yet. Although former American party
men continued to find places in the coalition, antislavery rhetoric and mild Whig
economic planks now dominated party ideology.
The season’s political campaign did not attract much attention or
enthusiasm. Once again Democrats failed to cultivate state or local issues that
could take away from their troubling national record.158 Although turnout was
light, the People’s/Republican victory was still impressive. Both state candidates
won by more than 20,000 votes, while the coalition gained control of the state
senate-winning ten of eleven contested seats-and increased its majority in the
legislative assembly. In the aftermath of the election Pennsylvania Republicans
seemed most concerned with launching the Presidential campaign of their
favorite: Simon Cameron.159
Before Republicans could start celebrating their imminent Presidential
victory though, they faced a horrifying predicament. After making his final
preparations in Chambersburg Pennsylvania, abolitionist John Brown led his
small group of devoted followers on a crusade against slavery, storming the
Harper’s Ferry arsenal on October 16,1859. Brown’s raid represented all that the

156 A sparsely attended anti-Lecompton convention made no nominations and did not recommend
leaving the Democratic party. Congressman John Hickman was the most prominent attendee.
Pittsburgh Post, April 16; Erie Observer, April 23.
157 Adams Sentinel, June 13. The Pittsburgh Post still attacked Republican nativism: “The Know
Nothing Republicanism has been concealed, but it exists strong and proscriptive as ever.” May 14.
158 Harrisburg Patriot and Union, January 12.
159 The full result was: Auditor General: Cochran-R 181,835 Wright-D 164,544; Surveyor
General. Keim-R 182,227 Row-D 163,877. For a Cameron recommendation see: Pittsburgh
Gazette, October 18.
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South feared about northern abolitionist agitation. Although Republicans were,
almost to a man, not abolitionists-indeed Pennsylvania Republicans often pointed
with pride to abolitionist criticism of their polices-southemers and most northern
Democrats did not take care to delineate between their antislavery doctrine and
abolitionism. In the aftermath of Brown’s raid most Pennsylvania Democrats tried
to blame Republican antislavery agitation for the attack. “The teachings of their
leaders have been the cause of the outbreak at Harper’s Ferry,” insisted the
Pittsburgh Post. “Brown was no more insane than hundreds of others who are
leaders of the Republican party,” declared the Erie Observer. “If these friends of
the Negro should at last produce a dissolution of the Union or a civil war,” the
Harrisburg Patriot and Union assured, “the Democracy will be loudly able to
declare the whiteness of its hands from the stain of complacency.”160
Although Republicans all demanded that Brown’s actions should be
punished, many newspapers brazenly asserted that his raid was in large part the
fault of the South. Franklin County’s Republican press blamed southern ruffians
for turning Brown into a murderer. There was little sympathy with southern
attacks on Republicanism. The Philadelphia North American simply felt that
“Virginians should quiet themselves.” Brown’s execution especially offended the
Pittsburgh Gazette, which charged: “the execution of the old man at Charlestown
yesterday was a plain admission on the party of Slavery that they dare not spare a
brave man’s life, and that magnanimity is impossible to a system based on wrong

160Pittsburgh Post, October 25; Erie Observer, October 29; Harrisburg Patriot and Union, October
13. The Post dared to express some admiration for Brown, admitting after his execution:
“Although his courage, sincerity, and disinterestedness may be conceded, all honest and just men
must condemn his acts.” Post, December 3.
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and upheld by violence.” Republicans sincerely believed that they were not
radicals; it was the South that was now dominated by radicals. “We have no
sympathy with fanatics, whether they are John Brown and his confederate
traitors... or the plotters of disunion in the legislative halls of Charleston S.C.”
assured the Harrisburg Telegraph,161
Democrats now seemed to have a national event that could be used to their
advantage. A belief developed that Democrats would have won the elections of
1859 if they had been held after Brown’s raid. Democrats did in fact make gains
in New England’s spring elections, quite possibly benefiting from the Harper’s
Ferry outrage. But Brown’s raid would only be a temporary setback for
Republicans. More importantly, it could not heal the schisms in the Democracy.
The attack on Harper’s Ferry may well have made them worse. Southern
Democratic demands on their northern partners in 1860-somewhat prompted by
Brown’s raid—threw the party into chaos. Pennsylvania’s Democratic party
arguably suffered more turmoil than any other as a result of the ensuing spilt. The
chaotic state of the Democratic party, helped Pennsylvania Republicans secure a
surprisingly large and historically critical victory. 1860 marked the end of the
Keystone State.

161Franklin Repository and Transcript, October 26; Philadelphia North American, October 21;
Pittsburgh Gazette, December 3; Harrisburg Telegraph February 24, 1860; Adams Sentinel,
December 6.

CHAPTER 5
“We Will Seal the Doom of Southern Tyranny,
Over White Men at Least”
The End of the Keystone State: The Elections of 1860

The Pittsburgh Gazette, like most politicized newspapers, was wont to
make grand declarations. In early 1860 editor Russell Errett assured readers that
“No party ever organized in this country, not even excepting the good old Whig
party, could boast purer principles or more legitimate or patriotic objects than the
Republican party.” His words, though pure propaganda, nonetheless reveal the
sense of legitimacy that the Pennsylvania Republican party now held. Errett, an
erstwhile Whig, could not escape the reality that new principles had triumphed.
Whiggery was dead, but Republicanism was vibrant and attractive.162
By 1860 the Pennsylvania Republican party was a united and diverse
organization; appealing to a wide range of political interests, yet devoted to set of
fundamental principles that it shared with parties in its sister states. Capturing the
governor’s office and securing the state’s crucial electoral votes for the party’s
Presidential candidate now seemed well within reach. Holding together the
coalition of 1858 and picking up a few of the traditionally apathetic voters who
162 Pittsburgh Gazette, February 22.

105
only turned out for Presidential contests would likely be enough to hold off the
stumbling Democratic party. In sharp contrast to Republicans, Keystone
Democrats were burdened with a party in national chaos. As the year progressed,
conditions only worsened.
Pennsylvania’s 1860 elections turned on the inability of the Democratic
party to present a unified conservative alternative to Republicanism. Instead, the
disunited state of Democracy, combined with the radical pronouncements that
emanated from southern party leaders, convinced many Pennsylvanians that the
Republican party was a moderating and conservative force. Consequently, the
great moderate, Abraham Lincoln, rolled up a vote that trumped even James
Buchanan’s 1856 total. Lincoln’s conservatism though would not assuage the
South. Indeed, despite protestations of conservatism, Pennsylvania’s Republican
party would not forgo the fundamental principle that had formed the party in the
aftermath of Kansas-Nebraska, opposition to slavery. The contextual radicalism
of opposing the spread of slavery never disappeared from Keystone
Republicanism. This principle was fundamental to party identity. In 1860
Pennsylvania joined with its sister northern states in rejecting the course of
sectional conciliation as heretofore practiced by native son James Buchanan and
his predecessors. The result was civil war.
I
By 1860 Pennsylvania’s Democratic party stood in an unenviable position.
James Buchanan, .who had been counted on to save the Union, was now the target
of unrelenting criticism. Andrew Jackson’s “place is now filled by an old
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federalist, who cares more for the interests of southern slaveholders than for the
welfare of his native state,” jeered the Pittsburgh Gazette. That Republicans now
claimed to adhere to the principles of the Union-saving Democratic founder
Jackson, was a humiliating prospect. With southern Democrats continuing to
threaten secession Republicans seemed to have a better claim to Jackson. At times
in 1860 it appeared as if John C. Calhoun, and not Jackson had won the struggle
for Democracy.163
The situation within the state party was far from harmonious. Both the
sitting governor William Packer and John W. Forney, the powerful campaign
chairman from 1856, now sulked on the fringes of the party. Of even greater
concern was the sense of alienation that festered among party loyalists. Turnout
had fallen off by a disquieting amount in 1858, while opposition totals had largely
held steady or increased. Reinvigorating and reuniting the party’s base in time for
the Presidential election was a must.
Hopes appeared bleak as Democrats assembled in Reading for the party’s
state nominating convention. In addition to formulating a platform and naming a
gubernatorial candidate, Presidential electors needed to be selected. It was also
possible that the convention would recommend a Presidential nominee. To its
credit, the convention passed off relatively smoothly. Recent disagreements
appeared to be largely resolved. Even Governor Packer garnered support for his
state policies. The platform repudiated the right of Congress to exclude slavery
163 Pittsburgh Gazette, January 23, 1860. Republicans often claimed Andrew Jackson as a hero;
amazingly former Whig papers, like the Gazette, evoked Jackson just as much as other sheets. “No
man is more imbued with the sprit o f resolution and determination of Andrew Jackson than
Abraham Lincoln,” insisted the Harrisburg Telegraph, October 25, 1860. Hereafter all dates for
this section are 1860.
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from the territories, but maintained a commitment to the Cincinnati platform.
Support for a protective tariff was also reaffirmed. Former congressman Henry D.
Foster received the governor’s nomination to almost universal acclimation.
Finally, the convention named a slate of electors, but made no recommendation
for the Presidency. Ominously, the platform pledged to “accept the nomination of
the Charleston convention.”164
The Charleston convention, which opened April 23, proved to be a
disaster for the Democratic party. After failing to obtain their desired platform, a
group of radical southerners walked out of the convention. The remaining rump
assembly could not secure the necessary votes to nominate the favorite
‘moderate,’ Stephen A. Douglas. Instead, the convention dissolved without a
nominee, as the delegates agreed to reassemble in Baltimore during June. Most
Pennsylvania Democrats were shocked and disgusted by the breakup. “Our
Democratic brethren of the South are permitting their action to be governed by a
sprit of sectionalism,” wailed the Pittsburgh Post. “The Democratic party at the
North have heretofore stood by the Constitutional rights of the South,”
complained the vociferously pro-Buchanan Erie Observer. In editor B. F. Sloan’s
view, the Cincinnati platform of 1856 should have been adequate. “Everything
looks bad,” moaned President Buchanan, “not only for the party, but for the
country.”165

164Pittsburgh Post, March 5, 6; Erie Observer, March 3; Coleman, Disruption o f Democracy, 12325.
165 Pittsburgh Post, April 30; Erie Observer, May 5; Pittsburgh Gazette, May 5; Buchanan to
Robert Tyler, June 13, Auchampaugh, Robert Tyler, 300.
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The Baltimore convention did not produce a healthier result. Radicals
again showed up and then bolted the convention—among them twelve
Pennsylvanians-eventually nominating Vice President John C. Breckinridge on a
slave code/states’ rights platform. The Baltimore holdouts settled on Douglas.
Subsequently both candidates claimed to be the legitimate nominee of the
Democratic party, a development that divided party leadership in several states.
Pennsylvania Democrats were particularly tom over who deserved their support.
“The extra ordinary movements at Baltimore,” worried a Crawford County
Democrat, “have created here, as elsewhere, great excitement among our friends.”
Lancaster’s Democratic organ bluntly concluded, “disaster and defeat stares us in
the face.”166
Although most northern Democratic state organizations quickly decided
that Douglas was the official nominee, Pennsylvania’s Democracy faced a
different situation. The personal influence of President Buchanan upon state party
leadership likely guaranteed that Douglas would not obtain an official blessing
from the central committee. Although Buchanan eventually admitted that he
would vote for Breckinridge, his public pronouncement that “every Democrat is at
perfect liberty to vote as he thinks proper,” more aptly typified the
counterproductive lack of leadership that had plagued his Presidency. The refusal
of Buchanan and his lieutenants to admit that Douglas was the favored candidate
of Pennsylvania Democrats only fueled party infighting. Instead, a lack of stem

166 J. E. McFarland to William Bigler, June 28, Bigler papers, HSP; Lancaster Intelligencer quoted
Harrisburg Telegraph, June 29; Chambersburg Valley Spirit, June 27; Pittsburgh Post, June 25.
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national leadership helped plunge local organizations into chaos, a condition best
revealed by the lack of a unified voice from leading Democratic newspapers.167
Editors sometimes supported Douglas, sometimes Breckinridge, or more
often tried to avoid choosing sides. If a county’s paper selected one candidate,
opponents would start an opposing paper to champion the other. From the fringes
of the party, John Forney’s Philadelphia Press provided the fiercest opposition to
Breckinridge. A typical Forney harangue read: “NO TRUE FRIEND of
DOUGLAS in Pennsylvania, or elsewhere, can touch an electoral ticket which
contains upon it the single name of a Breckinridge Disunionist.”168 Most proDouglas organs were less acerbic than the Press, usually claiming only that they
preferred the Little Giant, while often failing to place his name officially within
their banner. But passions were running high. The campaign was going to be
malicious, even within the Democratic party itself.169
II
The situation for Pennsylvania’s Republican party had changed
dramatically since its first Presidential campaign. “Our party is now consolidated
by four years active and ardent service in the field,” commented the Pittsburgh
Gazette m Old and new Democratic outrages combined to keep Republicans

167 Buchanan quoted in Klein, James Buchanan, 348; Buchanan’s two top Keystone allies,
Jeremiah S. Black and William Bigler apparently were quiet Breckinridge supporters. See: A.
Whitaker to William Bigler, July 31, Bigler papers, HSP; Robert P ? to Jeremiah S. Black,
September 28, Black papers, LC.
168 Press quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, July 11.
169 The Pittsburgh Post and Chambersburg Valley Spirit gave mild support to Douglas. The Press
and the Harrisburg State Sentinel were the most avid Douglas sheets. Pro-Breckinridge papers
included, the Reading Gazette, Columbia Democrat, Norristown Register, Philadelphia Argus, and
the Pennsylvanian, as listed in Harrisburg Telegraph, June 30. The Valley Sprit later switched to
Breckinridge.
170 Pittsburgh Gazette, May 28.
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animated and united. Democrats, with solid southern support, had blocked an
increase in the tariff and a homestead bill during spring’s congressional session.
Both measures had received ardent support within Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, the
corruption of Buchanan’s administration—though limited by later standards-was
proving to be worse than any other in history. Westmoreland County Republican
congressman John Covode led the investigation of Buchanan in the House. His
investigation claimed to have exposed an unprecedented amount of executive
waste. “The details of the extravagance of the national administration are
hideous,” concluded Simon Cameron. With Buchanan and company to kick
around, Keystone Republicans never ran out of campaign fodder.

171

Adversity though did not completely evade the Republican party.
Pennsylvania Republicans faced their own internal disorder during 1860, as
personal rivalries threatened to divide the party. The intensifying feud between
two of the party’s leading men, Simon Cameron and Andrew G. Curtin, came
center state during 1860. According to most accounts, the feud was bom out of
the struggle to elect a Senator in 1855. During that race Curtin, a former Whig,
and Cameron, a former Democrat, both endeavored to capture the support of the
American party, but the newly-formed movement could not agree on either man
and no candidate won election. Both men blamed the other for the failure and
made accusations of bribery. For the next five years the feud festered as
Cameron’s role in the Keystone Republican party steadily increased.172

171 Cameron quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, September 22.
172 For the origins o f the feud see: Bradley, Cameron 96-105, and McClure, Old Time Notes, I,
passim.
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Now Cameron was attempting to gain a complete stranglehold on the
party. Already favored to receive the official Presidential recommendation of the
state nominating convention, Cameron hoped to control state-level leadership,
including the pending gubernatorial nominee.

17^

Curtin and his allies were

horrified at the prospect. In turn they hoped to combine with enough non
committed People’s party backers to keep Cameron from achieving his goal of
controlling the 1860 campaign.
Try as he might, Cameron could not dictate the results of the People’s
party convention. Cameron’s favorites went down to defeat as Curtin received the
gubernatorial nomination. To satisfy the Cameron group, their boss was tabbed as
the state’s favorite for the Presidency, although few politicos believed that his
questionable background would allow him to be nominated. Meanwhile; the
platform again committed to halting the spread of slavery, but it also claimed to
“hail the people of the south as brothers, in whose prosperity we rejoice.”174
Curtin’s allies also obtained the leadership of the all-important state
central committee, meaning they would control the financing and management of
the campaign. Curtin’s closest advisor Alexander McClure was named committee
chairman. McClure had run up against Cameron in 1859 when he was defeated in
the race for state assembly speaker through Cameron’s interference. Having
McClure in charge of finances, which he had so recently controlled was a direct
threat to Cameron’s leadership. Throughout the summer Cameron’s allies bitterly

173 A. Reeder to Cameron, January 4, Russell Errett to Cameron, January 8, David Taggart to
Cameron, January 10, Cameron papers, LC.
174 Harrisburg Telegraph, February 24; J. R. Hendrickson to Simon Cameron, February 28,
Cameron papers, DCHS; Pittsburgh Gazette, February 24, 25.
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attacked McClure’s handling of the campaign. “Unless McClure is forced out of
his position,” complained Pittsburgh Gazette editor and Cameron lieutenant
Russell Errett, “Curtin cannot be elected.”175
Cameron’s supporters planned to unseat McClure at a July meeting of the
campaign committee, but a night of excessive drinking forced many Cameron
men to miss an early morning session that subsequently allowed McClure to
remain in place. Eventually, the squabbling caught the attention of national
leadership in Springfield. Lincoln in turn sent an advisor to Pennsylvania to
determine if McClure, or perhaps Cameron, was derailing the campaign. Cameron
was apparently able to convince Lincoln that he had the campaign under control,
though no action was taken against McClure. Ultimately, the effects of the feud
on the party’s electoral fortunes appear to have been minimal. To the eternal
fortune of the Republican party, the Curtin/Cameron row did not interfere with
the strength of its platform or its ideological appeals.176

in
Spring’s key municipal elections mostly went Republican, though their
closeness in several locales was a cause for concern. Although Philadelphia’s
mayoral election returned moderate Republican Alexander Henry to office, his
majority was down from 1858, heightening Republican concern that conservatives
might desert them if the party’s Presidential nominee proved too radical. Even the
175 Errett quoted in William H. Russell, “Alexander K. McClure and the People’s party in the
Campaign o f 1860,” PMHB, 28 (October, 1961), 340; Errett to Cameron, June 23, Cameron to
Alexander McClure, August 1, J. P. Sanderson to Cameron, October 1, Cameron papers, LC; On
the 1859 speaker’s race see: McClure, O ld Time Notes, I, 346-49.
176 Simon Cameron to Abraham Lincoln, August 1, Cameron papers, LC; The problems o f the
feud during 1860 are covered in Bradley, Cameron, 154-57, and Bradley, Triumph o f Militant
Republicanism, 81-85; the only public comment on the internal problems o f the Republican
campaign that I came across was in the Harrisburg Telegraph, August 6.
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ardently Republican Pittsburgh Gazette worried that conservative concerns would
not be heard. “If we are to succeed in carrying Pennsylvania this fall,” it warned,
“some attention must be paid to this call, which is numerous not only in
Philadelphia, but throughout the eastern part of the state.” The impending
Republican national convention would have to account for the concerns of
Pennsylvania. “Chicago must understand that conservatism is necessary,”
remarked the Philadelphia North American. Because of these fears the leading
Republican contender for the Presidential nomination, William H. Seward,
garnered stiff resistance from Pennsylvania leadership. “Great and talented as is
Wm H. Seward,” warned the Adams Sentinel, “we fear his nomination would
bring defeat.” Instead, a number of Keystone Republicans backed the most
conservative candidate that they could, with Missouri’s Edward Bates and Ohio’s
John McLean receiving support. Even radical Thaddeus Stevens backed McLean,
whom almost nobody else favored.177
Chicago took care to mollify Pennsylvania. Although Simon Cameron was
the first choice for most Keystone conventioneers, the nomination of Abraham
Lincoln proved acceptable to all of Pennsylvania’s factions. Lincoln’s record as a
moderate, as well as the inclusive nature of the party’s platform won widespread
aplomb. “We believe that Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin are
conservative enough for every useful purpose,” concluded the North American.
Even though the tariff plank was not very specific, its mere inclusion brought
Pennsylvania’s delegation to euphoria. Spirits were quite high amongst
177Pittsburgh Gazette May 5; Philadelphia North American, May 11; Adams Sentinel, May 14;
Harrisburg Telegraph, May 12; Seward’s life-long opposition to nativism also hurt his chances in
Pennsylvania. McClure, O ld Time Notes, I, 399.
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Republican ranks; some could feel the impeding revolution in the air. Shortly
after the close of the convention the Westmoreland Country People's party
resolved that by the election of Lincoln “we will seal the doom of southern
tyranny, over white men at least.”178
IV
Lincoln was not the only ‘conservative’ candidate to enter the Presidential
field. Although it was hardly warranted, the nomination of John Bell by a cadre of
aging Whigs created an amount of apprehension, especially in Philadelphia
Republican circles. Democrats meanwhile, were confident that they could secure
the votes of the mostly ex-Whig Bell patrons. William Bigler wrote President
Buchanan with a great deal of wishful thinking “if we can get the Bell men to
cooperate .. . Lincoln will lose the state.” Although New York’s Democratic
party formed a joint Presidential ticket with Bell’s supporters, no such agreement
could be reached in Pennsylvania. Ultimately the Constitutional Union party
made no state nominations, although the party’s lone newspaper eventually
supported Foster for governor. However, excluding Philadelphians, most
Republicans came to view the Bell movement as a non-entity, which it indeed
was. 179
In Pennsylvania the Republican campaign rested on a combination of
progressive economic planks and opposition to the aggressively proslavery
policies of the Democratic administration. The party’s principles were according
178 Philadelphia North American, May 28; Westmoreland Country resolutions quoted Pittsburgh
Gazette, June 19; For general convention commentary see: Adams Sentinel, May 28; Pittsburgh
Gazette, May 19, 21; Wainwright, Diary o f Sidney George Fisher, 353.
179 William Bigler to James Buchanan, August 13, Buchanan papers, HSP; Philadelphia North
American, July 14, 27; Pittsburgh Gazette, May 12, August 22.
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to the Harrisburg Telegraph “free territory for free labor, protection for home
industry, and homes for the homeless.” The Pittsburgh Gazette expressed the dual
nature of the Republican party in a comparison of the gubernatorial candidates:
“Curtin represents national ideas-and is the advocate of freedom for the territories
and protection of American industry. Foster represents a Southern policy for the
country, prominent among which are the nationality of Slavery and Free
Trade.”180
The tariff issue again played a prominent role in the Republican campaign.
“It is our nigger,” quipped Simon Cameron to an amused Congress. National
Republican leadership was well aware of the intensifying demands of
Pennsylvanians for a protective tariff But just in case they might need a reminder,
key editors stepped up their demands on the eve of the national convention. The
North American demanded that Chicago pay “due respect to the interests of
American labor.” Although disappointed that their favorite candidate had not been
nominated, Pennsylvania’s staunchest protectionists were apparently happy with
I Q1

the nomination of Lincoln and the adoption of a pro-tariff platform.
In response Democrats challenged the national record of the Republican
party on the tariff, especially questioning Lincoln’s commitment to protection.
“Mr. Lincoln is held up as the friend of protective policy,” observed Henry Foster,
“yet you cannot find a vote he ever gave, or a speech he ever made, wherein he
favored the doctrine of protection at all.” The Pennsylvanian asked, “if Mr.

180 Harrisburg Telegraph, September 13 (quotation), August 22, October 5, 8, 16; Pittsburgh
Gazette, March 5.
181 Cameron quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, May 24; Philadelphia North American, May 11; Bradley,
Triumph o f Militant Republicanism, 68-69.
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Lincoln is a Protective Tariff man, where in the evidence of it?” Democrats had a
legitimate case. In Congress Pennsylvania Democrats had supported the Morrill
Tariff Bill. William Bigler was one of only two Democratic Senators to vote for
its passage, while Henry Foster had traveled to Washington to try and lobby for
additional Democratic support. Centre County’s Democratic sheet took notice
claiming, while “Foster is at Washington advocating the passage of the tariff bill
and the interests of the white people of Pennsylvania, Curtin is stumping it in
Pennsylvania in behalf of niggerism and the nigger.”182
While numerous historians have concluded that Democratic efforts to
neutralize the tariff in 1860 were crucially ineffective, some contemporary
Keystone Republicans insisted that demands for higher tariffs were not vital to
their successes. Alexander McClure reported to Lincoln that “the tariff is regarded
as of no greater importance than slavery aggression: and in the [northern section
of Pennsylvania] the tariff is but tolerated, and the greatness of Freedom
overshadows all others.” In Pittsburgh, historian Michael Holt argues that the
tariff hardly registered on the political radar. Economically, Pittsburgh iron
manufactures may have actually benefited from lower tariffs. Across the state the
political draw of the tariff may have very well played itself out by 1860. The
panic of 1857 had proved to be short lived. By 1860 most displaced industrial
workers were again active in the workforce.

182 Foster quoted Erie Observer, June 10; Pennsylvanian quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, September 7;
Bellefonte Watchman quoted Harrisburg Telegraph, June 15; Erie Observer, June 10; William
Bigler’s support o f the Morrill Tariff drew widespread aplomb from Keystone Democrats. See: J.
Lawrence Getty to Bigler, June 21, John M. Marcy to Bigler, June 21, S. S. Halderman to Bigler,
June 28, Bigler papers, HSP.
183 McClure quoted in William Russell, “Alexander K. McClure,” 33. McClure did speak out
against Democratic claims that they were in favor o f higher tariffs proclaiming: “Henry D. Foster
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In addition to the crusade for a protective tariff, Pennsylvania Republicans
now consistently championed ‘progressive’ initiatives geared at dispersing
northern free labor principles. Representative Galusha Grow was the leading
proponent of a homestead bill. Allegheny County congressman James K.
Moorhead insisted that spreading industry to the South would guarantee sectional
harmony. “Let us spread and diffuse manufacturing skill throughout the states
North and South,” he declared on the floor of the House, “and we will soon find
that sectional disunion will disappear.”
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Nativism though was one issue that refused to disappear from the political
landscape. The People’s party state platform protested the importation of foreign
paupers and criminals, and criticized the prevalence of naturalization frauds at the
ballot box. Meanwhile, Douglas’s Catholic wife made him an easy target for
nativists. The most strident nativists warned that a Douglas Presidency would be
bound to the wishes of Rome. “If the Pope adopts a bad cause,” insisted the
Harrisburg Telegraph, “the Catholic is bound to sustain that cause.” The
consistent support that Catholics gave to Democrats continued to gall
Republicans. “The whole power of the Catholic Church is thrown into this contest
. . . against free principles and in favor of locofocosim,” howled the Pittsburgh
Gazette.1*5 By 1860 however, nativism cultivated far from universal acceptance
among Pennsylvania Republicans. Most newspapers insisted that Republicanism
is the deadly foe o f protection!” Harrisburg Telegraph, September 29; Holt, Forging a Majority,
277-79.
184 Moorhead quoted in, “Western Pennsylvania and the Morrill Tariff,” WPHM, 6 (April 1923),
113; Pittsburgh Gazette, March 21, June 25, 27; Philadelphia North American, May 23.
185 Harrisburg Telegraph, June 14 (quotation), July 27; Pittsburgh Gazette, April 13. Nativism was
particularly strong in the Gazette during 1860; McClure, Old Time Notes, 421-22; For Democratic
attacks on Republican nativism see: Chambersburg Valley Spirit, October 31, Pittsburgh Post,
October 9.
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had nothing to do with Know Nothingism and some even took to attacking
Democrats for their treatment of Catholics.186
Although local and state issues did occasionally surface during 1860, none
seem to have factored greatly into the final result of the campaign. In Philadelphia
Republicans praised the work of mayor Henry in improving the city’s waterworks
and parks in sharp contrast to his do-nothing Democratic predecessor. Railroad
relief bills won praise from Harrisburg Republicans, while Pittsburgh’s
Republican party seemed to now be the champion of the anti-tax movement.
Thomas Williams, who had bolted the party in 1858 over the tax issue, returned to
the fold. Democratic attempts to capitalize on western resentment against eastern
Pennsylvania railroad companies in Erie and Franklin Counties do not seem to
have had much benefit. Though local issues most likely played a crucial role in
bringing some voters to the polls, national issues predominated platforms,
newspapers, and political correspondence during I860.187
In Pennsylvania the sectional crisis was never far from the general
political discussion. “While I deprecate, as much as any man, all unnecessary
agitation of the slavery question,” a former Democrat told a Harrisburg audience,
“I cannot close my eyes against the influence of that question.” Northumberland
County’s Republican convention summed up the principles of the state party in
one resolution. It read: “We condemn the niggardly course of the so-called

186 Adams Sentinel, September 5, 12, 19; Philadelphia North American, September 28; Pittsburgh
Gazette, October 10. A local Pittsburgh Republican convention went as far as to state: “our
people, whether native or foreign by birth may depend upon us to advocate their right to secure
this country as a market for the product o f their skill and labor against foreign competition.”
Gazette, March 9.
187 Philadelphia North American, April 19; Harrisburg Telegraph, April 4, October 4, Holt,
Forging a Majority, 275; Erie Observer, October 20, Chambersburg Valley Spirit, July 25.
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Democratic party on all the great measures of the day. Their course in favor of
free trade; extension of slavery over territory now free; their sympathy in favor of
a censor, as now practiced in the South over the press opinions and free speech of
the people.” The undemocratic principles of the slave power could no longer be
tolerated in Pennsylvania. “It is time for the Northern people to consider well how
far the south have a ‘right’ to infringe on the prosperity of free labor,” demanded
the Harrisburg Telegraph.

ISS

Attacking the pro-slaveiy ties of the Democratic party remained the most
effective negative tactic employed by Keystone Republicans. “The extension of
negro slavery into the territories of the United States has become a settled policy
of the Democratic party,” proclaimed former Democrat John Hickman. “Millions
of scores of fertile lands . . . are filched from our industrial classes . . . to be
turned into barren wastes by those who have already blasted more than one half of
our soil as with an avalanche of fire.” Yet Hickman’s remarks reveal the subtleties
of the antislavery campaign. It was not the fate of the slave that resonated most
among Pennsylvania Republican converts, but the future of the nation.189
Republican attitudes about race had changed little since the Fremont
campaign. The Philadelphia North American maintained an extremely negative
impression of blacks remarking, “they are, unquestionably at present of a type far
inferior to ours in the scale of humanity, and will require many ages of culture and
development to raise them to our level.” “We fight the battle of Free White
American Labor,” insisted the Harrisburg Telegraph. Southerners were warned to
188 William Dock quoted Harrisburg Telegraph, September 27; Northumberland resolution quoted
Telegraph, June 20; Telegraph, August 13.
189 Hickman quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, July 30.
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“keep your negroes at home.” Even the muted concern that some Republicans
expressed for slaves angered some Pennsylvanians. A correspondent of Simon
Cameron complained of radical Republicans who “think more of the nigger than
they do the poor white man.” Although Keystone Republicans never allowed
slavery and the sectional problem to disappear from public discussion, they were
almost always careful to portray them as conservative or racist causes. “I am not
asking you to liberate the slaves,” insisted future Senator Edgar Cowan, “it is the
poor white men we want to liberate first.” Although Cowan and other
Pennsylvania Republicans did not claim to support slavery like some Democrats
did, white men always came first.190
As the campaign progressed conservatism seemed to be the order of the
day. Philadelphia and Harrisburg Republican leaders in particular claimed that
their party represented conservative views. More importantly, enough
Pennsylvanians had convinced themselves that the Republican party was
conservative to place it on the threshold of victory. “The Republican party, should
it triumph,” wrote diarist Sidney George Fisher “will do nothing to injure the
rights and interests of the South.” Almost no southerner could agree with this
conclusion. For, in spite of the protests of noninterference and the outbursts of
racism, the revolution had indeed come to Pennsylvania. The demand that the
spread of slavery be halted in denial of Dred Scott was radical. “Of course slavery

190 Philadelphia North American, August 31; Harrisburg Telegraph, June 18; G. R. Shaw to
Cameron, February 2, Cameron papers, DCHS; Cowan quoted in, Joseph Wolstoncraft, “Western
Pennsylvania and the Election o f 1860,” Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 6 (January,
1923), 31; William Bigler overtly supported slavery in a letter to Pittsburgh’s David Lynch, Bigler
to Lynch, December 23, 1856, Bigler papers, HSP; Meanwhile, racism remained very pungent in
almost all Democratic newspapers. See especially, Chambersburg Valley Spirit, July 25,
Pittsburgh Post, November 5.
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is an evil to be endured where it exists by law,” reminded the Harrisburg
Telegraph early in 1860, “but [it should] be resisted where it has no legal
existence, and can have none until it be legalized by the people of a sovereign
state.” “We have permitted a miserable, sectional minority too long to override
and insult the majority,” concluded Franklin County’s Republican organ. Such
pronouncements as these, and not the assurances of Sidney Fisher or
Philadelphia’s conservative North American caught the attention of
southerners.191
V
As the Republican party built upon its new found respectability,
Democrats continued to come apart, virtually guaranteeing Lincoln’s victory. The
struggle to decide which Democratic Presidential nominee was running in
Pennsylvania was never quite resolved. Throughout the campaign solid evidence
existed that most Keystone Democrats favored Douglas. Western Pennsylvanians
in particular tended to favored Douglas. “There is but one Democratic candidate
in the field” protested the Greensburg Argus, “and that is Stephen A. Douglas.”
Such devotion impeded both attempts at unity and the growth of the proBreckinridge faction. Although Breckinridge men were numerous, and enjoyed
the quiet support of the administration, an outright choice of the Vice President by
the state committee would have alienated thousands of Democratic voters, most
likely ending the still reasonable hopes that October’s state race could be won.
“Would we then sacrifice all because there exists a difference of opinion on the
191 Wainwright, Diary o f Sidney George Foster, 355; Harrisburg Telegraph, January 30; Franklin
Repository and Transcript, August 8; However even the Pittsburgh Gazette insisted that the
Republican party represented conservative issues. May 21, June 26.
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subject of the presidency?” asked Franklin County’s Democratic organ. “We must
learn to tolerate this difference.”192
Forming a joint electoral ticket that welcomed supporters of both
candidates was the only hope, but some Douglas men could not accept any such
recognition of the southern bolters. Douglas himself made no effort to secure a
fusion, instead he impeded it. The Little Giant included Pennsylvania in his
unprecedented speaking tour, attacking Breckinridge wherever he stopped. The
Erie Observer, which had usually been critical of Douglas since his break with
Buchanan, approved of little in the speech that he delivered during a driving Erie
hailstorm. “If demagogues would leave us alone,” concluded the Observer “we
would give a good account of ourselves in October and November.”
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If only the party could hold together for the governor’s race there might be
hope. Henry Foster tried to leave the presidential race out of his gubernatorial
campaign. Foster, who was a distant cousin of Breckinridge, never publicly
revealed who had his support. “The question is sometimes asked,” explained
Bucks County’s Democratic organ “is Foster a Douglas or a Breckinridge man?
We answer that outside of the Presidential question, there is no such distraction in
the Democratic party.” Democrats could hardly deny though that the Presidential
question was a giant distraction.194

192 Argus quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, July 11; Chambersburg Valley Spirit, August 22. Franklin
County’s Democratic organization officially backed Douglas, the Valley Spirit though aligned
with Breckinridge during September.
193 Erie Observer, September 29; Harrisburg Telegraph, September 8. Republicans took great
pleasure at Douglas’s decision to attack Breckinridge.
194 Doylestown Democrat quoted Pittsburgh Post, August 10.
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The state campaign committee met twice before the October election in an
attempt to resolve the Presidential question. While a July Philadelphia gathering
accomplished little, an August meeting in the tiny mountain town of Cresson was
able to produce a compromise fusion ticket. Under the agreement Democratic
voters could stipulate their preferred candidate, but the man who had the best
chance of winning would get Pennsylvania’s electoral votes in the event of the
ticket’s triumph. Breckinridge men and moderate Douglas supporters seemed
satisfied, but not every Democrat agreed to support the Cresson compromise.
Shortly after the fusion ticket appeared, a group of Douglas backers produced
their own ticket that only included the Little Giant.195 Increasingly it all seemed
pointless; the Presidential squabble had already noticeably sapped party strength.
On the eve of state elections all but the most resolute Democrats could see the
handwriting on the wall. An Indiana County Democrat bluntly asserted, “if we are
defeated in October, it will be our own fault.”196
VI
October did indeed bring defeat for the Democratic party. Andrew G.
Curtin defeated Foster by over 30,000 votes. Curtin drew an incredible 100,000
more votes than David Wilmot in 1857, earning the support of more than 260,000
Pennsylvanians. Foster’s vote was nearly equal to James Buchanan’s total four
years earlier, but accounting for the growth of the electorate, Democratic turnout
had dropped considerably. In addition to losing the governorship, Democrats

195 Henry M. Philips to James Buchanan, July 13, Buchanan papers, HSP; For the Cresson meeting
see: Pittsburgh Post, August 10, 11; Bradley, Triumph o f Militant Republicanism, 80-81; Thomas
MacDowell to William Bigler, August 10, Bigler papers, HSP.
196 J. Coulter to William Bigler, August 4, Bigler papers, HSP.
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dropped 71 out of 100 assembly seat races and ten of twelve state senate contests.
The overwhelming Republican majority was thus able to retire Senator Bigler in
early 1861. Congressional contests provided a relative bright spot, as the party
I Q 'J

won six seats, defeating two incumbents.
Nonetheless, Democratic spirits were crushed. Pittsburgh’s Democratic
organ laid the blame on the sitting President. “As poor old Mr. Buchanan has been
accused of all the crimes in the calendar, we may as well make the last entry and
place to his credit the destruction of the Democratic party.” John W. Forney
conquered: “Who is responsible [for the defeat]?” he asked in the Philadelphia
Press. The answer was a resounding “James Buchanan!” The Pittsburgh Post was
so crushed by the defeat of Foster that it pondered dissolving. Yet the most
■I Q Q

upsetting prospect was the now imminent election of Lincoln.
Immediately following the defeat the Democratic central committee
scrambled to form yet another unified electoral ticket. What became known as the
Reading ticket would make no distinction between Douglas and Breckinridge. If
the ticket should somehow triumph, the state’s electoral votes would go to the
candidate who had the best chance of winning election. With his near sweep of
the South, that would have meant Breckinridge. Yet few people seriously believed
there was any chance that Lincoln would not win easily. Adding to the nearly
insurmountable obstacles that faced Keystone Democrats, some Douglas backers

197Coleman, 140; The full vote was: Curtin-R 262,353, Foster-D 230,239. Henry Longnecker and
Benjamin Junkin went down to defeat in the normally Democratic seventh and sixteenth districts.
Berks County’s eighth district also passed back into Democratic control.
198 Pittsburgh Post, October 11 (quotation), 12, 15; Press quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, October 12.
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still refused to agree to the compromise and instead continued to circulate a
straight Douglas ticket.199
In an anticlimactic result Lincoln crushed his combined opposition and
secured the Presidency. Lincoln actually drew an even-higher vote than Curtin,
while the Reading ticket lost 50,000 Foster voters. The straight Douglas ticket
drew only about 16,500 votes, more than half of which came from Philadelphia.
Bell won 7,000 votes in Philadelphia, but drew insignificant support elsewhere.
Lincoln had made tremendous gains over Fremont in the southeastern section of
Pennsylvania, while his vote in he north and west was similar to Fremont’s.
Continuing a trend that would be a near constant during the era of the third party
system, Democrats obtained the vast majority of immigrant and Catholic voters.
Turnout was estimated at 75.2 percent.200
The magnitude of the victory quickly resonated with Republicans. “The
great North has for the first time in the political history of the country vindicated
its honor, and has shown that it despises the threats of traitors as readily as it
condemns their dangerous principles.” These words of the Pittsburgh Gazette
reveal that the election of Lincoln meant more than just a simple changing of the
guard. The Republican triumph was a victory of ideology and principle. It was a
refutation of the dough-faced Buchanan and his cronies. “‘Honest Old Abe’ and

199 Pittsburgh Post, October 10.
200 The Presidential vote was: Lincoln-R 268,030, Reading Ticket-D 178,871, Douglas Straight
16,765, Bell-CU 12,770; Turnout from Gienapp, “Politics Seems to Enter into Everything,” 19.
The governor’s race produced a turnout o f 77.7 percent.
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correct principles have crushed our opponents,” concluded a Gettysburg
Republican.201
Post-election commentaries however did not always agree on the causes of
the Republican triumph. The strength of the antislavery vote was often debated.
The Philadelphia North American felt “slavery was not the dominating idea of the
Presidential contest.” While many Republicans claimed the tariff to be their most
effective weapon, doubters existed in both parties.

Philadelphia’s leading

Republican paper even saw the election as a referendum on Whiggeiy. “The old
Whig sprit yet lives, and it is roused .. . against the same corrupt and insidious
enemy.” Attempting to determine what issues entered the minds of voters more,
seems an impossible goal. As it were, the lack of a uniform postscript to the
election has perpetuated an unproductive argument over the motives of the
electorate of 1860.203
Regardless of the motivations of the individual voter, the implications of
the Republican victory were revolutionary. “Fifteen states are without a
President,” grimly reported the Chambersburg Valley Spirit. The rise of the
Republican party had introduced an element of northern militancy into
Pennsylvania. While the strength of the Republican pseudo-militia group the
Wide Awakes may have been innocent, the explicit rejection of the recent course
of the national government was not so innocuous. As the first steps towards
secession were undertaken Pittsburgh’s leading Republican paper stood resolute.
201 Pittsburgh Gazette, November 8; Robert L. Harper to Thaddeus Stevens, November 9, Stevens
papers, LC.
202 Philadelphia North American, November 7; William L. Hirst to James Buchanan, October 12,
Buchanan papers, HSP.
203 Philadelphia North American, October 2; See also Franklin Repository, November 14.
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“The election of Lincoln, will we venture to predict, lay the ghost of disunion; but
if it should not, there will be power enough in the general government when he is
inaugurated, to crush out any insane attempt at rebellion.” Pennsylvania had made
its decision.204

204Chambersburg Valley Spirit, November, 14; Pittsburgh Gazette, October 23.

CONCLUSION

“The North can never consent to the universal dominion of Slavery in this
nation and nothing less will satisfy the South.” In this way Alexander K. McClure
grimly summed up the secession crisis in mid-December 1860. Yet McClure,
along with most Pennsylvania Republicans, were not ready to accept any of the
pending compromises that promised to sooth the South, but would most likely
wreck the Republican party. If we compromise, he concluded, “our present
victory would be fruitless.” Most Keystone Republicans agreed with McClure and
refused to support any of the reactionary measures that attempted to assuage the
South during the winter of 1860-61. Once war began Pennsylvania Republicans
gave nearly unbroken support to the military effort.
Although they had usually supported the various compromise measures,
most Keystone Democrats backed the war effort in the aftermath of Fort Sumter.
But the war only intensified the divisions within the party. By 1863 the
copperhead/peace faction of the party predominated. Pennsylvania’s Democratic
party included some of the most reactionary antiwar activists in the North. They
came perilously close to controlling government. Yet when military victory
205 McClure to James McPherson, December 14, McPherson papers, LC.
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eventually came, the record of opposition seriously hurt Democrats. After 1865
Democratic victories in Pennsylvania were few and far between.
Despite suffering a setback in the 1862 congressional election and losing
control of the legislative assembly for two years, the Republican party—which
continued to run under the moniker of People’s or Union party—for the most part
maintained its power during the Civil War. Andrew G. Curtin secured a narrow
reelection in 1863 and provided able leadership throughout the War. Simon
Cameron served a stormy tenure as Secretary of War—David Wilmot replaced
him in the Senate—and then labored as Minister to Russia, before returning to
Pennsylvania to help in Lincoln’s reelection in 1864. Ultimately, Cameron
secured firm control over Pennsylvania’s Republic party. Curtin lost his feud with
Cameron and was eventually forced out of the party. By then the sectional issues
that ignited the Civil War had faded from the headlines, however, the Republican
party now dominated Pennsylvania politics.206

Between 1854 and 1860 the second party system came to an end in
Pennsylvania and the third party system was bom. A myriad of forces combined
to terminate the old condition and create the new pattern of politics. Nativism,
temperance, slavery, and voter apathy, helped destroy the Whig party and
destabilize the Democratic party. Over the course of two years two separate
national organizations struggled to create a new anti-Democratic party.
Democrats, on the other hand, sought to reestablish their base and secure alienated

206 For coverage o f wartime politics see: Erwin S. Bradley, Triumph o f Militant Republicanism,
and Arnold M. Shankman, The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement.
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former Whigs. At first the Know Nothing movement and the American party were
more successful than Free Soilers and Republicans in forming an opposition
party. However, the American party was tom asunder by its transformation from a
nativist/antiparty organization to a national conservative anti-Democratic party.
Although the original precepts of Know Nothingism remained vibrant, the
American party proved a stagnant ephemeral force. Though initially burdened by
the state’s lack of a stridently antislavery electorate, the Republican party
eventually benefited both from American party erosion and Democratic
blundering. The intensification of the sectional crisis brought the Republican
party instant credibility.
Yet, Republican victory came relatively late to Pennsylvania. The strength
of the Fillmore movement in southeastern and central Pennsylvania, combined
with the inflated performance of the Democratic party under state-favorite James
Buchanan, resulted in a lop-sided defeat in 1856. The party’s first gubernatorial
race the next year served only to establish the party as the uncontested opposition
to seemingly entrenched Democracy. However, the almost perpetual tumult of the
1850’s left Democrat’s hold on power tenuous at best. Economic malaise, placid
leadership, and dough-faced submission to increasingly outrageous southern
demands marred the Buchanan Presidency. Meanwhile, Republicans had finally
crushed their conservative/nativist competitors and secured a more coherent
response to local and state issues. Republicans-reinvented in the guise of the
People’s party-additionally expanded into economics, grabbing hold of the
protectionist cause. The expansion of the Republican identity helped produce just
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enough new converts in 1858 to overwhelm a now stammering Democratic party.
The drop in party turnout between 1856 and 1858 resulted in the worst defeat in
Keystone Democratic history. The unity of ’56 would never quite return.
Although Democrats regrouped admirably by 1860, the bitter national
breakup of the party that year all but guaranteed defeat. In a surprising reversal of
1856, the Republican Presidential candidate crushed a divided selection of
opponents. While the Pennsylvania Republican party maintained an unwavering
opposition to the spread of slavery, it insisted that such a position was
conservative. The well-chosen slate of officers combined with the inclusive nature
of the new party platform convinced many Pennsylvanians that the South would
accept Republican victory. Yet the party’s own rhetoric belied such reasoning. As
Alexander McClure observed, the North would not stand to see slavery thrive, but
the South could accept nothing less. In 1860 Pennsylvania, wittingly or not, chose
its side. Thus a tradition of looking both ways, of refuting radicalism, and serving
as a bulwark of Unionism came to an end. The means were varied compared to
other northern states, but the result was the same.

Antebellum politics encompassed a wide array of ideologies and interests.
An incredible range of passions and prejudices motivated the electorate and drove
them to the polls. Some voters were moved by self-interested economics; others
sought to produce an imposition of their own values on others, while many voted
only to ‘throw the rascals out.’ It is impossible to know for sure why a majority of
Pennsylvanians voted for the Republican party in 1860. Yet party ideology does
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give us some basic insights. The words of politicians and editors and the
principles of official platforms mattered much more during the Civil War era than
in today’s cynical world. The vast majority of antebellum political historians
continue to insist that voters followed their party because they believed in its
principles. Although religious and ethnic groups tended to stay loyal to certain
parties, their loyalty was heavily tied to the supportive ideology of that party.
Catholics supported Democrats because of their commitment to religious freedom
in the face of opposition bigotry. Evangelical reformers tended to support Whigs
and later Republicans, because they shared many of the same goals. Thus,
ideology remains central.
During the 1850’s the majority of the electorate of Gettysburg switched its
allegiance from the Whig party to the Republican party. In the process they broke
with their Maryland neighbors. Though possessing virtually identical economies
and harboring a very similar population, the two communities had one major
difference, their willingness to accept the fundamentally antislavery Republican
party. Though the personal feelings of Gettysburg voters will never be fully
known, the ideology of their party of choice is undeniable. Support of a
progressive tariff, or agreement with railroad legislation, perhaps even antiCatholic prejudice, may have been the primary motivators during those critical
elections of October and November 1860, but the resulting blow against the slave
power and the Union proved more lasting.
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APPENDIX
Electoral Returns by County
Black-D 167,010
Smyser-W 78,571

1854 Supreme Court Election

Baird-KN 120,576

Adams

1,952
914

1,343

Allegheny

5,351
4,313

5,705

Armstrong

1,932
783

1,663

Beaver

1,460
1,107

1,290

Bedford

2,053
1,228

836

Berks

8,256
2,474

2,794

Blair

1,445
487

2,205

Bradford

2,701
2,014

1,885

Bucks

5,148
2,818

2,366

Butler

2,374
1,656

1,189

Cambria

1,705
761

810

Carbon

1,229
231

784

Centre

2,133
349

2,341

Chester

4,564
3,726

2,670

Clarion

2,183
95

1,981

Clearfield

1,391
382

900

Clinton

948
305

1,182

Columbia

2,147
1,660

966

Crawford

2,609
1,663

1,744

Cumberland

2,651
1,401

2,018

Dauphin

2,292
missing

2,553

Delaware

1,581
1,379

886

Elk

344
11

373

Erie

2,389
1,494

1,694

Fayette

2,354
73

3,377

Franklin

2,761
1,457

2.144
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Fulton

877
308

387

Greene

1,972
204

1,325

Huntingdon

1,416
585

1,997

Indiana

1,223
1,356

1,140

Jefferson

945
120

1,497

Juniata

1,176
814

359

Lancaster

4,738
5,676

5,564

Lawrence

Lebanon

1,590
1.401

1,209

Luzerne

4,297
1,030

McKean

996
1,566

902

Lehigh

3,092
1,725

1,251

3,572

Lycoming

2,274
260

2,440

469
284

30

Mercer

2,513
1,514

851

Mifflin

1,292
641

940

Monroe

1,894
213

223

Montgomery

5,530
3,140

1,954

Montour

948
295

388

Northampton

3,758
679

2,241

Northumberland 2,185
806

945

Perry

1,464
143

1,893

Philadelphia

25,446
5,872

22,104

Pike

631
88

51

Potter

538
460

214

Schuylkill

5,377
896

3,451

Somerset

1,451
1,406

1,118

Sullivan

407
114

169

Susquehanna

2,133
1,069

1,308

Tioga

1.402
782

1,474

Union

1,842
2,010

707

Venango

1,413
285

1,259

Warren

1,048
722

543

Washington

3,509
1,931

2,322

Wayne

1,769
515

709
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Westmoreland 3,297
1,096

2,433 Wyoming

York

4,044

4,612
731

857
237

765
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1855 Canal Commission Election

Plummer-D 161,281
Nicholson-A 149,745

Adams

1,784
1,679

Allegheny

6,740
5,877

2,357

Armstrong

1,633
2,148

Beaver

1,334
1,107

581

Bedford

1,667
1,791

Berks

6,948
3,264

Blair

1,465
2,392

Bradford

2,476
4,173

Bucks

5,328
4,123

Butler

2,182
2,582

Cambria

2,063
1,437

Carbon

1,187
519

Centre

1,851
2,033

Chester

4,460
4,668

Clarion

2,154
1,508

Clearfield

1,409
1,018

Clinton

934
996

10

Columbia

1,635
984

Crawford

2,015
2,091

791

Cumberland

2,399
2,660

Dauphin

2,292
3,021

Delaware

1,581
1,379

12

Elk

350
236

14

Erie

1,698
2,113

471

Fayette

2,620
2,312

12

Franklin

2,411
2,860

Fulton

822
609

Greene

1,997
1,393

Huntingdon

1,194
1,920

Indiana

667
2,315

Jefferson

1,089
1,043

Juniata

837
1,023

121

Williamson-R 7,226
Misc.
6,383

120

586

Lancaster

5,099
5,301

0

Lawrence

864
1,197

Lebanon

1,865
2,256

0

Lehigh

3,394
2,633

Luzerne

3,957
3,571

0

Lycoming

2,266
2,034

McKean

265
455

0

Mercer

1,635
1,808

Mifflin

1,310
1,382

0

Monroe

1,327
531

Montgomery

5,207
3,573

4

Montour

920
438

Northampton

3,738
2,443

0

Northumberland 1,983
1,041

Perry

1,332
1,539

0

Philadelphia

28,384
25,770

Pike

614
64

8

Potter

436
634

0
2,082

Snyder

819
1,090

Schuylkill

5,012
. 1,775

Somerset

1,481
2,050

0

Sullivan

347
292

Susquehanna

1,579
2,164

0

Tioga

1,381
1,723

Union

793
1,500

0

Venango

1,501
1,468

Warren

717
958

122

Washington

3,182
3,214

Wayne

1,594
1,420

0

Westmoreland 3,547
3,200

Wyoming

529
794

0

York

4,349
4,138

138
1856 Congressional Elections
I
Florence-D
Knight-U

9,495
7,275

XII
J. Montgomery-D 10,442
Smith-U
7,657

XXIII
Stewart-U
8,552
Cunningham-D 5,467

6,411
6,018

XII
Dimmick-D
Dimk-U

11,235
5,065

XXIV
Gillis-D
Myers-U

9,785
9,114

7,933
6,753

XIV
Grow-U
Sheward-D

13,325
5,361

XXV
Dick-U
McFadden-D

8,944
4,215

n
Morris-U
Marshall-D
HI
Landy-D
Millward-U
IV
Phillips-D
Forts-A
Kelley-R
V
O. Jones-D
Mulvany-U
VI
Hickman-D
Bowen-U

9,279
6,560
2,457

9,674
7,961

8,024
7,851

vn
Chapman-D
Bradshaw-U
VIE
J. Jones-D
Yoder-U
IX
Edwards-U
Heister-D
X
Kunkel-U
Eyer-D
XI
Dewart-D
Campbell-U

10,321
8,789

9,951
3,947

10,001
8,320

9,227
7,360

8,959
6,418

XV
White-D
Irwin-U

9,980
9,450

XVI
Ahl-D
Todd-U

11,191
9,670

XVII
Reilly-D
Pumroy-U

10,224
9,715

XVIII
Eddie-U
Pershing-D

8,792
8,508

XIX
Covode-U
McKinely-D

10,409
8,724

XX
Montgomery-D 10,256
Knight-U
9,411
XXI
Ritchie-U
McCams

7,647
5,944

XXII
Purviance-U
Gibson-D

6,840
4,854
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1856 Presidential Election

Buchanan-D
Fremont-R

230,700
147,510

Fillmore-A 55,838-26,338

Adams

2,837
1,120

24-1,225

Allegheny

9,062
13,671

898-608

Armstrong

2,680
3,076

75-113

Beaver

I,905
2,658

183-103

Bedford

2,458
306

152-1,784

Berks

II,272
1,037

304-3,282

Blair

2,080
445

667-1,853

Bradford

2,314
6,933

71-30

Bucks

6,517
4,682

316-419

Butler

2,648
3,401

67-14

107-867

Carbon

1,868

156-309

Cambria

2,987
804

692

Centre

2,895
390

552-1,400

Clarion

2,760
788

6-944

Clinton

1,485
618

Crawford

Chester

6,333
6,308

828-620

Clearfield

1,678
756

93-550

34-648

Columbia

2,888
1,139

6-214

3,891
5,360

41-4

Cumberland

3,437
1,472

14-1,565

Dauphin

3,093
1,614

106-2,330

Delaware

2,005
1,000

791-319

Elk

676
265

7-45

Erie

2,584
5,157

252-37

Fayette

3,554
2,889

45-1,228

Franklin

3,469
2,336

16-1,327

Fulton

970
149

6-561

Greene

2,447
l'321

14-272

Huntingdon

2,164
926

737-908

Indiana

1,762
2,625

32-218

Jefferson

1,463
1,163

32-683

Juniata

1,565
480

160-597
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Lancaster

8,781
6,608

977-3,616

Lawrence

1,220
3,067

86-11

Lebanon

2,393
2,348

41-648

Lehigh

4,428
2,237

21-91

Luzerne

6,791
4,850

563-305

Lycoming

McKean

526
812

40-7

Mercer

2,899
3,686

103-16

Mifflin

1,491
216

61-989

Monroe

2,276
560

12-67

Montgomery

7.134
2,846

1,778-492

Montour

Northampton

5,260
1,168

Perry

2.135
521

Pike

862
270

5-10

Potter

667
1,264

2-4

Schuylkill

7,035
2,188

367-2,315

Snyder

1,265
943

49-1,404

Somerset

1,763
1,458

1-1,404

Sullivan

538
309

5-33

Susquehanna

2,548
3,861

43-8

Tioga

1,368
4,541

20-7

Union

1,092
1,429

15-171

Venango

2,157
2,041

7-65

Warren

1,231
2,091

47-2

Washington

4,288
4,237

128-137

Wayne

2,259
2,059

113-69

Westmoreland

5,172
4,202

66-283

Wyoming

1,171
1,138

57-17

York

1,994-644

657-750

3,824
934

1,271
666

70-1,700

11-138

Northumberland 3,059
566

244-1,090

Philadelphia

11,860-12,218

38,222
7,892

6,879
512

1,001-3,300
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1857 Governorship Race

Packer
Wilmot

188,887
146,136

Hazlehurst 28,132

Adams

2,363
1,900

59

Allegheny

6,610
7,687

Armstrong

2,409
2,106

111

Beaver

1.557
1,999

Bedford

2,338
1,568

398

Berks

8,722
2,750

Blair

1,819
1,450

569

Bradford

2,082
5,642

Bucks

5,747
4,801

101

Butler

2,361
2,831

47

Cambria

2,379
1,042

165

Carbon

1.557
672

153

Centre

2,663
2,145

35

Chester

5,388
5,269

524

Clarion

2,132
987

23

Clearfield

1,459
725

235

Clinton

1,464
1,083

18

Columbia

1,464
1,144

30

Crawford

2,576
3,514

Cumberland

3,078
2,466

58

Dauphin

3,109
2,656

Delaware

1,598
1,614

609

Elk

502
276

Erie

1,995
3,305

143

Fayette

3,104
2,520

80

Forest

65
75

Franklin

3,186
3,058

91

Fulton

817
570

Greene

2,034
1,000

Huntingdon

1,749
1,678

248

Indiana

1,438
2,650

Jefferson

1,268
1,125

54

600

26

856

874

142
Juniata

1,108
1,035

20

Lancaster

6,486
7,698

1,236

Lawrence

993
1,992

64

Lebanon

1,990
2,664

182

Lehigh

3,805
2,957

9

Luzerne

5,268
3,536

214

Lycoming

2,872
1,701

348

McKean

496
565

Mercer

2,539
2,928

49

Mifflin

1,532
1,217

104

Monroe

2,254
504

5

Montgomery

5,448
2,608

1,386

Montour

1,080
568

71

Northampton

4.097
1,111

1,010

Northumberland 2,821
974

490

Perry

1,965
1,564

161

Philadelphia

14,405 Pike

758
190

12

581

27,749
10,001

Potter

495
957

4

Schuylkill

5,950
3.097

Snyder

999
989

81

Somerset

1,741
2,277

Sullivan

494
265

0

Susquehanna

2,419
3,224

Tioga

1,193
3,234

0

Union

971
1,275

Venango

1,900
1,790

2

Warren

899
1,368

Washington

3,752
3,614

142

Wayne

1,992
1,691

49

Westmoreland 4,361
3,448

27

Wyoming

1,226
995

12

York

1.332

5,314
1,778

16
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1858 Congressional
I
Florence-D
Ryan-P
Nebg-AL
II
Morris-P
Martin-D
III
Verree-P
Landy-D
IV
Millward-P
Phillips-D
V .
Wood-P
O. Jones-D
VI
Hickman-AL
Manley-D
Broomall-P

6,823
6,492
2,442

5,653
4,030

6,977
5,834

9,749
6,451

9,701
7,209

6,786
5,185
4,676

vn
Longnecker-P
Roberts-D

8,324
8,076

VIII
Schwartz-P
J. Jones-D

7,321
7,302

IX
Stevens-P
Hopkins-D

9,513
6,341

X
Killinger-P
Weidle-D

8,897
5,589

XI
Campbell-P
Dewart-D
Cake-AL

7,153
4,387
3,614

let Returns
XII
Scranton-P
10,023
McRenyolds-D 6,186

Hall-P
Gillis-D

8,905
8,111

XII
Dimmick-D
Shoemaker-P

8,009
6,566

XXV
Babbitt-P
Marshall-D

6,306
4,113

XIV
Grow-P
Parkhurst-D

11,165
3,359

XV
Hale-P
White-D

9,238
7,349

XVI
Junkin-P
Fisher-D

8,655
8,600

XVII
McPherson-P
Reilly-D

9,348
9,081

XVIII
Blair-P
Pershing-D

9,114
6,679

XIX
Covode-P
Foster-D

9,257
8,165

XXIV

XX
Montgomery-AL 9,254
Knight-D
5,798
XXI
Moorhead-P
6,539
Burke-D
XXII
McKnight-P
5,438
Williams-AT 3,903
Birmingham-D 502

4,879

144
1859 Auditor General Election

Wright-D
Cochran-R

164,544
181,835

Adams

2,538
2,529

Allegheny

4,720
7,934

Armstrong

1,943
2,282

Beaver

1,131
1,756

Bedford

2,147
2,011

Berks

7,444
6,251

Blair

1,449
2,600

Bradford

1.639
3,743

Bucks

5,159
5,172

Butler

1,514
2,075

Cambria

1,868
1,593

Carbon

1.640
1,491

Centre

2,233
2,446

Chester

4,044
5,066

Clarion

1,216
532

Clearfield

1,448
1,129

Clinton

1,600
1,226

Columbia

1,782
1,005

Crawford

2,141
2,766

Cumberland

3,224
2,921

Dauphin

2,217
3,331

Delaware

1,280
2,097

Elk

411
317

Erie

1,119
2,325

Fayette

2,824
2,676

Forest

Franklin

3,267
3,692

Fulton

851
716

Greene

1,596
785

Huntingdon

1,774
2,264

Indiana

827
1,922

Jefferson

851
1,071

30
37 .

145
Juniata

1,309
1,223

Lancaster

Lawrence

526
1,351

Lebanon

1,280
2,451

Lehigh

3,856
2,613

Luzerne

5,936
5,071

Lycoming

2,949
2,599

McKean

587
600

Mercer

2,225
2,770

Mifflin

1,439
1,372

Monroe

1,777
409

Montgomery

5,056
4,535

Montour

1,154
602

Northampton

4,077
2,797

Perry

2,052
2,070

Northumberland 2,159
1,602

3,433

7,602

Philadelphia

26,366
29,525

Pike

721
135

Potter

502
948

Schuylkill

4,534
4,879

Snyder

737
1,286

Somerset

1,190
2,187

Sullivan

525
324

Susquehanna

2,091
2,807

Tioga

1,042
1,940

Union

840
1,363

Venango

1,837
2,622

Warren

757
1,139

Washington

3,390
3,745

Wayne

1,949
1,609

Wyoming

945
751

Westmoreland 4,163
3,803
York

5,203
4,983
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1860 Governor’s Election

Foster-D
Curtin-R

230,239
262,353

Adams

2,849
2,773

Allegheny

9,190
15,879

Armstrong

2,698
3,744

Beaver

1.715 <
2,682

Bedford

2,561
2,469

Berks

10,318
6,833

Blair

2,172
3,051

Bradford

2,328
6,664

Bucks

6,330
6,383

Butler

2,548
3,526

Cambria

2,583
2,177

Carbon

1,930
1,722

Centre

2,824
3,165

Chester

5,913
7,540

Clarion

2,297
1,795

Clearfield

2,040
1,756

Clinton

1,703
1,750

Columbia

2,586
1,848

Crawford

3,187
5,277

Cumberland

3.716
3,625

Dauphin

3,302
4.555

Delaware

1,996
3,183

Elk

633
421

Erie

2,469
6,813

Fayette

3.556
3,382

Forest

69
129

Franklin

3,379
4,053

Fulton

851
716

Greene

2,669
1,529

Huntingdon

2,114
3,070

Indiana

1,886
3,672

Jefferson

1,493
1,886

147
Juniata

1,465
1,503

Lancaster

7,153
13,012

Lawrence

959
2,645

Lebanon

2,234
3,847

Lehigh

4,566
4,166

Luzerne

6,916
6,682

Lycoming

3,034
3,615

McKean

706
1,048

Mercer

2,794
3,624

Mifflin

1,490
1,723

Monroe

2,163
822

Montgomery

7,392
5,812

Montour

1,220
983

Northampton

5,249
3,507

Perry

2,128
2,416

Northumberland 2,955
2,429
Philadelphia

42,119
40,233

Pike

843
324

Potter

615
1,410

Schuylkill

7,067
7,301

Snyder

1,134
1,704

Somerset

1,372
2,977

Sullivan

543
394

Susquehanna

2,456
4,110

Tioga

1,331
4,147

Union

1,019
1,820

Venango

2,142
2,581

Warren

1,172
2,112

Washington

4,206
4,768

Wayne

2,537
2,610

Wyoming

1,336
1,192

Westmoreland 5,276
a

York

Q 'in

6,665
5,322
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1860 Presidential Election

Reading-D

178,871

Douglas

16,765

Lincoln-R

268,030

Bell

12,776

Adams

2,644
2,724

36
38

Allegheny

6,725
16,725

523
570

Armstrong

1,621
2,824

5
50

Beaver

1,621
2,842

4
58

Bedford

2,224
2,505

14
86

Berks

8,846
6,709

420
130

Blair

1,275
3,050

239
397

Bradford

2,188
7,091

9
22

Bucks

5,174
6,443

487
95

Butler

2,332
3,646

13
22

Cambria

1,643
2,277

110
124

Carbon

1,301
1,758

369
21

Centre

2,423
3,021

26
16

Chester

5,008
7,771

263
202

Clarion

2,078
1,829

0
12

Clearfield

1,836
1,702

0
23

Clinton

1,244
1,736

72
0

Columbia

2,366
1,873

86
14

'

Crawford

2,961
5,779

62
22

Cumberland

3,183
3,593

26
147

Dauphin

2,392
4,531

195
169

Delaware

1,500
3,181

195
169

Elk

523
407

0
0

Erie

2,531
6,160

17
90

Fayette

3,308
3,454

24
147

Forest

47
107

0
0

Franklin

2,515
4,151

622
76

Fulton

911
788

1
49

Greene

2,665
1,614

26
17

Huntingdon

1,622
3,089

55
22

Indiana

1,347
3,910

0
22

Jefferson

1,134
1,704

6
5
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Juniata

1,147
1,494

1
62

Lancaster

5,135
13,352

728
446

Lawrence

788
2,937

16
31

Lebanon

1,917
3,868

10
103

Lehigh

4,094
4,170

145
52

Luzerne

6,803
7,300

0
0

Lycoming

2,402
3,494

187
91

McKean

591
1,077

0
2

Mercer

2,546
3,855

2
49

Mifflin

1,189
1,701

83
36

Monroe

1,262
844

291
0

Montgomery

5,590
5,826

509
690

Montour

786
1,043

311
4

Northampton

4,597
3,839

115
171

97
72

Perry

1,743
2,371

8
38

Northumberland 2,306
2,422
Philadelphia

21,619
39,223

9,274
7,131

Pike

831
381

0
1

Potter

521
1,545

0
0

Schuylkill

4,968
7,568

422
139

Snyder

910
1,678

60
5

Somerset

1,175
3,218

1
10

Sullivan

497
429

0
1

Susquehanna

2,548
4,470

2
6

Tioga

1,278
4,754

11
9

Union

812
1,824

28
6

Venango

1,932
2,680

6
6

Warren

1,087
2,284

4
0

Washington

3,975
4,724

8
91

Wayne

2,618
2,857

0
2

Westmoreland 4,796
4,887

13
13

Wyoming

1,237
1,286

8
0

York

562
574

5,497
5,128
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1848 Presidential Result by County
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1854 Governorship Result by County
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1855 Canal Commission Result by County
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1856 Presidential Result by County
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1857 Governorship Result by County
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1 8 5 8 Congressional Result by County and District Figure 11
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